plain wording clause in Illinois

13 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1949–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen scotus · 1993 · cited in 10 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2001–2025 2 sentences 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 4 No. 1-24-0530 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 18 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).	9	10
Haage v. Zavalagreen ill · 2021 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 2 sentences 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 4 No. 1-24-0530 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 18 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).	2	2
Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkeygreen scotus · 2013 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 2 sentences 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 4 No. 1-24-0530 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 2025Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013). ¶ 18 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).	2	2
People v. Boclairgreen ill · 2002 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015 2 sentences 2015People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 100 (2002). ¶ 21 The defendant’s remaining point on appeal is that he received ineffective assistance from his posttrial appointed counsel at his Krankel hearing. 2014People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 100 (2002). ¶ 21 The defendant's remaining point on appeal is that he received ineffective assistance from his posttrial appointed counsel at his Krankel hearing.	2	2
Moskowitz v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.green illappct · 2002 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004Ed. 2d 387, 396 , 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993)." Moskowitz v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA. , 329 Ill. 2004Ed. 2d 387, 396 , 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993).” Moskowitz v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA., 329 Ill.	2	2
Giangiulio v. Ingalls Memorial Hospitalgreen illappct · 2006 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021See Giangiulio v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 365 Ill.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

Case	Cited	Years
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine green ill · 2001 2 sentences 2004Where the statute or regulation contains language expressly preempting state law, '"the task of statutory construction must * focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent."' Sprietsma , 197 Ill. 2d at 120-21 , quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 664 , 123 L. 2004Where the statute or regulation contains language expressly preempting state law, ‘ “the task of statutory construction must * focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ Sprietsma, 197 Ill. 2d at 120-21 , quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 , 123 L.	4	2002–2004
Village of Mundelein v. Wisconsin Central Railroad green ill · 2008 1 sentence 2021If the federal statute contains an express exemption provision, “the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transportation, 507 U.S. at 664 ; Village of Mundelein, 227 Ill. 2d at 289 . ¶ 73 HIPAA and the Privacy Rule establish a uniform federal floor or baseline of privacy protection for PHI, which states are free to exceed.	1	2021–2021
Larimore v. Larimore neutral illappct · 1939 1 sentence 1949In Larimore v. Larimore, 299 Ill.	1	1949–1949

Where else courts name it

IL 13 (1949–2025) CA 12 (1996–2025) PA 7 (2011–2025) NY 7 (1986–2026) WA 6 (1995–2016) FL 6 (1963–2017) OH 5 (1994–2025) NM 4 (1986–2021) TX 4 (1994–2021) AZ 4 (1981–2014) MN 4 (2000–2016) NC 4 (1974–2025) WI 3 (1983–2018) NV 3 (2011–2024) KS 3 (2015–2018) LA 3 (1987–2000) KY 2 (2023–2025) OR 2 (2002–2007) AL 2 (2003–2015) MI 2 (1997–2014) NH 2 (2021–2021) AR 2 (2009–2025) IN 2 (2019–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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