plain wording clause (California) · Go Syfert
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plain wording clause in California

12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Wyeth v. Levinegreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2016
2 sentences

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

44
In Re Tobacco Cases IIgreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2016
2 sentences

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

44
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trustgreen
scotus · 2016 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2025
2 sentences

2025FAAAA was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.” (Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021 .) However, “[i]f a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060 ; accord, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016) 579 U.S. 115, 125 .) “The pre

2025FAAAA was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.” (Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021 .) However, “[i]f a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060 ; accord, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016) 579 U.S. 115, 125 .) “The pre

33
Assurance Wireless USA, L.P. v. Alice Reynoldsgreen
ca9 · 2024 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025Wireless USA, L.P. v. Reynolds (9th Cir. 2024) 100 F.4th 1024, 1032, fn. 4 ; see R.J.

2025Wireless USA, L.P. v. Reynolds (9th Cir. 2024) 100 F.4th 1024, 1032, fn. 4 ; see R.J.

22
English v. General Electric Co.green
scotus · 1990 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2016
2 sentences

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

22
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marinegreen
scotus · 2002 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2016
2 sentences

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

2016(Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 51 , 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194 ].) First, the question of preemption *895 ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ (In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1265 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 163 P.3d 106 ], quoting English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 79 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 65 , 110 S.Ct. 2270 ]; see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at p. 565 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1194 ] [‘ “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” ’].) If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statuto

22
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'ngreen
scotus · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

22
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc.green
ca1 · 2011 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’ [Citations.] If a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must

22
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.green
scotus · 1992 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

22
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolensgreen
scotus · 1995 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

2014Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364, 368 [ 169 L.Ed.2d 933 , 128 S.Ct. 989 ] (Rowe); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens (1995) 513 U.S. 219, 222-223 [ 130 L.Ed.2d 715 , 115 S.Ct. 817 ] (Wolens) [construing similar express preemption clause of the ADA]; Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383-384 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 157 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 ] (Morales) [same].) We recently observed that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘two cornerstones’ of federal preemption analysis. [Citation.] First, the question of preemption ‘ “fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.” ’

22
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen
scotus · 1993 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–2007
2 sentences

2007Even if some form of a presumption against preemption survives these cases in situations touching on foreign affairs, it does not affect the outcome here because, as we shall discuss, even without an antipreemption presumption, we find no basis for preemption. 6 Where a statute “contains an express pre-emption clause, our ‘task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” (Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 62-63, quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easte

2007Even if some form of a presumption against preemption survives these cases in situations touching on foreign affairs, it does not affect the outcome here because, as we shall discuss, even without an antipreemption presumption, we find no basis for preemption. 6 Where a statute “contains an express pre-emption clause, our ‘task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” (Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 62-63, quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easte

22
Simmons v. Lamarquegreen
scotus · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Code, § 1466, subd. (a)(2).) 2 that power by enacting an express preemption provision, or courts may infer preemption under one or more of three implied preemption doctrines: conflict, obstacle, or field preemption.” (Ibid.) “In both express and implied preemption cases, whether preemption will be found in a given case depends foremost on congressional intent.” (Ibid.) “If a statute contains an express pre-emption clause, our task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress‟ pre-emptive

11
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Koppers Co.green
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996(Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Koppers Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 599, 603 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 257 ].) Since section 409 contains an express preemption clause, . . the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” (CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood (1993) 507 U.S. 658, 664 [ 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 396 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 ].) As it pertains to this case, section 409 covers (1) reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data; (2) compiled or collected; (3) for the purpose of ident

1996(Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Koppers Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 599, 603 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 257 ].) Since section 409 contains an express preemption clause, . . the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” (CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood (1993) 507 U.S. 658, 664 [ 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 396 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 ].) As it pertains to this case, section 409 covers (1) reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data; (2) compiled or collected; (3) for the purpose of ident

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Brown v. Mortensen green
cal · 2011
2 sentences

2025FAAAA was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.” (Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021 .) However, “[i]f a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060 ; accord, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016) 579 U.S. 115, 125 .) “The pre

2025FAAAA was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.” (Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021 .) However, “[i]f a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060 ; accord, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016) 579 U.S. 115, 125 .) “The pre

52014–2025
Allen Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. green
ca9 · 2020
2 sentences

2025FAAAA was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.” (Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021 .) However, “[i]f a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060 ; accord, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016) 579 U.S. 115, 125 .) “The pre

2025FAAAA was first “tempered by ‘the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,’ particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.” (Miller, supra, 976 F.3d at p. 1021 .) However, “[i]f a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1060 ; accord, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust (2016) 579 U.S. 115, 125 .) “The pre

22025–2025
Friends of Eel River v. North Coast Ry. Auth. green
cal · 2017
1 sentence

2022“When express preemption is claimed, the court’s ‘task is to “identify the domain expressly pre- empted.” [Citation.] To do so, we focus first on the statutory language, “which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”’” (Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority (2017) 3 Cal.5th 677, 704 .) “Indeed, in all preemption cases, whether express or implied preemption is claimed, the fundamental 12 question regarding the scope of preemption is one of congressional intent.” (Ibid.) “‘If a statute “contains an express pre-emption clause, our ‘task of sta

12022–2022
People Ex Rel. Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. neutral
calctapp · 2016
1 sentence

2022Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 884, 895 .) “There is also a second rule that may be relevant to an analysis in preemption cases, namely, ‘“‘“the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”’”’” (Ibid.) “This is known as the presumption against preemption . . . .” (Ibid.) 2.

12022–2022
National Meat Assn. v. Harris green
scotus · 2012
2 sentences

2014Code, § 1466, subd. (a)(2).) 2 that power by enacting an express preemption provision, or courts may infer preemption under one or more of three implied preemption doctrines: conflict, obstacle, or field preemption.” (Ibid.) “In both express and implied preemption cases, whether preemption will be found in a given case depends foremost on congressional intent.” (Ibid.) “If a statute contains an express pre-emption clause, our task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress‟ pre-emptive

2014Code, § 1466, subd. (a)(2).) 2 that power by enacting an express preemption provision, or courts may infer preemption under one or more of three implied preemption doctrines: conflict, obstacle, or field preemption.” (Ibid.) “In both express and implied preemption cases, whether preemption will be found in a given case depends foremost on congressional intent.” (Ibid.) “If a statute contains an express pre-emption clause, our task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress‟ pre-emptive

12014–2014
Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. green
cal · 2007
1 sentence

2012Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 935 .) Where, as here, “express preemption arises when Congress ‘ define[s] explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. [Citation.] Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, [citation], and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 936.) “Where a statute ‘contains an express pre-emption clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the

12012–2012
H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc., Dba Justin Boot Company, a Texas Corporation v. George Deukmejian, Governor of the State of California green
ca9 · 1983
2 sentences

2007Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 758 , and Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 760 , as addressing only express preemption.

2007Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 758 , and Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 760 , as addressing only express preemption.

12007–2007
Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc., a California Corporation v. George Deukmejian, Governor of the State of California green
ca9 · 1983
1 sentence

2007Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 758 , and Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 760 , as addressing only express preemption.

12007–2007

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 49u.s.c.14501 (5) USC § 49u.s.c.41713 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 13 (1949–2025) CA 12 (1996–2025) PA 7 (2011–2025) NY 7 (1986–2026) WA 6 (1995–2016) FL 6 (1963–2017) OH 5 (1994–2025) NM 4 (1986–2021) TX 4 (1994–2021) AZ 4 (1981–2014) MN 4 (2000–2016) NC 4 (1974–2025) WI 3 (1983–2018) NV 3 (2011–2024) KS 3 (2015–2018) LA 3 (1987–2000) KY 2 (2023–2025) OR 2 (2002–2007) AL 2 (2003–2015) MI 2 (1997–2014) NH 2 (2021–2021) AR 2 (2009–2025) IN 2 (2019–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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