spoliation claim in Indiana

2025Precedent First, from a jurisprudential perspective, Indiana courts have long interpreted the MMA as encompassing a variety of tortious conduct committed by a healthcare provider against a patient, not just conduct resulting in bodily injury or death.6 In Howard Regional Health System v. Gordon, for example, we held that the plaintiffs’ spoliation claim fell within the purview of the MMA. 952 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ind. 2011).

2020Our supreme court first addressed the spoliation claim and determined that the maintenance of health records was within the purview of the MMA because the “skillful, accurate, and ongoing maintenance of test and treatment records bears strongly on subsequent treatment and diagnosis of patients.” Id. at 186 .

2024In Glotzbach, we observed that an “explicit written request from the employee’s attorney to preserve the evidence” could support recognizing a spoliation claim. 854 N.E.2d at 340 .

2017See generally Glotzbach v. Froman , 854 N.E.2d 337 , 340 (Ind. 2006) (observing that "an explicit written request from the employee's attorney to preserve the evidence" supports recognition of a spoliation claim). [24] Dr. Flenar points out that Shirey, in responding to the motion for summary judgment, did not designate any evidence that supports her allegation that she requested her records from Dr. Flenar.

2024Id. at 136 .

2005The court concluded that a third-party claimant may assert a spoliation claim for damages for negligent or intentional conduct by an insurance carrier, id., but expressly declined to address whether, outside of the lability insurance context presented, there would be a duty to maintain evidence.

2017Rather, it is an allegation that Dr. Flenar lost or destroyed evidence that he knew or should have known was relevant to Shirey's personal-injury claim relating to the car accident. [18] Our Supreme Court held in Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. that Indiana law does not recognize a claim for "first-party" spoliation-the loss or destruction of evidence by a party to the principal litigation. 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005).

2014See Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ind.2006); Gribben, 824 N.E.2d at 354 ; Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 662-64 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that the spoliation doctrine does not apply to testimonial evidence), trans. denied.

2008We dismissed the spoliation claim, finding there was no duty on the part of an employer to preserve, for an employee, potential evidence in an employee's possible third party action. 580 N.E.2d at 690 .

2008We dismissed the spoliation claim, finding there was no duty on the part of an employer to preserve, for an employee, potential evidence in an employee’s possible third party action. 580 N.E.2d at 690 .

2017“When reviewing summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is proper only when the designated evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080, 1083 (Ind. 2017) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).

2017"When reviewing summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is proper only when the designated evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Megenity v. Dunn , 68 N.E.3d 1080 , 1083 (Ind. 2017) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ).

2014See also West, 167 F.3d at 779 (stating that spoliation includes “the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation” (citation omitted)).

2014See Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ind.2006); Gribben, 824 N.E.2d at 354 ; Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 662-64 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding that the spoliation doctrine does not apply to testimonial evidence), trans. denied.

2000See Cahoon, 715 N.E.2d at 16 .

1999“In Indiana, the exclusive possession of facts or evidence by a party, coupled with the suppression of the facts or evidence by that party, may result in an inference that the production of the evidence would be against the interest of the party which suppresses it.” Porter v. Irvin’s Interstate Brick & Block Co., Inc., 691 N.E.2d 1363, 1364-1365 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

1999"In Indiana, the exclusive possession of facts or evidence by a party, coupled with the suppression of the facts or evidence by that party, may result in an inference that the production of the evidence would be against the interest of the party which suppresses it." Porter v. Irvin's Interstate Brick & Block Co., Inc., 691 N.E.2d 1363, 1364-1365 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).