first complaint doctrine in Massachusetts

2025"Pursuant to the first complaint doctrine, we 'no longer permit in evidence testimony from multiple complaint witnesses, limiting the testimony to that of one witness' who, where feasible, will be the first person told of the sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 67-68 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 , 242- 243 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

2025The first complaint doctrine "permits a judge to admit testimony from the recipient of a complainant's initial report of sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 583 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 218-219 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

2026Nor are we persuaded by the defendant's argument that the judge should have ruled that the Commonwealth did not "need" to introduce first complaint testimony because the jury heard evidence of the victim's excited utterances including, "Keep your hands off me." The excited utterances conveyed different information than the first complaint, and in any event the first complaint doctrine does not "prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred by that doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible." Aviles, 461 Mass. at 69 , quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221 (2009)

2026In fact, in Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 226 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court clarified that the holding in Stuckich was not intended to imply that the testimony of a police officer "concerning the circumstances 5 giving rise to the police involvement in a sexual assault case will never be admissible as part of the Commonwealth's case-in- chief." In short, there was no violation of the first complaint rule and no substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.

2026Nor are we persuaded by the defendant's argument that the judge should have ruled that the Commonwealth did not "need" to introduce first complaint testimony because the jury heard evidence of the victim's excited utterances including, "Keep your hands off me." The excited utterances conveyed different information than the first complaint, and in any event the first complaint doctrine does not "prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred by that doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible." Aviles, 461 Mass. at 69 , quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221 (2009)

2025"Pursuant to the first complaint doctrine, we 'no longer permit in evidence testimony from multiple complaint witnesses, limiting the testimony to that of one witness' who, where feasible, will be the first person told of the sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 67-68 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 , 242- 243 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

2025See also Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008) (mere fact of disclosure, even without contents or details, constitutes complaint for purposes of first complaint doctrine). 1 The prosecutor misidentified the victim's therapist as the first complaint, but in any event stated, "We're not calling . . . [the] therapist." 2 The defendant also asserts that the victim's testimony that her father told her mother about the assaults violated the first complaint rule.

2024See McCoy, 456 Mass. at 847 ("The allowance of [an investigating officer]'s testimony of his interview with the victim -- even without substantive details -- is error under the first complaint doctrine, and unfairly enhances the victim's credibility" [footnote omitted]); Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008) (testimony regarding "[t]he description of the investigative process" and "[t]he fact that the Commonwealth brought its resources to bear on this incident" is "unnecessary and irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt, and is extremely prejudicial").

2024See McCoy, 456 Mass. at 847 ("The allowance of [an investigating officer]'s testimony of his interview with the victim -- even without substantive details -- is error under the first complaint doctrine, and unfairly enhances the victim's credibility" [footnote omitted]); Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008) (testimony regarding "[t]he description of the investigative process" and "[t]he fact that the Commonwealth brought its resources to bear on this incident" is "unnecessary and irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt, and is extremely prejudicial").

2023"While the first complaint doctrine prohibits 'piling on' of additional complaint witnesses, 'it does not exclude testimony that is otherwise independently admissible and serves a purpose other than to repeat the fact of a complaint and thereby corroborate the complainant's accusations.'" Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 814 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845 (2010).

2025The court explained that to hold otherwise would undermine the doctrine of first complaint, as "[t]estimony of a vague conversation that does not 'complain' that a sexual assault occurred . . . may communicate to the jury that the victim in fact did not complain at all and that, if she had indeed been assaulted, she would have complained with more force and in greater detail." Id.

2025Murungu, supra. Furthermore, allowing only the victim's statement that she had an STD, and not her complaint of rape a week later, would not comport with the purposes of the first complaint doctrine.

2015Evid. § 413(b) (multiple complaints *326 serving evidentiary purpose other than corroboration allowed if probative value outweighs prejudicial effect); Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 400 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 229 (2009) (if subsequent complaint evidence “does serve a purpose separate and apart from the first complaint doctrine, the judge may admit it ‘after careful balancing of the testimony’s probative and prejudicial value’ ”).

2013We have previously held that if evidence of a subsequent complaint is independently admissible and “serve[s] a purpose separate and apart from the first complaint doctrine, the judge may admit it ‘after careful balancing of the testimony’s probative and prejudicial value.’ ” Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 400 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 229 (2009) (Arana).

2025"Pursuant to the first complaint doctrine, we 'no longer permit in evidence testimony from multiple complaint witnesses, limiting the testimony to that of one witness' who, where feasible, will be the first person told of the sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 67-68 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 , 242- 243 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

2025The first complaint doctrine "permits a judge to admit testimony from the recipient of a complainant's initial report of sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 583 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 218-219 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

2023There, the court held that the first complaint doctrine "permits testimony from two first complaint witnesses in circumstances . . . where each witness testifies to disclosures made years apart concerning different periods of time and escalating levels of abuse, which constitute different and more serious criminal acts committed over a lengthy period." Id. at 288-289 .

2018Moreover, when the defendant is the first to introduce statements exceeding the scope of the first complaint doctrine to pursue a defense that the victim fabricated the allegations, the prosecution may "explore the contents and the context of the statements in more detail," Commonwealth v. Torres , 86 Mass. App. Ct. 272 , 278 (2014), and present evidence to "rebut questions raised by the defendant." Commonwealth v. Kebreau , 454 Mass. 287 , 298-299 (2009).

2026The first complaint doctrine "permit[s] some discrepancy" between the testimony of the victim and the first complaint witness and does not require "complete congruence." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 586 (2013).

2025"The first complaint doctrine permits a judge to admit testimony from the recipient of a complainant's initial report of sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 583 (2013).

2023In any event, whether the defendant preserved his objection to Ulak's testimony is immaterial, as we conclude that the testimony did not violate the first complaint rule. 4 Defense counsel had also previously referred to the forensic examination, which was favorable to the defense, in his opening statement, telling the jurors they would "hear that physical 3 Thus, before the daughter testified, the jury already knew that the victims had reported and described the defendant's conduct at these interviews -- which also explains why defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor asked the daug

2023In any event, whether the defendant preserved his objection to Ulak's testimony is immaterial, as we conclude that the testimony did not violate the first complaint rule. 4 Defense counsel had also previously referred to the forensic examination, which was favorable to the defense, in his opening statement, telling the jurors they would "hear that physical 3 Thus, before the daughter testified, the jury already knew that the victims had reported and described the defendant's conduct at these interviews -- which also explains why defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor asked the daug

2017"The primary goals of the first complaint doctrine were, and still are, to 'refute any false inference that silence is evidence of a lack of credibility on the part of [rape] complainants,' . . . and 'to give the jury as complete a picture as possible of how the accusation of [rape] first arose.'" Aviles, 461 Mass. at 72 , quoting from King, 445 Mass. at 243, 247 . "[B]y allowing in evidence all the details of the first complaint, the doctrine gives the fact finder 'the maximum amount of information with which to assess the credibility of the . . . complaint evidence as well as the over-all cr

2008In Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 248 , citing Commonwealth v. Licata, 412 Mass. 654, 660 (1992), the court noted that a limiting instruction should be given to the jury at the time that the first complaint testimony is admitted, followed by complete final instructions that include a first complaint instruction.

2025Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 814 (2018).

2023"While the first complaint doctrine prohibits 'piling on' of additional complaint witnesses, 'it does not exclude testimony that is otherwise independently admissible and serves a purpose other than to repeat the fact of a complaint and thereby corroborate the complainant's accusations.'" Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478 Mass. 804, 814 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845 (2010).

2012See Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 800-801 (2011).

2012We are instructed to analyze the challenged evidence to determine whether it (1) “was independently admissible,” (2) “served some purpose other than to corroborate the [complainant’s] accusation,” and (3) “was sufficiently important to a fair understanding of the Commonwealth’s case so that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 799 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Arana, supra at 225-226 , and Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 400 (2010).

2010First, since King there has been confusion over the application of the first complaint doctrine as to, inter alla, who is the first complaint witness and whether another complaint witness can be substituted as the first complaint witness, see Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 445-446 (2008); whether there can be two “first” complaint witnesses, see Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 296 (2009); when evidence regarding the investigative process by police crosses the line into impermissible first complaint evidence, compare Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008), with Com

2010First, since King there has been confusion over the application of the first complaint doctrine as to, inter alia, who is the first complaint witness and whether another complaint witness can be substituted as the first complaint witness, see Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 445-446 (2008); whether there can be two "first" complaint witnesses, see Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 296 (2009); when evidence regarding the investigative process by police crosses the line into impermissible first complaint evidence, compare Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008), with Com

2009It does not, of course, prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred by that doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible.” Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. at 220-221 , citing Commonwealth v. Montanez, 439 Mass. 441, 456 (2003) (Sosman, J. concurring) (“Obsession with the strictures imposed on [first] complaint testimony should not blind us to the fact that [first] complaint is not the only basis for admitting such evidence”).

2008The governing principles when we decided Commonwealth v. Montanez, 439 Mass. 441, 445-446 (2003), permitted this type of reference to other complaint witnesses.

2010The first complaint doctrine has been elaborated in Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214 (2009); Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449 (2008); Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 445-448 (2008); and Commonwealth v. Lyons, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 671 (2008).

2010The first complaint doctrine has been elaborated in Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214 (2009); Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449 (2008); Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 445-448 (2008); and Commonwealth v. Lyons, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 671 (2008). [4] On redirect examination, Keeley did testify to details of his interview with the victim.

2023See also Commonwealth v. Revells, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 492, 496 (2010) (first complaint was both victim's verbal statements to her mother and letter she wrote in "tightly intertwined oral and written communication").

2018The text message and telephone call were properly admitted, as they qualified together as a "single, tightly intertwined oral and written communication." Commonwealth v. Revells , 78 Mass. App. Ct. 492 , 496 (2010). 3 Conclusion .

2023In any event, whether the defendant preserved his objection to Ulak's testimony is immaterial, as we conclude that the testimony did not violate the first complaint rule. 4 Defense counsel had also previously referred to the forensic examination, which was favorable to the defense, in his opening statement, telling the jurors they would "hear that physical 3 Thus, before the daughter testified, the jury already knew that the victims had reported and described the defendant's conduct at these interviews -- which also explains why defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor asked the daug

2023In any event, whether the defendant preserved his objection to Ulak's testimony is immaterial, as we conclude that the testimony did not violate the first complaint rule. 4 Defense counsel had also previously referred to the forensic examination, which was favorable to the defense, in his opening statement, telling the jurors they would "hear that physical 3 Thus, before the daughter testified, the jury already knew that the victims had reported and described the defendant's conduct at these interviews -- which also explains why defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor asked the daug

2014Together with our understanding of the purpose of the first complaint doctrine, our decision in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2010), leads us to conclude that the first complaint testimony is admissible in this case.

2014In Wallace , a witness testified that the victim — his sibling, as in our case — *191 had told him that the defendant had “engaged in inappropriate sex with [the victim].” Id. at 415 .

2026We first note that the defendant did not object to the victim's brief testimony and thus our review is limited to whether there was error, and if so, we then inquire whether the error created a substantial risk 7 of a miscarriage of justice.5 See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999).

2025See id.

2025See Commonwealth v. Benson, 389 Mass. 473, 481 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 285 (1982) ("A finding of not guilty at a criminal trial can result from any number of factors having nothing to do with the defendant's actual guilt").

2025See Commonwealth v. Benson, 389 Mass. 473, 481 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 285 (1982) ("A finding of not guilty at a criminal trial can result from any number of factors having nothing to do with the defendant's actual guilt").

2023The victim's testimony that on January 26, 2016, she "ha[d] a conversation with a school counselor"; "went to [her] mom's house," "Children's Hospital," and "[t]he police station"; and that she no longer lived in the 6 Even assuming error, we discern no prejudice from the admission of the witness's testimony regarding the victim's disclosure "that her grandfather touched her breasts and her butt" where the defendant was acquitted on the indecent assault and battery charges for "touching her breasts" and "touching her buttocks." See Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 923 (2004).

2023See Commonwealth v. Dale, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 191 (2014) (earlier disclosure, which victim did not remember making, admissible because it advanced doctrine's purpose of "refut[ing] the stereotype that silence is evidence that the [victim] lacks credibility").

2022As the Supreme Judicial Court explained in Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008), such testimony "creates the imprimatur of official belief in the complainant" and is "unnecessary and irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt." [Note 9] See Commonwealth v. Hanino, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 495-496 (2012).

2021See Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689, 700 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221 (2009) ("The first complaint doctrine . . . does not 'prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred by that doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible'"); Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008).