nondelegability doctrine in Massachusetts

2026See also Sheriff of Middlesex County v. International Bhd. of Correctional Officers, Local R1-193, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 830, 834 (2005) (Flight exception was not triggered where discrimination claim was based on union membership and not membership in constitutionally protected category such as gender or race).

2010After holding that the town’s statutory authority to appoint police officers was nondelegable and that the matter was, therefore, not arbitrable, the court in *459 dictum rejected the union’s discrimination claim, stating that, even if the claim were not waived, “we are satisfied that [the discrimination claim] must fail . . . because it appears that no lawful relief could be granted without conflicting with the town’s nondelegable managerial prerogative.” Id. 15 Similarly, in Sheriff of Middlesex County v. International Bhd. of Correctional Officers, Local R1-193, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 830 (2005)

1982We therefore conclude that the nondelegability doctrine of School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, supra, does not apply to this case. 10 Since the denial of tenure on account of union activity is unlawful, the commission’s power necessarily includes the power to direct a school committee to reinstate a teacher even if reinstatement results in tenure.

1982See 417, supra. Moreover, since our decision in School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 372 Mass. 106 (1977), we have limited the nondelegability doctrine.

2010In response to the argument that an award compelling the school committee to promote the grievant would violate the nondelegability doctrine, we con- *458 eluded that the case called for “an exception” to the doctrine, referencing a case “where we suggested an exception if committee action was ‘a pretense or device actuated by personal hostility,’ ” 13 and also citing a decision by the Court of Appeals of New York where an exception to the doctrine was recognized if tenure was refused “for constitutionally impermissible reasons or in violation of statutory proscriptions.” 14 Id. at 644 .

2005Comm. v. Flight, 383 Mass. 642, 644 (1981), which carves out an exception to the nondelegability doctrine in cases of constitutionally impermissible discrimination.

2005This doctrine of nondelegability “rests largely on the notion that the quality of education provided to the Commonwealth’s [students] will depend, to some significant degree, on school administrators’ relatively unfettered discretion to make decisions concerning staffing and personnel in light of shifts in curricular emphasis, fluctuating student enrollment, and the availability of resources.” Id. at 28, 31 (applying the doctrine of nondelegability as it has been recognized in the elementary and secondary school setting to public institutions of higher education).

2004L. c. 150E, §§ 1, 2 (1994 ed.), and the recognition of an exclusive domain of authority for local school committees, protected by the nondelegability doctrine.” HECC v. MTA, 423 Mass. at 28 .

2026Under the nondelegability doctrine, a court may vacate an arbitration award where the "arbitrator intrudes upon decisions ... left by statute to the exclusive managerial control of designated public officials." Dracut, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 377 (alteration in original), quoting Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n. 477 Mass. 434,440 (2017).[6] Here, the City argues that the Arbitrator's Award directing the City to provide members of the Radio and Construction Shop units with vacation-related overtime opportunities intrudes upon the Fire Commissioner's nondelegable authority.

2019Here, the BHE grounds its argument in the nondelegability doctrine, insisting that § C(10) is unenforceable because the provision impermissibly intrudes on the BHE's managerial authority, see, e.g., Billerica v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1495, 415 Mass. 692, 694 (1993), and that the board erred in failing so to conclude.20 The BHE contends that § C(10) infringes on the nondelegable power that the statute at issue here, G.

1996An appointed official, who serves at the behest of an elected official, may be equally vulnerable to pressure that might “distort[ ] the normal political process for controlling public policy.” School Comm. of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 378 Mass. 65, 71 (1979).

1981See School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 369 Mass. 686, 689 (1976), where we suggested an exception if committee action was “a pretense or device actuated by personal hostility.” Cf. Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 777 (1976) (exception if tenure refused “for constitutionally impermissible reasons or in violation of statutory proscriptions”).

1981See School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 369 Mass. 686, 689 (1976), where we suggested an exception if committee action was “a pretense or device actuated by personal hostility.” Cf. Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 777 (1976) (exception if tenure refused “for constitutionally impermissible reasons or in violation of statutory proscriptions”).