equal inference rule in Texas

2024Although circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to establish a material fact, under the equal-inference rule, when “circumstances are consistent with either of the two facts and nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither 2 Put differently, the employee’s negligent conduct “must be of the same general nature as the conduct authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized to be within the scope of employment.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007). 2 fact can be inferred.” Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (Phillips, C.J.,

2022Thus, we 1 The equal inference rule provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager circumstantial evidence “which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.” Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001).

2020Under that rule, “a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from ‘meager circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.’” Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 , 70–71 (Tex. 2013), quoting Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005) (“When the circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may be inferred.”); Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

2019See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 813–14 (explaining the equal inference rule).

2020Under that rule, “a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from ‘meager circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.’” Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 , 70–71 (Tex. 2013), quoting Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2005) (“When the circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may be inferred.”); Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

2017Such an inference would “violate[] the equal inference rule, which provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from ‘meager circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.’” Id. (quoting Hammerly Oaks, 958 S.W.2d at 392 ). 21 As in Hancock, here there were multiple reasons why HUD might have decided not to revoke its commitment to insure Lakeway’s mortgage, and Lake Travis offered no evidence that the inference that Sossi’s letters significantly influenced HUD’s decision was more probable than the other possible inf

2025Such an inference would “violate[] the equal inference rule, which provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from ‘meager circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.’” See Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 70–71.

2023The two inferences required by the jury to reach its verdict violate the equal inference rule, “which provides that a jury may not - 70 - 04-18-00411-CV reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.” Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 , 70–71 (Tex. 2013) (citation omitted).

2009Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.1984) (“When circumstances are consistent with either of the two facts and nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither fact can be inferred.”); see also Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex.2001) (Phillips, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the history and application of *838 the equal inference rule).

2004The applicable rule was succinctly stated in Litton [Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.1984)] as follows: ‘When circumstances are consistent with either of the two facts and nothing shows that one is more *648 probable than the other, neither fact can be inferred.” Id. at 324 . [[Image here]] Properly applied, the equal inference rule is but a species of the no evidence rule, emphasizing that when the circumstantial evidence is so slight that any plausible inference is purely a guess, it is in legal effect no evidence.

2011See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez , 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998); Litton Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gammage , 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984).

2011See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.1998); Litton Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.1984).

2024See All Star, 298 S.W.3d at 423–24 (because the names of a number of affiliated entities began with the words “Antero Resources,” the equal-inference rule prevented court from inferring that references to “Antero,” “Antero Resources,” or “Antero Resources Corp.” referred to “Antero Resources Piceance Corporation”). 20 The Counties identified no other evidence to support an implied finding that API failed to observe corporate formalities. 4.

2024See All Star, 298 S.W.3d at 423–24 (because the names of a number of affiliated entities began with the words “Antero Resources,” the equal-inference rule prevented court from inferring that references to “Antero,” “Antero Resources,” or “Antero Resources Corp.” referred to “Antero Resources Piceance Corporation”). 20 The Counties identified no other evidence to support an implied finding that API failed to observe corporate formalities. 4.

2017See Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 70-71 ; see also Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 262 (Tex. 2014) (jury could not reasonably infer that defamation caused cancellations at funeral home “when the cancellations could have occurred for any number of reasons”).

2016See id.; see also Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 262 (Tex. 2014) (“the jury cannot reasonably infer that defamation caused the cancellations when the cancellations could have occurred for any number of reasons”).

2016See Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex. 2014); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

2008Lewis , 173 S.W.3d at 562 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)).

2015We apply the equal inference rule: “‘[w]hen the –4– circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may be inferred.’” Id. (quoting Tubelite, a Div. of Indal, Inc. v. Risica & Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1991)).

2015We apply the equal inference rule: “ ‘[w]hen the circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may be inferred.’ ” Id. (quoting Tubelite, a Div. of Indal, Inc. v. Risica & Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex.1991)).

2026Station, 442 S.W.3d at 265 (quoting Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 , 70–71 (Tex. 2013)) (concluding evidence was legally insufficient).

2019Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. 2014) (applying the equal-inference rule).

2025See Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 , 70–71 (Tex. 2013) (“[T]he equal inference rule . . . provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from ‘meager circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.’”); Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. 2010) (recognizing that “when the evidence equally supports two alternatives” it is “no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence”).

2015Such evidence raises no more than a possibility of causation, which is insufficient.″ 377 The expert also relied on evidence of a foul smell, a finding consistent with an anaerobic infection, to support his opinion that she suffered from an undetected anaerobic infection. 378 The hospital, however, [*66] offered other explanations for the smell. 379 Because the evidence included ″competing explanations for the smell″ and only ″meager″ circumstantial evidence, the jury would be compelled to speculate and ″could not reasonably infer an infection caused by the Hospital’s negligence.″ 380 In short

2023Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 , 70–71 (Tex. 2013); see Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015).

2017See id.; see also Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634 (“An inference is not reasonable if it is susceptible to multiple, equally probable inferences, requiring the factfinder to guess in order to reach a conclusion.”).

2015TEX.FAM.CODE § 2.401; see also Farrell v. Farrell, 459 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2015, no pet.). 7 plausible inference is purely a guess, it is “no evidence.”); see also Mills v. Mest, 94 S.W.3d 72, 75-76 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).4 Following their 2001 divorce, Frank contends that even though he and Cynthia engaged in periods of intimacy and friendship, the documentary evidence and the parties’ conduct established that no agreement ever occurred and no marriage existed.

2011The majority identifies some of this direct evidence proffered by appellees and then dismisses such evidence as giving rise to multiple inferences to be disregarded under the equal inference rule and Mills v. Mest, 94 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).

2012That Court, rather, held that, when the evidence "gives rise to at least two, reasonably equal, plausible inferences. . . it is clearly the jury that makes the choice of which inference to accept." Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 165 (Tex. Crim.App.2006).

2012That Court, rather, held that, when the evidence “gives rise to at least two, reasonably equal, plausible inferences ... it is clearly the jury that makes the choice of which inference to accept.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 165 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

2009See City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802 , 813 B 14 (Tex. 2005) (discussing the equal-inference rule); Lee v. Hasson , 286 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (applying the equal-inference rule).

2009See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813-14 (Tex.2005) (discussing the equal-inference rule); Lee v. Hasson, 286 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (applying the equal-inference rule).

2014To establish his strict products-liability claim based on a design defect, Carpenter had to demonstrate that the compressor box was defective “when it left the hands of the manufacturer.”3 See Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 370 ; see also 3 To the extent Carpenter argues that a manufacturing defect, as opposed to a design defect, caused his injuries, we note that in strict products-liability cases based on a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff still must establish that the manufacturing defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer.

2014See Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (“The equal inference rule provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager circumstantial evidence ‘which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more probable than another.’”) (quoting Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997)); see also Zavala, 355 S.W.3d at 370 (“To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence must transcend mere suspicion.

2003Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d at 728 .

2003Id. at 729.

2024Although circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to establish a material fact, under the equal-inference rule, when “circumstances are consistent with either of the two facts and nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither 2 Put differently, the employee’s negligent conduct “must be of the same general nature as the conduct authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized to be within the scope of employment.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007). 2 fact can be inferred.” Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001) (Phillips, C.J.,

2023App. 1973); see also Frazier v. State, 576 S.W.2d 617 , 619–20 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.

2023App. 2006). 5 Finally, the equal-inference rule applies when there is only minimal circumstantial evidence, and here there is direct evidence of appellant’s guilt. “[T]he distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence is that the latter applies directly to the ultimate fact to be proved, while circumstantial evidence is the direct proof of a minor fact which, by logical inference, demonstrates the fact to be proved.” Crawford v. State, 502 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Crim.

2017Id.; see Goad v. State, 354 S.W.3d 443 , 449 n.2 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex. 2014); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

2015Ed. 2d 469 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)). 36 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714, 720 (Tex. 1997). 37 Id. at 711, 724-30 . 38 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254-57 , 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 248 (Tex. 2004). 39 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 40 38 Tex. L.

2015Ed. 2d 469 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)). 36 Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714, 720 (Tex. 1997). 37 Id. at 711, 724-30 . 38 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254-57 , 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 248 (Tex. 2004). 39 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 40 38 Tex. L.

2015Such evidence raises no more than a possibility of causation, which is insufficient.″ 377 The expert also relied on evidence of a foul smell, a finding consistent with an anaerobic infection, to support his opinion that she suffered from an undetected anaerobic infection. 378 The hospital, however, [*66] offered other explanations for the smell. 379 Because the evidence included ″competing explanations for the smell″ and only ″meager″ circumstantial evidence, the jury would be compelled to speculate and ″could not reasonably infer an infection caused by the Hospital’s negligence.″ 380 In short