Rosario rule in Massachusetts

2025Judgments affirmed. footnotes [1] Frost, a certified emergency medical technician with extensive narcotics training, observed the defendant at about 7:50 A.M. that morning for purposes of determining whether he was under the influence. [2] A sally port is "a secure entryway (as at a prison) that consists of a series of doors or gates." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /sally%20port [https://perma.cc/3BU9-EPP6]. [3] The Rosario rule, established in Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996), is grounded in the prompt presentment requirement of

2025Judgments affirmed. footnotes [1] Frost, a certified emergency medical technician with extensive narcotics training, observed the defendant at about 7:50 A.M. that morning for purposes of determining whether he was under the influence. [2] A sally port is "a secure entryway (as at a prison) that consists of a series of doors or gates." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /sally%20port [https://perma.cc/3BU9-EPP6]. [3] The Rosario rule, established in Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56 (1996), is grounded in the prompt presentment requirement of

2016See Powell, supra at 279 (“A bright-line rule . . . achieves the goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment delays”); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013). “[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and uncounseled arrestees.” Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.

2016See Powell, supra at 279 (“A bright-line rule . . . achieves the goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment delays”); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013). “[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and uncounseled arrestees.” Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.

2016See Powell, supra at 279 (“A bright-line rule . . . achieves the goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment delays”); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013). “[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and uncounseled arrestees.” Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.

2016See Powell, supra at 279 (“A bright-line rule . . . achieves the goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment delays”); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013). “[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and uncounseled arrestees.” Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.

2013“In a less direct manner, the rule, recognizing the coercive nature of a lengthy interrogation, provides the court with an additional assurance (over and above the assurance supplied by compliance with the requirements of Miranda, supra) that statements made by the defendant after arrest but before presentment are free, intelligent, and voluntary.” Commonwealth v. Butler, 423 Mass. 517, 523-524 (1996), citing Rosario, supra at 51 . i. Delay on January 12.

2013“In a less direct manner, the rule, recognizing the coercive nature of a lengthy interrogation, provides the court with an additional assurance (over and above the assurance supplied by compliance with the requirements of Miranda, supra) that statements made by the defendant after arrest but before presentment are free, intelligent, and voluntary.” Commonwealth v. Butler, 423 Mass. 517, 523-524 (1996), citing Rosario, supra at 51 . i. Delay on January 12.

2014In Morganti, a case the Commonwealth cites as another example of the application of the emergency exception, we determined that the Rosario rule did not govern because the rule does not “apply to persons arrested in other States on warrants issued in Massachusetts, whose arraignment would need to await their rendition to Massachusetts.” Morganti, 455 Mass. at 399 .

2014In Morganti, a case the Commonwealth cites as another example of the application of the emergency exception, we determined that the Rosario rule did not govern because the rule does not “apply to persons arrested in other States on warrants issued in Massachusetts, whose arraignment would need to await their rendition to Massachusetts.” Morganti, 455 Mass. at 399 .

2014Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966) (establishing prophylactic mechanism to safeguard privilege against self-incrimination from coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation).

2013It should be axiomatic that the test for evaluating what constitutes police “questioning” or “interrogation” while in custody is the same under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda), as it is under Rosario .

2018See McWilliams , 473 Mass. at 614 ( Rosario rule intended to facilitate defendant's right to counsel).

2016See Powell, supra at 279 (“A bright-line rule . . . achieves the goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment delays”); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013). “[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and uncounseled arrestees.” Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.

2016See Powell, supra at 279 (“A bright-line rule . . . achieves the goal of limiting the coercive effect of lengthy arraignment delays”); Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 287 (2013). “[T]he principal mischief that the Rosario rule was adopted to prevent [was] the coercive influence of intentional delays of arraignment to prolong custodial interrogation of unwilling and uncounseled arrestees.” Siny Van Tran, supra at 563.

2014Like the Rosario rule, § 3501(c) therefore “provide[s] immunization to voluntary confessions given within six hours of a suspect’s arrest.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 311 (2009).

2014Like the Rosario rule, § 3501(c) therefore “provide[s] immunization to voluntary confessions given within six hours of a suspect’s arrest.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 311 (2009).

2013See Colon, 835 F.2d at 29, 30-31 . 12 See also Fullwood, 86 F.3d at 30-31 . 13 In summary, we hold that the defendant’s November 19 statements were made as part of a continuing episode of “police questioning” within the meaning of Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56 , and therefore are subject to the Rosario rule.

2013See Colon, 835 F.2d at 29, 30-31 . 12 See also Fullwood, 86 F.3d at 30-31 . 13 In summary, we hold that the defendant’s November 19 statements were made as part of a continuing episode of “police questioning” within the meaning of Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56 , and therefore are subject to the Rosario rule.

2013See Colon, 835 F.2d at 29, 30-31 . 12 See also Fullwood, 86 F.3d at 30-31 . 13 In summary, we hold that the defendant’s November 19 statements were made as part of a continuing episode of “police questioning” within the meaning of Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56 , and therefore are subject to the Rosario rule.

2013See Colon, 835 F.2d at 29, 30-31 . 12 See also Fullwood, 86 F.3d at 30-31 . 13 In summary, we hold that the defendant’s November 19 statements were made as part of a continuing episode of “police questioning” within the meaning of Rosario, 422 Mass. at 56 , and therefore are subject to the Rosario rule.

2004However, the Rosario rule in its present case does not appear to allow exceptions to accommodate situations where, as here, a written confession is obtained through non-coercive police conduct and procedures outside the six-hour period following an oral confession that was validly obtained within the six-hour period. 5 Massachusetts decisions subsequent to but not subject to the Rosario rule have declined to suppress statements obtained after six hours, on the basis of additional factors commonly cited by other courts. 6 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 283 (2002) (19-hour dela

2004However, the Rosario rule in its present case does not appear to allow exceptions to accommodate situations where, as here, a written confession is obtained through non-coercive police conduct and procedures outside the six-hour period following an oral confession that was validly obtained within the six-hour period. 5 Massachusetts decisions subsequent to but not subject to the Rosario rule have declined to suppress statements obtained after six hours, on the basis of additional factors commonly cited by other courts. 6 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 283 (2002) (19-hour dela