survival claim in Maryland

2022Id. 16 Dr. Kenneth L.

2022Id. 16 Dr. Kenneth L.

2015Based on our review of Marcas, Daley, Surratt, and Leake , we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that, for the purposes of the LGTCA damages cap, “wrongful death claims, which are derivative of another person’s claim of injury [the survival claim], are considered collectively as one individual claim.” Leake, 204 Md.App. at 416 , 40 A.3d at 1144 .

2015Based on our review of Marcas, Daley, Surratt, and Leake , we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that, for the purposes of the LGTCA damages cap, “wrongful death claims, which are derivative of another person’s claim of injury [the survival claim], are considered collectively as one individual claim.” Leake, 204 Md.App. at 416 , 40 A.3d at 1144 .

2012Geisz, 313 Md. at 317 , 545 A.2d 658 (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Geisz, 313 Md. at 317 , 545 A.2d 658 (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2012It does not answer the question presented in this case, i.e., whether wrongful death claims are aggregated with a survivor claim, or considered separately, with respect to the LGTCA limitation of liability “per an individual claim.” In answer to that question, appellants contend that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Daley v. United, Services Automobile Association, 312 Md. 550 , 541 A.2d 632 (1988), and Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439 , 578 A.2d 745 (1990), compel the conclusion that a wrongful death claim, a derivative action, is considered -with the injured person’s survival

2012It does not answer the question presented in this case, i.e., whether wrongful death claims are aggregated with a survivor claim, or considered separately, with respect to the LGTCA limitation of liability “per an individual claim.” In answer to that question, appellants contend that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Daley v. United, Services Automobile Association, 312 Md. 550 , 541 A.2d 632 (1988), and Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439 , 578 A.2d 745 (1990), compel the conclusion that a wrongful death claim, a derivative action, is considered -with the injured person’s survival

2012In O’Hara v. Kovens, [ 305 Md. 280 , 503 A.2d 1313 (1986) ], a variety of nonliability hypothe ses could have explained the facts known to the O’Hara plaintiffs so that limitations was a fact question.

2012In O’Hara v. Kovens, [ 305 Md. 280 , 503 A.2d 1313 (1986) ], a variety of nonliability hypothe ses could have explained the facts known to the O’Hara plaintiffs so that limitations was a fact question.

2012It does not answer the question presented in this case, i.e., whether wrongful death claims are aggregated with a survivor claim, or considered separately, with respect to the LGTCA limitation of liability “per an individual claim.” In answer to that question, appellants contend that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Daley v. United, Services Automobile Association, 312 Md. 550 , 541 A.2d 632 (1988), and Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439 , 578 A.2d 745 (1990), compel the conclusion that a wrongful death claim, a derivative action, is considered -with the injured person’s survival

2012It does not answer the question presented in this case, i.e., whether wrongful death claims are aggregated with a survivor claim, or considered separately, with respect to the LGTCA limitation of liability “per an individual claim.” In answer to that question, appellants contend that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Daley v. United, Services Automobile Association, 312 Md. 550 , 541 A.2d 632 (1988), and Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439 , 578 A.2d 745 (1990), compel the conclusion that a wrongful death claim, a derivative action, is considered -with the injured person’s survival

2011(The Court also held that the wrongful death claim was not time-barred because it was filed within three years of the death and the decedent’s claims were not time-barred before then.) *348 In holding that “class action tolling,” as adopted in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S.Ct. 756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and as extended in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), applied, the Christensen Court explained that it will recognize exceptions to statutes of limitations sparingly, and only in limited situations, so

2011(The Court also held that the wrongful death claim was not time-barred because it was filed within three years of the death and the decedent’s claims were not time-barred before then.) *348 In holding that “class action tolling,” as adopted in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S.Ct. 756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and as extended in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), applied, the Christensen Court explained that it will recognize exceptions to statutes of limitations sparingly, and only in limited situations, so

2011(The Court also held that the wrongful death claim was not time-barred because it was filed within three years of the death and the decedent’s claims were not time-barred before then.) *348 In holding that “class action tolling,” as adopted in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S.Ct. 756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and as extended in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), applied, the Christensen Court explained that it will recognize exceptions to statutes of limitations sparingly, and only in limited situations, so

2011(The Court also held that the wrongful death claim was not time-barred because it was filed within three years of the death and the decedent’s claims were not time-barred before then.) *348 In holding that “class action tolling,” as adopted in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S.Ct. 756 , 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and as extended in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 , 103 S.Ct. 2392 , 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), applied, the Christensen Court explained that it will recognize exceptions to statutes of limitations sparingly, and only in limited situations, so

2008Id.

2005We observe that in Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 190 , 873 A.2d 463 , we concluded "that, in order for a limitations defense to a survival claim to *669 bar a cause of action for wrongful death, the applicable limitations period must expire before the decedent’s death.” If Christiansen learned he had lung cancer in the Spring of 1998, as appellees contend, he would have had until the Spring of 2001 to file suit.

2005We observe that in Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 190 , 873 A.2d 463 , we concluded "that, in order for a limitations defense to a survival claim to *669 bar a cause of action for wrongful death, the applicable limitations period must expire before the decedent’s death.” If Christiansen learned he had lung cancer in the Spring of 1998, as appellees contend, he would have had until the Spring of 2001 to file suit.

1989Id. at 541-42 , 547 A.2d 654 .

1989Id. at 541-42 , 547 A.2d 654 .

1988See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31 , 501 A.2d 446 (1985); Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966).

1988See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31 , 501 A.2d 446 (1985); Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966).

1988See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31 , 501 A.2d 446 (1985); Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966).

1988See Trimper v. Porter-Hayden, 305 Md. 31 , 501 A.2d 446 (1985); Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137 , 215 A.2d 825 (1966).

1970With respect to that question her interest survived This survival rule has been referred to with approval by this Court in Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965); Connelly v. Connelly, 190 Md. 79, 84 , 57 A. 2d 276 (1948) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 136 , 40 A. 2d 374 (1944) and Scheihing v. B. & O.

1970With respect to that question her interest survived This survival rule has been referred to with approval by this Court in Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965); Connelly v. Connelly, 190 Md. 79, 84 , 57 A. 2d 276 (1948) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 136 , 40 A. 2d 374 (1944) and Scheihing v. B. & O.

1970With respect to that question her interest survived This survival rule has been referred to with approval by this Court in Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965); Connelly v. Connelly, 190 Md. 79, 84 , 57 A. 2d 276 (1948) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 136 , 40 A. 2d 374 (1944) and Scheihing v. B. & O.

1970With respect to that question her interest survived This survival rule has been referred to with approval by this Court in Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965); Connelly v. Connelly, 190 Md. 79, 84 , 57 A. 2d 276 (1948) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 136 , 40 A. 2d 374 (1944) and Scheihing v. B. & O.

1970With respect to that question her interest survived This survival rule has been referred to with approval by this Court in Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965); Connelly v. Connelly, 190 Md. 79, 84 , 57 A. 2d 276 (1948) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 136 , 40 A. 2d 374 (1944) and Scheihing v. B. & O.

1970With respect to that question her interest survived This survival rule has been referred to with approval by this Court in Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 230 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965); Connelly v. Connelly, 190 Md. 79, 84 , 57 A. 2d 276 (1948) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 136 , 40 A. 2d 374 (1944) and Scheihing v. B. & O.