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25 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1970–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2021See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 4 n.1 (stating: “[c]ontrary to [Plaintiff’s] assertions, [Appellants] acknowledge [the Superior Court’s] precedential decision in Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013), which does not bind non-signatory wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitration agreements”); see also Pisano, 77 A.3d at 663 (holding: “Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute creates an independent action distinct from a survival claim that, although derived from the same tortious conduct, is not derivative of the rights of the decedent. [Therefore, a decedent’s] contractu 2021See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 4 n.1 (stating: “[c]ontrary to [Plaintiff’s] assertions, [Appellants] acknowledge [the Superior Court’s] precedential decision in Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013), which does not bind non-signatory wrongful death beneficiaries to arbitration agreements”); see also Pisano, 77 A.3d at 663 (holding: “Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute creates an independent action distinct from a survival claim that, although derived from the same tortious conduct, is not derivative of the rights of the decedent. [Therefore, a decedent’s] contractu | 3 | 6 |
Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc.green2 sentences2024Contractor shall proceed diligently with any undisputed Work under the Contract Documents notwithstanding the existence of any dispute, controversy or claim, and during the pendency of any ____________________________________________ 2 In Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490, 493 (Pa. 2016), the High Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “preempt[ed] the application of [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure] 213(e)[, concerning compulsory joinder of wrongful death and survival actions], and require[d] arbitration of the survival claim against Extendicare.” I 2024Contractor shall proceed diligently with any undisputed Work under the Contract Documents notwithstanding the existence of any dispute, controversy or claim, and during the pendency of any ____________________________________________ 2 In Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490, 493 (Pa. 2016), the High Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “preempt[ed] the application of [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure] 213(e)[, concerning compulsory joinder of wrongful death and survival actions], and require[d] arbitration of the survival claim against Extendicare.” I | 1 | 5 |
Shinaver v. Szymanskigreen1 sentence2022Shinaver v. Szymanski, 471 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ohio 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Kiser v. Schultegreen1 sentence2021McMichael v. McMichael, 241 A.3d 582 , 587-88 (Pa. 2020); Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Rettger v. UPMC SHADYSIDEgreen1 sentence2021Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d 915, 933-35 (Pa. Super. 2010); Davis v. Steigerwalt, 822 A.2d 22, 30-31 (Pa. Super. 2003); Bortner v. Gladfelter, 448 A.2d 1386, 1390 (Pa. Super. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLCgreen2 sentences2021See id., 124 A.3d at 325, 327 (trial court properly refused to submit to arbitration the survival claim of deceased’s son/plaintiff (and purported POA agent), who had signed the arbitration agreement on the deceased’s behalf upon admission to the nursing home, where the POA agreement was never produced and the trial court found no agency relationship). 2021See id., 124 A.3d at 325, 327 (trial court properly refused to submit to arbitration the survival claim of deceased’s son/plaintiff (and purported POA agent), who had signed the arbitration agreement on the deceased’s behalf upon admission to the nursing home, where the POA agreement was never produced and the trial court found no agency relationship). | 1 | 1 |
Bortner v. Gladfeltergreen1 sentence2021Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d 915, 933-35 (Pa. Super. 2010); Davis v. Steigerwalt, 822 A.2d 22, 30-31 (Pa. Super. 2003); Bortner v. Gladfelter, 448 A.2d 1386, 1390 (Pa. Super. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Steigerwaltgreen1 sentence2021Rettger v. UPMC Shadyside, 991 A.2d 915, 933-35 (Pa. Super. 2010); Davis v. Steigerwalt, 822 A.2d 22, 30-31 (Pa. Super. 2003); Bortner v. Gladfelter, 448 A.2d 1386, 1390 (Pa. Super. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Hatwood v. Hospital of the Universitygreen1 sentence2021Hatwood v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 55 A.3d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Mitch v. Xto Energy, Inc.green2 sentences2020Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2019) ____________________________________________ 2 The order denied the motion as to the Survival claim against St. 2020Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2019) ____________________________________________ 2 The order denied the motion as to the Survival claim against St. | 1 | 1 |
Rickard v. American National Property & Casualty Co.green1 sentence2018Nevertheless, a survival action may include injuries Decedent suffered short of death, for example, the bedsores themselves.7 See 42 Pa.C.S. § ____________________________________________ 7See supra note 3 (indicating Appellant sought damages including pain and suffering prior to death in her survival action). - 10 - J-S10033-18 8302 (prescribing that “[a]ll causes of action . . . real or personal” survive the death of the plaintiff); cf. Rickard, 173 A.3d at 306 (“a survival claim is simply the action the decedent could have brought for the injuries he suffered prior to his death and is gener | 1 | 1 |
Stegner v. Fentongreen2 sentences2017Because the claims are separate and distinct, and because the wrongful death action “bears no relation to the damages recoverable by a decedent who sues for the injury while living,” Stegner v. Fenton, 351 Pa. 292 , 40 A.2d 473, 475 (1945), we cannot agree that the Deceased’s contractual obligation to the Welfare Fund transferred to the wrongful-death claim. 6 Relatedly, we also reject applicability of McCutchen. 2017Because the claims are separate and distinct, and because the wrongful death action “bears no relation to the damages recoverable by a decedent who sues for the injury while living,” Stegner v. Fenton, 351 Pa. 292 , 40 A.2d 473, 475 (1945), we cannot agree that the Deceased’s contractual obligation to the Welfare Fund transferred to the wrongful-death claim. 6 Relatedly, we also reject applicability of McCutchen. | 1 | 1 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepciongreen1 sentence2016See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. [J-43-2016] - 31 Whether one characterizes Rule 213(e) as a contract defense or as an arbitration- neutral procedural rule, it was applied in this case to defeat arbitration of the survival claim that Extendicare and Decedent (through her legal representative) agreed to submit to arbitration. | 1 | 1 |
Krevitz v. City of Philadelphiagreen2 sentences1999See also, Krevitz v. City of Philadelphia, 167 Pa. Commw. 412, 422 , 648 A.2d 353, 358 (1994) (discovery rule cannot be employed to extend the time for filing a wrongful death and survival action beyond the two year statute of limitations). 1999See also, Krevitz v. City of Philadelphia, 167 Pa. Commw. 412, 422 , 648 A.2d 353, 358 (1994) (discovery rule cannot be employed to extend the time for filing a wrongful death and survival action beyond the two year statute of limitations). | 1 | 1 |
Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp.green2 sentences1999See Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 524 , 526 A.2d 323, 327 (1987) (the statute of limitations governing a survival claim begins to run no later than the date of death); Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 430 Pa. Super. 162, 172 , 633 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1993), aff’d, 542 Pa. 194 , 666 A.2d 238 (1995) (an action for the wrongful death of another must be brought no later than two years after the date of death). 1999See Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 524 , 526 A.2d 323, 327 (1987) (the statute of limitations governing a survival claim begins to run no later than the date of death); Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 430 Pa. Super. 162, 172 , 633 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1993), aff’d, 542 Pa. 194 , 666 A.2d 238 (1995) (an action for the wrongful death of another must be brought no later than two years after the date of death). | 1 | 1 |
Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co.green2 sentences1999See Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 524 , 526 A.2d 323, 327 (1987) (the statute of limitations governing a survival claim begins to run no later than the date of death); Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 430 Pa. Super. 162, 172 , 633 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1993), aff’d, 542 Pa. 194 , 666 A.2d 238 (1995) (an action for the wrongful death of another must be brought no later than two years after the date of death). 1999See Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 524 , 526 A.2d 323, 327 (1987) (the statute of limitations governing a survival claim begins to run no later than the date of death); Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 430 Pa. Super. 162, 172 , 633 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1993), aff’d, 542 Pa. 194 , 666 A.2d 238 (1995) (an action for the wrongful death of another must be brought no later than two years after the date of death). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017It also refused to compel arbitration of the survival action predicated upon this Court’s then- binding decision in Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 113 A.3d 317 (Pa.Super. 2015), holding that, since Pa.R.C.P. 213 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301 mandated consolidation of wrongful death and survival actions, and only a judicial forum could accommodate the wrongful death beneficiaries right to a jury trial, the court could not sever the survival claim and send it to arbitration. 2016Id. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences2016See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301; Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431 ; Pezzulli, 26 A.2d at 662 . 2016See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301; Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431 ; Pezzulli, 26 A.2d at 662 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia
green
2 sentences2016See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301; Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431 ; Pezzulli, 26 A.2d at 662 . 2016See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301; Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431 ; Pezzulli, 26 A.2d at 662 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Cardinal v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Appellants’ Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted).3 We have explained: Our review of a claim that the trial court improperly [overruled] the appellant's preliminary objections in the nature of a petition to compel arbitration is limited to ____________________________________________ 2 “An order overruling preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration is immediately appealable as an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7320(a) and Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).” Cardinal v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 46 , 49 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017). 3 Appellants’ issues on appeal c | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Dubose, R. v. Willowcrest Nur. Home, Aplts.
green
1 sentence2019On the other hand, a wrongful death action accrues to the decedent's heirs when the decedent dies of such an injury ...." Dubose , 173 A.3d at 637 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
MedCath Inc. Employee Health Care Plan v. Stratton
neutral
2 sentences2017We also examine MedCath Incorporated Employee Health Care Plan v. Stratton, 79 F.Supp.3d 1046 (D. 2017We also examine MedCath Incorporated Employee Health Care Plan v. Stratton, 79 F.Supp.3d 1046 (D. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Setlock v. Pinebrook Personal Care & Retirement Center
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 912 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carroll v. Avallone
green
2 sentences2010In support, the Hospital cites our Supreme Court’s decision in Carroll v. Avallone, 595 Pa. 676 , 939 A.2d 872 (2007), contending that the evidence presented here was no more controverted than that adduced in *934 Carroll where a zero verdict on a survival claim was upheld. 2010In support, the Hospital cites our Supreme Court’s decision in Carroll v. Avallone, 595 Pa. 676 , 939 A.2d 872 (2007), contending that the evidence presented here was no more controverted than that adduced in *934 Carroll where a zero verdict on a survival claim was upheld. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Tindall v. Friedman
green
1 sentence2009The trial court stated that instead, they merely pointed to other cases where jury awards were “substantially less under facts which they believe [were] more compelling and argue[d] that the only reasonable explanation is that this award [was] so grossly exorbitant that it must have been based on passion or prejudice.” Id. ¶ 48 The trial court found that significant evidence supported the jury award of $7,213,200 ($5,383,200 of which was allocated for the wrongful death claim and $1,830,000 for the survival claim): 12 *980 While admittedly a large verdict, there was significant testimony regar | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp.
green
2 sentences1999See Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 524 , 526 A.2d 323, 327 (1987) (the statute of limitations governing a survival claim begins to run no later than the date of death); Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 430 Pa. Super. 162, 172 , 633 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1993), aff’d, 542 Pa. 194 , 666 A.2d 238 (1995) (an action for the wrongful death of another must be brought no later than two years after the date of death). 1999See Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 514 Pa. 517, 524 , 526 A.2d 323, 327 (1987) (the statute of limitations governing a survival claim begins to run no later than the date of death); Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp., 430 Pa. Super. 162, 172 , 633 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1993), aff’d, 542 Pa. 194 , 666 A.2d 238 (1995) (an action for the wrongful death of another must be brought no later than two years after the date of death). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Dougherty v. McLaughlin
green
2 sentences1997Consequently, we are constrained to conclude that a new trial is necessary ....” Id. at 134-35 , 637 A.2d at 1020 . (citations omitted) In Bortner , no damages were awarded as to a survival claim to the decedent’s estate. 1997Consequently, we are constrained to conclude that a new trial is necessary ....” Id. at 134-35 , 637 A.2d at 1020 . (citations omitted) In Bortner , no damages were awarded as to a survival claim to the decedent’s estate. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Schwab v. P. J. Oesterling & Son, Inc.
green
2 sentences1970As in Schwab , the appellant here knew well that it was faced with a lawsuit timely filed by an individual qualified to press both the wrongful death and the survival action claims; as in Schwab , the appellant was confronted with a complaint which, while not spelling out the statutory basis for the survival claim, did contain reference to damages which were recoverable only in a survival action; and as in Schwab , the amendment “merely brought in an additional element of damage for a cause of action already within the compass of the oziginal complaint.” 386 Pa. at 393 , 126 A. 2d at 420 . 1970As in Schwab , the appellant here knew well that it was faced with a lawsuit timely filed by an individual qualified to press both the wrongful death and the survival action claims; as in Schwab , the appellant was confronted with a complaint which, while not spelling out the statutory basis for the survival claim, did contain reference to damages which were recoverable only in a survival action; and as in Schwab , the amendment “merely brought in an additional element of damage for a cause of action already within the compass of the oziginal complaint.” 386 Pa. at 393 , 126 A. 2d at 420 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.