13 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pond v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2022In 1860, we addressed the narrow class of “excusable homicide[s]” and noted that the accused in such cases acts in “the defense of [his] own life, or that of his family, relatives or dependants [sic], within those relations where the law permits the defense of others as of one’s self.” Pond v People, 8 Mich 150, 175 (1860) (emphasis added). 2022In 1860, we addressed the narrow class of “excusable homicide[s]” and noted that the accused in such cases acts in “the defense of [his] own life, or that of his family, relatives or dependants [sic], within those relations where the law permits the defense of others as of one’s self.” Pond v People, 8 Mich 150, 175 (1860) (emphasis added). | 4 | 4 |
Boget v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See also People v Coahran, 436 P3d 617, 622-623 ; 2019 COA 6 (Colo App, 2019) (the defendant, charged with the property crime of criminal mischief, was entitled to a jury instruction on self- defense where she kicked at her boyfriend’s car door to distract him and free herself from his grasp); Boget v State, 74 SW3d 23, 24-25, 31 (Tex Crim App, 2002) (a self-defense instruction was appropriate in response to a criminal-mischief prosecution where the defendant alleged that he had smashed the window of a truck because it was driving recklessly toward him). 2022See also People v Coahran, 436 P3d 617, 622-623 ; 2019 COA 6 (Colo App, 2019) (the defendant, charged with the property crime of criminal mischief, was entitled to a jury instruction on self- defense where she kicked at her boyfriend’s car door to distract him and free herself from his grasp); Boget v State, 74 SW3d 23, 24-25, 31 (Tex Crim App, 2002) (a self-defense instruction was appropriate in response to a criminal-mischief prosecution where the defendant alleged that he had smashed the window of a truck because it was driving recklessly toward him). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Dupreegreen2 sentences2022See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705-706 (finding self-defense applicable to nonassaultive felon-in-possession charge); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52, 58 ; 878 NW2d 811 (2016) (the defendant should have been permitted to claim self-defense in response to the nonassaultive crime of carrying a concealed weapon); People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 305 ; 819 NW2d 82 (2012) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense did not apply to the possessory, nonassaultive felony-firearm charge); People v Miller, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket 2022See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705-706 (finding self-defense applicable to nonassaultive felon-in-possession charge); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52, 58 ; 878 NW2d 811 (2016) (the defendant should have been permitted to claim self-defense in response to the nonassaultive crime of carrying a concealed weapon); People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 305 ; 819 NW2d 82 (2012) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense did not apply to the possessory, nonassaultive felony-firearm charge); People v Miller, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket | 3 | 3 |
v. Coahrangreen2 sentences2022See also People v Coahran, 436 P3d 617, 622-623 ; 2019 COA 6 (Colo App, 2019) (the defendant, charged with the property crime of criminal mischief, was entitled to a jury instruction on self- defense where she kicked at her boyfriend’s car door to distract him and free herself from his grasp); Boget v State, 74 SW3d 23, 24-25, 31 (Tex Crim App, 2002) (a self-defense instruction was appropriate in response to a criminal-mischief prosecution where the defendant alleged that he had smashed the window of a truck because it was driving recklessly toward him). 2022See also People v Coahran, 436 P3d 617, 622-623 ; 2019 COA 6 (Colo App, 2019) (the defendant, charged with the property crime of criminal mischief, was entitled to a jury instruction on self- defense where she kicked at her boyfriend’s car door to distract him and free herself from his grasp); Boget v State, 74 SW3d 23, 24-25, 31 (Tex Crim App, 2002) (a self-defense instruction was appropriate in response to a criminal-mischief prosecution where the defendant alleged that he had smashed the window of a truck because it was driving recklessly toward him). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Kurrgreen2 sentences2024This Court also held, however, that the defense-of-others doctrine only applies to the protection of a fetus or embryo “solely in the context of an assault against the mother.” Id. 2016People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 321, 328 ; 654 NW2d 651 (2002) (indicating that a fetus put in danger by an assault of the mother may be considered “another” for purpose of the defense-of-others defense). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Henrygreen2 sentences2023See People v Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 149 ; 889 NW2d 1 (2016). -9- § 14:10 (16th ed). 2023See People v Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 149 ; 889 NW2d 1 (2016). -9- § 14:10 (16th ed). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Chandlergreen2 sentences2025In light of this conclusion, the dearth of evidence contradicting defendant’s account of the day of the shooting, defense counsel’s argument on self- defense, and the jury’s conviction of defendant for first-degree murder on the basis of the evidence despite the self-defense instruction, we hold defendant has failed to demonstrate that “but for 1 See also State v Valdez, 12 NW3d 191, 197 (Minn, 2024) (reasoning “we have generally stated that a defense-of-others claim ‘parallels’ self-defense”); State v Chandler, 2017-Ohio-8573 ; 99 NE3d 1255, 1259-1260 (Ohio App, 2017) (“With respect to the se 2025In light of this conclusion, the dearth of evidence contradicting defendant’s account of the day of the shooting, defense counsel’s argument on self- defense, and the jury’s conviction of defendant for first-degree murder on the basis of the evidence despite the self-defense instruction, we hold defendant has failed to demonstrate that “but for 1 See also State v Valdez, 12 NW3d 191, 197 (Minn, 2024) (reasoning “we have generally stated that a defense-of-others claim ‘parallels’ self-defense”); State v Chandler, 2017-Ohio-8573 ; 99 NE3d 1255, 1259-1260 (Ohio App, 2017) (“With respect to the se | 1 | 1 |
People v. Guajardogreen2 sentences2023See Leffew, 508 Mich at 638 (“Under the defense-of-others doctrine, [o]ne may use force in defense of another when he or she reasonably believes the other is in immediate danger of harm and force is necessary to prevent the harm; deadly force is permissible to repel an attack which reasonably appears deadly.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original; emphasis added); 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (3d ed), § 10.5(b), pp 223-224 (“As with self-defense, so too with the defense of another, one is not justified in using force to protect the other unless he reasonably beli 2023See Leffew, 508 Mich at 638 (“Under the defense-of-others doctrine, [o]ne may use force in defense of another when he or she reasonably believes the other is in immediate danger of harm and force is necessary to prevent the harm; deadly force is permissible to repel an attack which reasonably appears deadly.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original; emphasis added); 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (3d ed), § 10.5(b), pp 223-224 (“As with self-defense, so too with the defense of another, one is not justified in using force to protect the other unless he reasonably beli | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riddlegreen2 sentences2023See Leffew, 508 Mich at 638 (“Under the defense-of-others doctrine, [o]ne may use force in defense of another when he or she reasonably believes the other is in immediate danger of harm and force is necessary to prevent the harm; deadly force is permissible to repel an attack which reasonably appears deadly.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original; emphasis added); 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (3d ed), § 10.5(b), pp 223-224 (“As with self-defense, so too with the defense of another, one is not justified in using force to protect the other unless he reasonably beli 2023See Leffew, 508 Mich at 638 (“Under the defense-of-others doctrine, [o]ne may use force in defense of another when he or she reasonably believes the other is in immediate danger of harm and force is necessary to prevent the harm; deadly force is permissible to repel an attack which reasonably appears deadly.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original; emphasis added); 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (3d ed), § 10.5(b), pp 223-224 (“As with self-defense, so too with the defense of another, one is not justified in using force to protect the other unless he reasonably beli | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Crews
green
2 sentences2022The panel thought that whether the defense-of-others defense applied to home invasion was “far from certain, at best,” and therefore concluded that “[d]efense counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to advance a novel legal argument.” Leffew, unpub op at 5, quoting People v Crews, 299 Mich App 381, 400 ; 829 NW2d 898 (2013). 2022The panel thought that whether the defense-of-others defense applied to home invasion was “far from certain, at best,” and therefore concluded that “[d]efense counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to advance a novel legal argument.” Leffew, unpub op at 5, quoting People v Crews, 299 Mich App 381, 400 ; 829 NW2d 898 (2013). | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Goree
green
2 sentences2022See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705-706 (finding self-defense applicable to nonassaultive felon-in-possession charge); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52, 58 ; 878 NW2d 811 (2016) (the defendant should have been permitted to claim self-defense in response to the nonassaultive crime of carrying a concealed weapon); People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 305 ; 819 NW2d 82 (2012) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense did not apply to the possessory, nonassaultive felony-firearm charge); People v Miller, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket 2022See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705-706 (finding self-defense applicable to nonassaultive felon-in-possession charge); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52, 58 ; 878 NW2d 811 (2016) (the defendant should have been permitted to claim self-defense in response to the nonassaultive crime of carrying a concealed weapon); People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 305 ; 819 NW2d 82 (2012) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense did not apply to the possessory, nonassaultive felony-firearm charge); People v Miller, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Dunigan
green
2 sentences2022Cf. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 330 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (defense counsel’s failure to present a diminished- capacity defense reflected a strategic choice to focus instead on the insanity defense); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 583-584 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (theory of the defense precluded the need for the jury instruction at issue because “that instruction would have been inconsistent with, and potentially detrimental to, defendant’s theory that he was not the perpetrator and had been falsely accused by the victim”); People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 94 ; 397 NW2d 229 (1986) (def 2022Cf. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 330 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (defense counsel’s failure to present a diminished- capacity defense reflected a strategic choice to focus instead on the insanity defense); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 583-584 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (theory of the defense precluded the need for the jury instruction at issue because “that instruction would have been inconsistent with, and potentially detrimental to, defendant’s theory that he was not the perpetrator and had been falsely accused by the victim”); People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 94 ; 397 NW2d 229 (1986) (def | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Reed
green
2 sentences2022Cf. People v Reed, 453 Mich 685, 695 ; 556 NW2d 858 (1996) (defense counsel not deficient for failing to advance a novel legal argument that no Michigan authority had recognized). 2022Cf. People v Reed, 453 Mich 685, 695 ; 556 NW2d 858 (1996) (defense counsel not deficient for failing to advance a novel legal argument that no Michigan authority had recognized). | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Pickens
green
2 sentences2022Cf. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 330 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (defense counsel’s failure to present a diminished- capacity defense reflected a strategic choice to focus instead on the insanity defense); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 583-584 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (theory of the defense precluded the need for the jury instruction at issue because “that instruction would have been inconsistent with, and potentially detrimental to, defendant’s theory that he was not the perpetrator and had been falsely accused by the victim”); People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 94 ; 397 NW2d 229 (1986) (def 2022Cf. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 330 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (defense counsel’s failure to present a diminished- capacity defense reflected a strategic choice to focus instead on the insanity defense); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 583-584 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (theory of the defense precluded the need for the jury instruction at issue because “that instruction would have been inconsistent with, and potentially detrimental to, defendant’s theory that he was not the perpetrator and had been falsely accused by the victim”); People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 94 ; 397 NW2d 229 (1986) (def | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2022Cf. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 330 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (defense counsel’s failure to present a diminished- capacity defense reflected a strategic choice to focus instead on the insanity defense); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 583-584 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (theory of the defense precluded the need for the jury instruction at issue because “that instruction would have been inconsistent with, and potentially detrimental to, defendant’s theory that he was not the perpetrator and had been falsely accused by the victim”); People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 94 ; 397 NW2d 229 (1986) (def 2022Cf. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 330 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (defense counsel’s failure to present a diminished- capacity defense reflected a strategic choice to focus instead on the insanity defense); People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 583-584 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013) (theory of the defense precluded the need for the jury instruction at issue because “that instruction would have been inconsistent with, and potentially detrimental to, defendant’s theory that he was not the perpetrator and had been falsely accused by the victim”); People v Robinson, 154 Mich App 92, 94 ; 397 NW2d 229 (1986) (def | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Triplett
green
2 sentences2022See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705-706 (finding self-defense applicable to nonassaultive felon-in-possession charge); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52, 58 ; 878 NW2d 811 (2016) (the defendant should have been permitted to claim self-defense in response to the nonassaultive crime of carrying a concealed weapon); People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 305 ; 819 NW2d 82 (2012) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense did not apply to the possessory, nonassaultive felony-firearm charge); People v Miller, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket 2022See Dupree, 486 Mich at 705-706 (finding self-defense applicable to nonassaultive felon-in-possession charge); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52, 58 ; 878 NW2d 811 (2016) (the defendant should have been permitted to claim self-defense in response to the nonassaultive crime of carrying a concealed weapon); People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 305 ; 819 NW2d 82 (2012) (the trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense did not apply to the possessory, nonassaultive felony-firearm charge); People v Miller, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Trakhtenberg
green
2 sentences2023To establish prejudice, he “must show that but for counsel’s deficient performance, a different result would have been reasonably probable.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 55-56 ; 826 NW2d 136 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2023To establish prejudice, he “must show that but for counsel’s deficient performance, a different result would have been reasonably probable.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 55-56 ; 826 NW2d 136 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences2025In light of this conclusion, the dearth of evidence contradicting defendant’s account of the day of the shooting, defense counsel’s argument on self- defense, and the jury’s conviction of defendant for first-degree murder on the basis of the evidence despite the self-defense instruction, we hold defendant has failed to demonstrate that “but for 1 See also State v Valdez, 12 NW3d 191, 197 (Minn, 2024) (reasoning “we have generally stated that a defense-of-others claim ‘parallels’ self-defense”); State v Chandler, 2017-Ohio-8573 ; 99 NE3d 1255, 1259-1260 (Ohio App, 2017) (“With respect to the se 2025In light of this conclusion, the dearth of evidence contradicting defendant’s account of the day of the shooting, defense counsel’s argument on self- defense, and the jury’s conviction of defendant for first-degree murder on the basis of the evidence despite the self-defense instruction, we hold defendant has failed to demonstrate that “but for 1 See also State v Valdez, 12 NW3d 191, 197 (Minn, 2024) (reasoning “we have generally stated that a defense-of-others claim ‘parallels’ self-defense”); State v Chandler, 2017-Ohio-8573 ; 99 NE3d 1255, 1259-1260 (Ohio App, 2017) (“With respect to the se | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Cornell
green
2 sentences2023We have held that a jury instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is appropriate if “the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357 ; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). 7 In this case, we agree with the lower courts that trial counsel’s decision not to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was objectively unreasonable. 2023We have held that a jury instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is appropriate if “the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 357 ; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). 7 In this case, we agree with the lower courts that trial counsel’s decision not to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was objectively unreasonable. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2022In Leffew, defense counsel neglected to request a defense-of-others instruction for their clients, id. at 6, Micheline and Jeremiah Leffew, an omission that our Supreme Court deemed deficient performance under Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 ; 104 S Ct 2052 ; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). 2022In Leffew, defense counsel neglected to request a defense-of-others instruction for their clients, id. at 6, Micheline and Jeremiah Leffew, an omission that our Supreme Court deemed deficient performance under Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 ; 104 S Ct 2052 ; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Heflin
green
2 sentences2002“In Michigan, the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide if the defendant hon *321 estly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.” People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502 ; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). 2002“In Michigan, the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide if the defendant hon *321 estly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.” People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 502 ; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.