consortium claim (Missouri) · Go Syfert
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consortium claim in Missouri

13 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Maddox v. Truman Medical Center, Inc.green
moctapp · 1987 · cited in 4 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1995–2000
2 sentences

1997Respondents’ bank on the fact the appellant is the “lawfully wedded wife” of the injured person, and that she filed the compensation claim on his behalf, “that she was sufficiently in privity with him and his interests, so as to have had the opportunity to assert her claims.” This court in Maddox v. Truman Medical Center, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Mo.App.1987), reiterated the law in Missouri that although the consortium claim is derivative from the injured spouse’s claim, the “consortium claim and the underlying claim exist to compensate the different losses the two spouse’s suffer.” This cou

1995Although the consortium claim and the underlying claim exist to compensate the two spouses for the different losses they sustain, Maddox, 727 S.W.2d at 154 , both involve a claim for damages for malpractice or negligence related to health care.

34
Burrow v. Moyergreen
moctapp · 1975 · cited in 3 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1995
2 sentences

1995While it is often said that a consortium claim is "derivative," see, e.g., Burrow v. Moyer, 519 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Mo.App.1975), it is also said that a claim for loss of consortium is "separate and distinct" from the spouse's claim for her injuries, Marusic v. Union Electric Company, 377 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Mo. 1964), and that they are "two independent causes of action," Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d *214 889, 891 (Mo.App.1970).

1995While it is often said that a consortium claim is “derivative,” see, e.g., Burrow v. Moyer, 519 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Mo.App.1975), it is also said that a claim for loss of consortium is “separate and distinct” from the spouse’s claim for her injuries, Marusic v. Union Electric Company, 377 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Mo.1964), and that they are “two independent causes of action,” Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo.App.1970).

33
Cragin v. Lobbeygreen
moctapp · 1976 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987Appellants cite Cragin v. Lobbey, 537 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.App.1976), Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1974), and M.A.I. 33.01 for the proposition that while each defendant is entitled to a separate converse with respect to each asserted theory of liability, where both a claim for personal injury damages and a derivative claim for loss of consortium are asserted, the only allowable converse instruction with respect to the consortium claim is one directed to the consortium claim plaintiffs’ separate damage element.

1987Appellants cite Cragin v. Lobbey, 537 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.App.1976), Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1974), and M.A.I. 33.01 for the proposition that while each defendant is entitled to a separate converse with respect to each asserted theory of liability, where both a claim for personal injury damages and a derivative claim for loss of consortium are asserted, the only allowable converse instruction with respect to the consortium claim is one directed to the consortium claim plaintiffs' separate damage element.

22
Kamerick v. Dormangreen
moctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Ctr., 621 S.W.3d 36 , 43 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (“‘where the right to recover is dependent entirely on the doctrine of respondeat superior and there is a finding of no negligence by the servant there should be no judgment against the master’” (citations omitted)); 10 Kamerick v. Dorman, 907 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (“A consortium claim is derivative from the injured spouse's claim and depends on the validity of the underlying claim.

11
Burke v. L & J Food & Liquor, Inc.green
moctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006“A consortium claim is a separate, distinct, and personal legal claim, and is derivative only in the sense that it must be occasioned by a spouse’s injury.” Burke v. L & J Food & Liquor, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Mo.App.

11
Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.green
moctapp · 1970 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995While it is often said that a consortium claim is “derivative,” see, e.g., Burrow v. Moyer, 519 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Mo.App.1975), it is also said that a claim for loss of consortium is “separate and distinct” from the spouse’s claim for her injuries, Marusic v. Union Electric Company, 377 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Mo.1964), and that they are “two independent causes of action,” Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo.App.1970).

11
Marusic v. Union Electric Companygreen
mo · 1964 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995While it is often said that a consortium claim is "derivative," see, e.g., Burrow v. Moyer, 519 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Mo.App.1975), it is also said that a claim for loss of consortium is "separate and distinct" from the spouse's claim for her injuries, Marusic v. Union Electric Company, 377 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Mo. 1964), and that they are "two independent causes of action," Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d *214 889, 891 (Mo.App.1970).

1995While it is often said that a consortium claim is “derivative,” see, e.g., Burrow v. Moyer, 519 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Mo.App.1975), it is also said that a claim for loss of consortium is “separate and distinct” from the spouse’s claim for her injuries, Marusic v. Union Electric Company, 377 S.W.2d 454, 459 (Mo.1964), and that they are “two independent causes of action,” Garland v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo.App.1970).

11
Stapleton v. Palmoregreen
ga · 1982 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987Accord, Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 , 297 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1982) (dictum); Board of Commissioners v. Nevitt, 448 N.E.2d 333, 341 (Ind.App. 1983).

1987Accord, Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 , 297 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1982) (dictum); Board of Commissioners v. Nevitt, 448 N.E.2d 333, 341 (Ind.App. 1983).

11
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp.green
ill · 1983 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987In Hammond v. North America Asbestos Co., 97 Ill.2d 195 , 73 Ill.Dec. 350, 358 , 454 N.E.2d 210, 218 (1983), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a consortium claim governed by a longer statute of limitations than that applicable to the injured spouse’s claim could proceed, though the underlying claim was time-barred.

1987In Hammond v. North America Asbestos Co., 97 Ill.2d 195 , 73 Ill.Dec. 350, 358 , 454 N.E.2d 210, 218 (1983), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a consortium claim governed by a longer statute of limitations than that applicable to the injured spouse’s claim could proceed, though the underlying claim was time-barred.

11
Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.green
moctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Mo.App.1978).

11
Board of Com'rs of Cass County v. Nevittgreen
indctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987Accord, Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 , 297 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1982) (dictum); Board of Commissioners v. Nevitt, 448 N.E.2d 333, 341 (Ind.App. 1983).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Joggerst v. O'Toole green
moctapp · 1974
2 sentences

1987However, both Cragin and Wyatt , as well as preceding cases which stood for the same proposition such as Joggerst v. O’Toole, 513 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App.1974), were decided prior to the Supreme Court's modification of M.A.I. in 1980 to mandate the packaging of instructions where there is more than one claim involved in a particular cause, M.A.I. 2.05 and See M.A.I. 2.00 General Comment B. 2 Instruction number six and twelve were patterned on M.A.I. 2.05.

1987However, both Cragin and Wyatt , as well as preceding cases which stood for the same proposition such as Joggerst v. O'Toole, 513 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App.1974), were decided prior to the Supreme Court's modification of M.A.I. in 1980 to mandate the packaging of instructions where there is more than one claim involved in a particular cause, M.A.I. 2.05 and See M.A.I. 2.00 General Comment B. [2] Instruction number six and twelve were patterned on M.A.I. 2.05.

21987–1987
Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company green
moctapp · 1974
2 sentences

1987Appellants cite Cragin v. Lobbey, 537 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.App.1976), Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1974), and M.A.I. 33.01 for the proposition that while each defendant is entitled to a separate converse with respect to each asserted theory of liability, where both a claim for personal injury damages and a derivative claim for loss of consortium are asserted, the only allowable converse instruction with respect to the consortium claim is one directed to the consortium claim plaintiffs’ separate damage element.

1987Appellants cite Cragin v. Lobbey, 537 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.App.1976), Wyatt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 514 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1974), and M.A.I. 33.01 for the proposition that while each defendant is entitled to a separate converse with respect to each asserted theory of liability, where both a claim for personal injury damages and a derivative claim for loss of consortium are asserted, the only allowable converse instruction with respect to the consortium claim is one directed to the consortium claim plaintiffs' separate damage element.

21987–1987
Jones v. Siesennop green
illappct · 1977
2 sentences

2012Quite in contrast to this case, in Seehom, the court determined that the underlying cause of action contained neither elements of a personal injury claim within the meaning of the survival statutes (because the consortium claim was derivative) nor elements of an injury to property (because a wife’s comfort does not constitute a husband’s property). 6 It is worthwhile considering that Illinois courts, the source in White of the characterization of the nature of a legal malpractice claim, have held that legal malpractice claims survive under the Illinois survival statute, which permits the survi

2012Quite in contrast to this case, in Seehom, the court determined that the underlying cause of action contained neither elements of a personal injury claim within the meaning of the survival statutes (because the consortium claim was derivative) nor elements of an injury to property (because a wife’s comfort does not constitute a husband’s property). 6 It is worthwhile considering that Illinois courts, the source in White of the characterization of the nature of a legal malpractice claim, have held that legal malpractice claims survive under the Illinois survival statute, which permits the survi

12012–2012
Teschner v. Physicians Radiology green
moctapp · 1988
1 sentence

2001Id. at 667 .

12001–2001
Burtrum v. U-Haul Co. of Southern Missouri green
moctapp · 1983
1 sentence

1985The court in Burtrum v. U-Haul Company of Southern Missouri, 658 S.W.2d 70 (Mo.App. 1983), held that when a jury returns verdicts for an injured spouse but against the other on a consortium claim, those verdicts are inconsistent.

11985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MO § Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.105 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CT 30 (1979–2019) FL 23 (1979–2022) LA 21 (1985–2013) IL 19 (1970–2026) PA 18 (1979–2014) MO 13 (1985–2021) IA 13 (1984–2024) MA 12 (1971–2024) ME 10 (1984–2025) NJ 10 (1965–2015) OH 9 (1992–2013) NY 9 (1976–2012) MI 7 (1980–1992) GA 7 (1991–2022) KY 6 (1966–2026) MS 6 (1985–2018) WA 5 (1984–2018) CA 5 (1974–2005) MT 5 (1986–2014) MD 4 (1967–1995) MN 4 (1989–1991) TX 3 (1997–2005) AK 3 (1975–1988) DE 3 (1988–2022) WV 3 (1995–2001) NE 3 (1993–2006) VT 3 (1998–2026) IN 3 (1988–2001) DC 2 (1981–2009) AZ 2 (1998–2019) AL 2 (1986–1997) NC 2 (1988–1990) CO 2 (1986–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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