consortium claim in Connecticut

2011The defendant relies on our statement in Hopson that “because a consortium action is derivative of the injured spouse’s cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement . . . .” Id.

2011The defendant relies on our statement in Hopson that "because a consortium action is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement . . . ." Id.

1994In Maloney v. Lesnick, 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 (1988), reversed on other grounds, 213 Conn. 548 (1990), the court stated: "Moreover, the plaintiff's consortium claim is for loss of filial, rather than spousal consortium.

1994Counts Two and Four: Loss of Consortium The defendants argue that Connecticut does not recognize an action for loss of filial consortium and cite Mahoney v. Lensink , 17 Conn. App. 130 , 55 A.2d 1088 (1988), as authority.

1993Co., 203 Conn. 305 , 312 , 524 A.2d 641 (1987). "[B]ecause a consortium action is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits." Hopson v. St.

1993Co., 203 Conn. 305 , 312 , 524 A.2d 641 (1987). "[B]ecause a consortium action is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits." Hopson v. St.

2011We considered the question of whether joinder of the consortium claim with the predicate claim should be required, and found that question to be inextricably linked to the question of whether the settlement of a predicate action would bar the derivative consortium action. [5] Id., at 91 , 735 A.2d 347 .

2011We considered the question of whether joinder of the consortium claim with the predicate claim should be required, and found that question to be inextricably linked to the question of whether the settlement of a predicate action would bar the derivative consortium action. [5] Id., at 91 , 735 A.2d 347 .

2009Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 786 , 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (same); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759 , 761 n.2, 873 A.2d 175 (2005) (same); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (loss of consortium is “derivative action . . . dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action”); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins.

2009Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 786 , 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (same); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759 , 761 n.2, 873 A.2d 175 (2005) (same); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (loss of consortium is “derivative action . . . dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action”); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins.

1997In Greene v. Metals Selling Corporation, 3 Conn. App. 40 . 47 (1984), the decedent husband was held not to have had a cause of action so that the consortium claim had to be CT Page 12500 stricken, also see Kershaw v. UpRight, Inc., 1996 Ct. Sup. 1267 -x (No. CV950409957, 1/29/96), Ortiz v. Ford, 1996 Sup. Ct. 4022, 17 CONN.

1991"A consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouses' cause of action." Greene v. Metals Selling Corporation, 3 Conn. App. 40 , 46 (1984). "[T]he right of consortium tracks the existence of the marital relationship and terminates upon its dissolution by death or divorce." Meizoso v. Bajoros, 12 Conn. App. 516 , 520 (1987).

1995"An action for loss of consortium is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit by the injured spouse is barred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners , 219 Conn. 179 , 199 , 592 A.2d 912 CT Page 1588-J (1991), citing to Hopson v. St.

1995"An action for loss of consortium is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit by the injured spouse is barred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners , 219 Conn. 179 , 199 , 592 A.2d 912 CT Page 1588-J (1991), citing to Hopson v. St.

1994In Maloney v. Lesnick, 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 (1988), reversed on other grounds, 213 Conn. 548 (1990), the court stated: "Moreover, the plaintiff's consortium claim is for loss of filial, rather than spousal consortium.

1992In Maloney v. Lesnick, 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 (1988), reversed on other grounds, 213 Conn. 548 (1990), the court stated: "Moreover, the plaintiff's consortium claim is for loss of filial, rather than spousal consortium.

2011The court also noted that “a consortium claim by a lone spouse will not be recognized where the underlying tort has been prohibited or abolished.” Id.

2011The court also noted that "a consortium claim by a lone spouse will not be recognized where the underlying tort has been prohibited or abolished." Id.

2009Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 786 , 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (same); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759 , 761 n.2, 873 A.2d 175 (2005) (same); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (loss of consortium is “derivative action . . . dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action”); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins.

2009Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 786 , 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (same); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759 , 761 n.2, 873 A.2d 175 (2005) (same); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (loss of consortium is “derivative action . . . dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action”); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins.

2009Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 786 , 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (same); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759 , 761 n.2, 873 A.2d 175 (2005) (same); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (loss of consortium is “derivative action . . . dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action”); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins.

2009Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, 278 Conn. 779, 786 , 900 A.2d 18 (2006) (same); Prescott v. Meriden, 273 Conn. 759 , 761 n.2, 873 A.2d 175 (2005) (same); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 555-56 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (loss of consortium is “derivative action . . . dependent upon the legal existence of the predicate action”); Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins.

1999Justice Borden, writing for the Court in a 5-2 decision in Mendillo, supra, concluded the imposition of third party liability on a tortfeasor was an exception to the general rule of the scope of a special policy inquiry. 246 Conn. 480 .

1998"It is difficult to rationalize why rights protected by the legal contract of marriage should give rise to a consortium claim, while rights which are constitutionally protected should not." Id. "[T]he parent-child relationship holds an equally esteemed position as that between spouses, such as that parental interests and rights as to children are of constitutional dimension, albeit in other contexts." LeBlanc v. Vitam Youth Treatment Center , supra, 19 Conn. L.

1998"It is difficult to rationalize why rights protected by the legal contract of marriage should give rise to a consortium claim, while rights which are constitutionally protected should not." Id. "[T]he parent-child relationship holds an equally esteemed position as that between spouses, such as that parental interests and rights as to children are of constitutional dimension, albeit in other contexts." LeBlanc v. Vitam Youth Treatment Center , supra, 19 Conn. L.

1997The Plaintiffs argue therefore, that Summary Judgment should not issue on the consortium claim. "[S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800 , 805 , 679 A.2d 945 (1996); Practice Book § 384.

1997The Plaintiffs argue therefore, that Summary Judgment should not issue on the consortium claim. "[S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800 , 805 , 679 A.2d 945 (1996); Practice Book § 384.

1997Lynn v. Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc . 226 Conn. 282 , 289 (1993); Hopson v. St.

1997Where the injured spouse's "claim is barred, the derivative claim of loss of consortium is also barred." Murray v. Commissioner of Transportation, 31 Conn. App. 752 , 757 , 626 A.2d 1328 (1993).

1997Where the injured spouse's "claim is barred, the derivative claim of loss of consortium is also barred." Murray v. Commissioner of Transportation, 31 Conn. App. 752 , 757 , 626 A.2d 1328 (1993).

1997In Greene v. Metals Selling Corporation, 3 Conn. App. 40 . 47 (1984), the decedent husband was held not to have had a cause of action so that the consortium claim had to be CT Page 12500 stricken, also see Kershaw v. UpRight, Inc., 1996 Ct. Sup. 1267 -x (No. CV950409957, 1/29/96), Ortiz v. Ford, 1996 Sup. Ct. 4022, 17 CONN.

1996See Broadmax v. Ali, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, CT Page 4022-B Docket No. 321979 (September 21, 1995) (Thim, J.); Casner v. Fine, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 462895 14 Conn. L.

1993As the court noted, in Buchholz's Appeal, supra, at 419 , "a parent has a constitutionally protected right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his child." (emphasis added) Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 , 652 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, supra. It is difficult to rationalize why rights protected by the legal contract of marriage should give rise to a consortium claim, while rights which are constitutionally protected should not.

1991"A consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouses' cause of action." Greene v. Metals Selling Corporation, 3 Conn. App. 40 , 46 (1984). "[T]he right of consortium tracks the existence of the marital relationship and terminates upon its dissolution by death or divorce." Meizoso v. Bajoros, 12 Conn. App. 516 , 520 (1987).

1979It is clear, however, from the language of the cases from other jurisdictions which were relied on by the court in Hopson that there was no intention to alter or change the normal operation of the statutes of limitations in those jurisdictions. *285 For example, in Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corporation, 46 N.J. 82 , 95, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that where the original personal injury claim has not been barred and the action is still pending, the other spouse’s consortium claim, if not itself barred by limitations, may be asserted in such action.

1979The California Supreme Court, in recognizing the existence of a right of action in the wife for loss of consortium, stated that its decision was to be “given normal retroactive effect within the limits of the statute of limitations.” (Emphasis added.) Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 12 Cal. 3d 382 , 408 n.30.

1979The Restatement (Second) of Torts will state that both the husband and wife have a right to recovery for loss of consortium on equal terms; the Restatement (Second) will also add the requirement that where possible the consortium claim must be joined with the claim for bodily injury. 4 Our decision today does not drastically or radically change existing law, for in no serious way will an existing interest be impaired or an expectation *496 be disappointed or a reliance be defeated. 5 See Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 578 , 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968) (viewing any problem of i

1979The Restatement (Second) of Torts will state that both the husband and wife have a right to recovery for loss of consortium on equal terms; the Restatement (Second) will also add the requirement that where possible the consortium claim must be joined with the claim for bodily injury. 4 Our decision today does not drastically or radically change existing law, for in no serious way will an existing interest be impaired or an expectation *496 be disappointed or a reliance be defeated. 5 See Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 578 , 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968) (viewing any problem of i