Jackson v. Virginia standard in Texas

2026That said, “both legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the jury’s rejection of self-defense [are reviewed] under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.” Rankin v. State, 617 S.W.3d 169 , 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim.

2025We disagreed and held: “the Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed that the Jackson v. Virginia standard ‘is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply . . . .’” Id. at *12-13 (quoting Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim.

2025STANDARD OF REVIEW In criminal cases, we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence under the well- established Jackson v. Virginia standard, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 , 894–96 (Tex. Crim.

2024Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 315–16 (1979); Gonzalez v. State, No. 08-19-00062-CR, 2020 WL 7585890 , at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 22, 2020, no pet.) (applying Jackson v. Virginia standard to a jury’s rejection of self-defense claim).

2026Id. at 608–09; see also Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (applying Jackson v. Virginia standard to jury’s rejection of self-defense claim).

2025Therefore, “we look not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted appellant’s self-defense testimony”; rather, “we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the 13 essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 (quoting Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e review

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994) (Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 ." 6 While it is axiomatic that appellate courts do not engage in credibility assessments, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that an appellate court must, at times, determine whether a jury's reliance upon certain evidence to support its conclusion is rational.

2015The Jackson v. Virginia standard still requires the reviewing court to determine whether " any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original); Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 418 n. 7 (Hervey, J., dissenting).

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994)( Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 . [20] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . [21] See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , 98 S.Ct. 2151 , 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). [22] For example, in Watson, in which we recognized that factual-sufficiency review is " barely distinguishable" from legal-sufficiency review, we stated that the first ground rule for factual- sufficiency review i

2015See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994) (Jackson v. Virginia standard necessarily encompasses a factual-sufficiency review), vacated, 922 S.W.2d at 136 ." 6 While it is axiomatic that appellate courts do not engage in credibility assessments, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that an appellate court must, at times, determine whether a jury's reliance upon certain evidence to support its conclusion is rational.

1997The Johnson decision was rendered more than seven years before the opinion in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), which rejected the [Johnson ] reasonable hypothesis analytical construct standard of review, id. at 161 , in favor of the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review.

1997The Johnson decision was rendered more than seven years before the opinion in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), which rejected the [Johnson ] reasonable hypothesis analytical construct standard of review, id. at 161 , in favor of the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review.

2025Therefore, “we look not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted appellant’s self-defense testimony”; rather, “we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the 13 essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609 (quoting Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e review

2018Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914 ; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19 (1979); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2011 pet. ref’d) (applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard to jury’s rejection of self-defense claim).

2020Thus, a reviewing court is not to simply determine whether there is evidence that supports the verdict, and, if so, declare that the evidence is legally sufficient. “[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard is not a ‘no evidence’ standard.” Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. Crim.

2006See also Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (hypothetical demonstrating proper application of Jackson v. Virginia standard). [8] This is also stated as viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. [9] This is also stated as viewing the evidence in a neutral light. [10] Whether these Code provisions apply to appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency questions is a matter of legislative intent which requires an appellate court to give effect to the unambiguous language of these Code provisions unless doing so would produce an

2015Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2015Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2011See id. at 912 (plurality op.); see also Pomier v. State , 326 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

2011See id. at 912 (plurality op.); Pomier v. State , 326 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

2024See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. Crim.

2021Id. at 669 . 6 In Brooks, the Court of Criminal Appeals instructed appellate courts to apply the Jackson v. Virginia standard “in determining whether the evidence can support each element of a criminal offense that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444, 448-449 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing), the court wrote that although the evidence in circumstantial evidence cases is not to be tested by an “ultimate” standard different from the standard of review applicable to direct evidence cases, the “exclusion of outstanding reasonable hypotheses” analysis is to be applied to determine the sufficiency of the evidence in circumstantial evidence cases, thereby calling forth the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review.

1994In Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), the Court jettisoned the "reasonable alternative hypothesis" understanding of the Jackson v. Virginia test for sufficiency of the evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, an understanding that we had previously embraced in Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.

2020All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled.”); see also Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim.

2020All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled.”); see also Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim.

2015Cf. Tibbs, 397 So.2d at 1125-26 (abandoning reversals based on weight of the evidence and stating that " [c]ases now pending on appeal in which a court has characterized the reversal as based on evidentiary weight should be reconsidered" ).

2015Cf. Tibbs, 397 So.2d at 1125-26 (abandoning reversals based on weight of the evidence and stating that “[c]ases now pending on appeal in which a court has characterized the reversal as based on evidentiary weight should be reconsidered”).

2015See Green, 260 S.W. at 196 (" Though the verdict should not be lightly annulled it is our duty to set it aside and order another trial when the evidence viewed in its strongest light from the standpoint of the state, fails to make guilt reasonably certain." ) (emphasis supplied). [47] To the extent that Walker can be read to support this proposition, we note that Walker was relying on that portion of the statutory predecessor to Article 44.25 that permitted a reversal " for the reason that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence." See Walker, 14 Tex.Ct.App. at 629 (emphasis suppl

2015See Green, 260 S.W. at 196 (“Though the verdict should not be lightly annulled it is our duty to set it aside and order another trial when the evidence viewed in its strongest light from the standpoint of the state, fails to make guilt reasonably certain.”) (emphasis supplied). 47 To the extent that Walker can be read to support this proposition, we note that Walker was relying on that portion of the statutory predecessor to Article 44.25 that permitted a reversal “for the reason that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” See Walker, 14 Tex.Ct.App. at 629 (emphasis supplied).

2007See Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 487 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would probably commit criminal acts *100 of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society).

2007See Allridge v. State , 850 S.W.2d 471, 487 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991) (appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would probably commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society).

2010The United States Supreme Court distinguished a reversal based on an “independent assessment of evidentiary weight” from the Jackson v. Virginia standard and stated, under Jackson v. Virgi *723 nia, “[t]he trier of fact, not the appellate court, holds ‘the responsibility ... fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Id. at 45 nn. 21 & 22, 102 S.Ct. 2211 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ).

2010The United States Supreme Court distinguished a reversal based on an “independent assessment of evidentiary weight” from the Jackson v. Virginia standard and stated, under Jackson v. Virgi *723 nia, “[t]he trier of fact, not the appellate court, holds ‘the responsibility ... fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Id. at 45 nn. 21 & 22, 102 S.Ct. 2211 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ).

2015See Smith, 355 S.W.3d at 146 (concluding jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant’s conduct in chasing decedent and attempting to stab him second time was inconsistent with his defensive claims); Denman v. State, 193 S.W.3d 129 , 132–33 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (finding evidence sufficient to support 9 conviction for aggravated assault under Jackson v. Virginia standard despite defendant’s claim of self-defense, which was based on testimony of defendant and other witnesses who stated that complainant had assaulted or threatened defendant on prior occasions);

2013See Denman v. State, 193 S.W. 3d 129 , 132–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault under the Jackson v. Virginia standard despite defendant's claim of self-defense, which was based on the testimony of the defendant and other witnesses who stated that the complainant had assaulted or threatened defendant on prior occasions).

2022See id. at 173 ; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902, 912 (Tex. Crim.

2017See Robinson v. State , 466 S.W.3d 166 , 173 (Tex. Crim.

2019We must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim.

2016App. 2010) (“[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 9 Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim.

2015However, when Clewis was decided in 1996, the Texas Supreme Court had decided that direct-appeal courts were required to exercise a factual-sufficiency standard with " deferential standards of review." See Roberts, 221 S.W.3d at 664 n. 7; Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex.1988).[40] With its requirement that all of the evidence must be viewed under deferential standards to determine whether a jury's verdict is " manifestly unjust and clearly wrong," this civil factual-sufficiency standard that Clewis adopted for criminal cases was essentially the Jackson v. Virginia

2015However, when Clewis was decided in 1996, the Texas Supreme Court had decided that direct-appeal courts were required to exercise a factual-sufficiency standard with “deferential standards of review.” See Roberts, 221 S.W.3d at 664 n. 7; Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex.1988). 40 With its requirement that all of the evidence must be viewed under deferential standards to determine whether a jury's verdict is “manifestly unjust and clearly wrong,” this civil factual-sufficiency standard that Clewis adopted for criminal cases was essentially the Jackson v. Virginia sta

2015In re F.J.S., 241 S.W.3d 565, 567 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2007, no pet.); In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 1997, no pet.).

2015In re F.J.S., 241 S.W.3d 565, 567 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.); In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.).

2015And quite correctly, this Court, citing that footnote, recognized Due Process demands sufficiency of the evidence be assessed in view of the trial court's charge to the jury (which of course must track the indictment): Gollihar's' standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the "elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case" clearly is not the same as the Jackson v. Virginia standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the "substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Compare Jackson, 99 S.Ct. at 2792 fn.

2011They diverge, however, in distinguishing between “substantive elements,” the only elements to be used in a Jackson v. Virginia analysis, and Gollihar’s “elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge.” The hypothetically correct jury charge may include elements that 29 Malik, at 240. 30 Fuller, 73 S.W.3d at 252 . 31 In Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring); see also Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (holding that the proper standard for review of factual sufficiency challenges to negative finding on issue that defendant had to prove by preponderance of the evidence is not Jackson v. Virginia standard); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (holding that Meraz standard was suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Watson v.

2011App. 1990) (holding that the proper standard for review of factual sufficiency challenges to negative finding on issue that defendant had to prove by preponderance of the evidence is not Jackson v. Virginia standard) ; Zuniga v. State , 144 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim.

2011They diverge, however, in distinguishing between “substantive elements,” the only elements to be used in a Jackson v. Virginia analysis, and Gollihar’s “elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge.” The hypothetically correct jury charge may include elements that 29 Malik, at 240. 30 Fuller, 73 S.W.3d at 252 . 31 In Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim.

2010The evidence that appellant injured the elderly victim by hitting him in the face with his fist satisfies the Jackson v. Virginia standard because it constitutes proof of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged of “injury to an elderly individual.” Id.

2018Laster v. State , 275 S.W.3d at 517 ; Winfrey , 323 S.W.3d at 882 (noting that, "It is the obligation and responsibility of appellate courts 'to ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.' " (citing Williams v. State , 235 S.W.3d 742 , 750 (Tex. Crim.

2016Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) ("[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt). 15 .