extreme doctrine in New York

1905So far as the thief is concerned, the felonious design. and action are then as complete as though the crime could have been, or, in fact, had been committed, and punishment of such offender is just as essential to the protection of the public, as one whose designs have been successful.’ ” (People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122 ; 17 N. Y.

1905So far as the thief is concerned, the felonious design and action are then as complete as though the crime could have been, or in fact had been, committed, and punishment of such offender is just as essential to the protection of the public as one whose designs have been successful.” People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122 , 65 N. E. 989 , 63 L.

1977(See People v Santos, supra, Matter of Lublin v Central Islip Psychiatric Center, supra.) Also, in Lublin, the Appellate Division quoted from and emphasized a New Jersey case, State of New Jersey v Krol (68 NJ 236, 248), in which the New Jersey court interpreted Jackson v Indiana by stating: "the state must make a meaningful factual determination as to whether defendant actually meets the standard for commitment.” In addition, it would be paradoxical in the extreme for a rule of law to declare a man legally incompetent and yet still rational enough to have him prove his present mental state.

1977(See People v Santos, supra, Matter of Lublin v Central Islip Psychiatric Center, supra.) Also, in Lublin, the Appellate Division quoted from and emphasized a New Jersey case, State of New Jersey v Krol (68 NJ 236, 248), in which the New Jersey court interpreted Jackson v Indiana by stating: "the state must make a meaningful factual determination as to whether defendant actually meets the standard for commitment.” In addition, it would be paradoxical in the extreme for a rule of law to declare a man legally incompetent and yet still rational enough to have him prove his present mental state.

1968(Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ; Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 .) For a criminal defendant this is not an extreme doctrine, which it might perhaps be when applied to a civil litigant.

1968(Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ; Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 .) For a criminal defendant this is not an extreme doctrine, which it might perhaps be when applied to a civil litigant.

1968(Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ; Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 .) For a criminal defendant this is not an extreme doctrine, which it might perhaps be when applied to a civil litigant.

1960The plaintiff was not, therefore, bound to accept the title tendered (New York Investors v. Manhattan Beach Bathing Parks Corp., 256 N. Y. 162, 164 , supra).

1960What he was required to prove was that a qualified title company would insure title free and clear of them, and the record is devoid of such proof.” (See, also, Antin v. O’Shea, 270 App. Div. 1046 .) In Beinhauer v. Morris ( 142 App. Div. 398, 400 ) the court said: “ While it may be true that the encroachments shown upon the Lovell survey, which constituted the extreme claim made, are not of sufficient importance to warrant a finding by the court that the title was not marketable, that is not the question presented upon this appeal; for by the agreement of the parties the title which was to be

1960What he was required to prove was that a qualified title company would insure title free and clear of them, and the record is devoid of such proof.” (See, also, Antin v. O’Shea, 270 App. Div. 1046 .) In Beinhauer v. Morris ( 142 App. Div. 398, 400 ) the court said: “ While it may be true that the encroachments shown upon the Lovell survey, which constituted the extreme claim made, are not of sufficient importance to warrant a finding by the court that the title was not marketable, that is not the question presented upon this appeal; for by the agreement of the parties the title which was to be

1943(Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 89 .) It is unnecessary to resort to this extreme rule.

1905If under his will there were provisions relating to its •sale which operated as an equitable conversion, then under the authority of Matter of Mills, 86 App. Div. 555 ; affd., by the Court of Appeals, 177 N. Y. 562 , it would pass under Mrs. Hull’s will as personal property, assuming that the law of Hew Jersey is the same as the law of this State on that subject.

1905If under his will there were provisions relating to its •sale which operated as an equitable conversion, then under the authority of Matter of Mills, 86 App. Div. 555 ; affd., by the Court of Appeals, 177 N. Y. 562 , it would pass under Mrs. Hull’s will as personal property, assuming that the law of Hew Jersey is the same as the law of this State on that subject.

1905The case of Morris v. Harburger ( 100 App. Div. 357 ), recently decided by this court, is relied upon by the respondent. 1 am of opinion that an extreme doctrine was laid down in that case, and while it should be followed as an authority by this court, it should be strictly limited to the facts then presented for adjudication.

1901Co., 139 id. 19.) But this extreme doctrine which, upon grounds of public policy, precludes the enforcement of the license after part or full performance, thus constituting a departure from the rule adopted by courts of equity concerning other contracts relating to real estate (Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285 ; Rindge v. Baker, 57 id. 209 ; Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 id. 462 ; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 id. 227; Wisemam, v. Lucksinger , 84 id. 31 ) has no application to the case at bar.

1901Co., 139 id. 19.) But this extreme doctrine which, upon grounds of public policy, precludes the enforcement of the license after part or full performance, thus constituting a departure from the rule adopted by courts of equity concerning other contracts relating to real estate (Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285 ; Rindge v. Baker, 57 id. 209 ; Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 id. 462 ; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 id. 227; Wisemam, v. Lucksinger , 84 id. 31 ) has no application to the case at bar.

1900Witherbee v. Supervisors, 70 id. 235 ; Cole v. State, 102 id. 48; O’Hara v. State, 112 id. 146; Mayor v. Tenth National Bank, 111 id. 446; Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Town of Attica, 119 id. 204.) Upon the facts, however, these were all proper cases for equitable relief, and those in which the extreme doctrine was announced were all decided under laws enacted prior to the adoption of sections 10 and 11 of article 8 of the Constitution in 1814.

1900The witness had testified that he was acquainted with the handwriting of plaintiff’s testator; that he had received numerous letters from him in the course of business dealings with him, and he was asked whether he could, “ with reasonable certainty, from your acquaintance with the handwriting of Father Schwenniger, state whether that is in his handwriting or not ? ” This question, even under the extreme rule suggested in People v. Corey (supra), which was a criminal case, in which the witness under discussion had evidenced a lack of ordinary intelligence, and who was in fact unable to read th

1888(Hoyer v. Town of Mascontah, 59 Ill., 137 ; State v. Hayden, 32 Wis., 663 .) The extreme rule of evidence insisted upon by the defendant’s counsel was considered to be necessary in Berckmans v. Berckmans (17 N. J.

1888(Hoyer v. Town of Mascontah, 59 Ill., 137 ; State v. Hayden, 32 Wis., 663 .) The extreme rule of evidence insisted upon by the defendant’s counsel was considered to be necessary in Berckmans v. Berckmans (17 N. J.