6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1876–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Michigan City v. Boecklinggreen1 sentence1892See, also, City of Michigan City v. Boeckling, 122 Ind. 39 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Indiana Car Co. v. Parker
green
2 sentences1895As to the Arnold case, the Supreme Court quite recently said: “In the case of Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, supra, the extreme doctrine maintained in that case was not .approved, and the same still meets with the disapproval of this court.” Indiana, etc., R. 1895In the case of the Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, supra, the extreme doctrine maintained in that case was not approved, and the same still meets with the disapproval of this court. | 2 | 1895–1895 |
Ransburg v. Richards
green
1 sentence2025Despite these dangers, the indemnification clause amounts to a “blanket release” of USATF from negligence, see Ransburg, 770 N.E.2d at 398 , precluding recovery for injuries related to USATF events “without limitation,” Appellant’s App. Vol. 6, p. 165 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Columbus & Indianapolis Central Railway Co. v. Arnold
neutral
1 sentence1905Co. v. Arnold (1869), 31 Ind. 174 , 99 Am. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Richards v. Jackson
green
1 sentence1876We have thus carefully examined all the authorities cited by the appellees, and considered the argument in support of their views, but we are unable to adopt the extreme rule contended for by them—approved but by the single case of Richards v. Jackson, supra, and expressed obiter by only one of the judges in the case of De Santos v. Taney, supra—namely, “that no brokerage is due until the sale is complete and executed ; that is to say, until the consideration of the sale has passed to the vendor.” This rule is not supported, indeed we think it is quite overthrown, by the current of authorities | 1 | 1876–1876 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.