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13 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
O'MARA v. Douglas Countygreen2 sentences2002Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 178 , 864 P2d 368 (1993) (function of a notwithstanding clause is to operate as “an exception to the provisions of law referenced in the clause”); O’Mara v. Douglas County, 318 Or 72, 76 , 862 P2d 499 (1993) (“The function of a ‘notwithstanding’ clause in the statute is to except the remainder of the sentence containing the clause from other provisions of a law that is referenced in that particular notwithstanding clause.”). 2002Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 178 , 864 P2d 368 (1993) (function of a notwithstanding clause is to operate as “an exception to the provisions of law referenced in the clause”); O’Mara v. Douglas County, 318 Or 72, 76 , 862 P2d 499 (1993) (“The function of a ‘notwithstanding’ clause in the statute is to except the remainder of the sentence containing the clause from other provisions of a law that is referenced in that particular notwithstanding clause.”). | 3 | 3 |
Severy v. Board of Parolegreen2 sentences2007Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 178 , 864 P2d 368 (1993) (function of a notwithstanding clause is to operate as “an exception to the provisions of law referenced in the clause”). 2007Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 178 , 864 P2d 368 (1993) (function of a notwithstanding clause is to operate as “an exception to the provisions of law referenced in the clause”). | 2 | 4 |
Baker v. City of Lakesidegreen2 sentences2019The city responded that ORS 12.020(2) did not apply, because of the notwithstanding clause of ORS 30.075(9). 343 Or. at 72 , 74 , 164 P.3d 259 . 2019The city responded that ORS 12.020(2) did not apply, because of the notwithstanding clause of ORS 30.075(9). 343 Or. at 72 , 74 , 164 P.3d 259 . | 1 | 6 |
Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2020See State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (stating that “an interpretation that renders a statutory provision meaningless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect for a coordinate branch of government that took the trou- ble to enact the provision into law and as a matter of complying with the interpretative principle that, if possible, we give a statute with multiple parts a construction that ‘will give effect to all’ of those parts” (quoting Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 337 Or 502, 510 , 98 P3d 1116 (2004)); ORS 174.010 (providing that courts are “to ascertain 2020See State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (stating that “an interpretation that renders a statutory provision meaningless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect for a coordinate branch of government that took the trou- ble to enact the provision into law and as a matter of complying with the interpretative principle that, if possible, we give a statute with multiple parts a construction that ‘will give effect to all’ of those parts” (quoting Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 337 Or 502, 510 , 98 P3d 1116 (2004)); ORS 174.010 (providing that courts are “to ascertain | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cloutiergreen2 sentences2020See State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (stating that “an interpretation that renders a statutory provision meaningless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect for a coordinate branch of government that took the trou- ble to enact the provision into law and as a matter of complying with the interpretative principle that, if possible, we give a statute with multiple parts a construction that ‘will give effect to all’ of those parts” (quoting Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 337 Or 502, 510 , 98 P3d 1116 (2004)); ORS 174.010 (providing that courts are “to ascertain 2020See State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 98 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (stating that “an interpretation that renders a statutory provision meaningless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect for a coordinate branch of government that took the trou- ble to enact the provision into law and as a matter of complying with the interpretative principle that, if possible, we give a statute with multiple parts a construction that ‘will give effect to all’ of those parts” (quoting Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 337 Or 502, 510 , 98 P3d 1116 (2004)); ORS 174.010 (providing that courts are “to ascertain | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2007See State v. Johnson, 339 Or 69, 93-94 , 116 P3d 879 (2005) (looking to historical practice in holding last antecedent rule inapplicable). 2007See State v. Johnson, 339 Or 69, 93-94 , 116 P3d 879 (2005) (looking to historical practice in holding last antecedent rule inapplicable). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Professional Services Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2002Thus, for example, in Wright v. Professional Services Industries, Inc., 153 Or App 102 , 956 P2d 230 , rev den, 327 Or 317 (1998), a worker who had unsuccessfully requested de novo review of an abitrator’s decision in a wage collection action complained that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees to the defendant employer. 2002Thus, for example, in Wright v. Professional Services Industries, Inc., 153 Or App 102 , 956 P2d 230 , rev den, 327 Or 317 (1998), a worker who had unsuccessfully requested de novo review of an abitrator’s decision in a wage collection action complained that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees to the defendant employer. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bell v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District
green
1 sentence2013At issue in Baker was whether the notwithstanding clause in ORS 30.275(9) applied to ORS 12.020(2), a statute that permits service of process to relate Cite as 353 Or 535 (2013) 539 back to the date on which the complaint was filed.1 We held that it did not, because “the notwithstanding clause in ORS 30.275(9) applies only to those provisions of ORS chapter 12 and other statutes that provide a limitation on the commencement of an action,” and ORS 12.020 was not such a statute. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Gaines
green
2 sentences2013Because this case presents a question of interpretation involving the interplay between two statutes, we resolve it under the principles set out in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009); that is, we examine the text and context of the statute and any legislative history that appears to be helpful at that level of analysis. 2013Because this case presents a question of interpretation involving the interplay between two statutes, we resolve it under the principles set out in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009); that is, we examine the text and context of the statute and any legislative history that appears to be helpful at that level of analysis. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Giulietti v. Oncology Associates of Oregon, P.C.
green
2 sentences2013Because it had concluded in an earlier decision that ORS 30.075(1) is a “statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action,” Giulietti v. Oncology Associates of Oregon, 178 Or App 260 , 36 P3d 510 (2001), the court held that ORS 30.075(1) fell within the scope of the notwithstanding clause of ORS 30.275(9). 2013Because it had concluded in an earlier decision that ORS 30.075(1) is a “statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action,” Giulietti v. Oncology Associates of Oregon, 178 Or App 260 , 36 P3d 510 (2001), the court held that ORS 30.075(1) fell within the scope of the notwithstanding clause of ORS 30.275(9). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Engweiler v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
green
2 sentences2011Second, in Engweiler V, this court concluded that the “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” clause at the beginning of the text of ORS 161.620 (1989) means “that the terms of ORS 161.620 (1989) prevailed over ‘any other provision of law.’ In other words, the notwithstanding clause ‘ma[kes] it irrelevant that ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1989) and ORS 163.105(1) (1989) each mandated a minimum sentence of 30 years without the possibility of parole for any person convicted of aggravated murder and made no exception for persons who were juveniles under the age of 17 when they committed [aggravated 2011Second, in Engweiler V, this court concluded that the "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law" clause at the beginning of the text of ORS 161.620 (1989) means "that the terms of ORS 161.620 (1989) prevailed over `any other provision of law.' In other words, the notwithstanding clause `ma[kes] it irrelevant that ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1989) and ORS 163.105(1) (1989) each mandated a minimum sentence of 30 years without the possibility of parole for any person convicted of aggravated murder and made no exception for persons who were juveniles under the age of 17 when they committed [aggravated | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Cook
green
1 sentence2011Third, in Engweiler V, the court also observed, as it had earlier in Engweiler IV , that juvenile aggravated murderers are "a small class of inmates who continued to receive indeterminate sentences," Engweiler IV, 340 Or. at 381, 133 P.3d 904 , and who are entitled to parole consideration: "ORS 161.620 (1989) trumped [ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1989) and ORS 163.105(1) (1989) ] by precluding imposition of the 30-year mandatory minimum sentence otherwise authorized by ORS 163.105(1) (1989) for juveniles who were under age 17 when they committed aggravated murder. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.