9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1955–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2007Because admission of those statements violated the federal Constitution, the error may be found harmless only if, on appeal, the Attorney General demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same notwithstanding the error. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) In characterizing the error as harmless, the majority reasons that John's statement at the hospital to Dr. Russell, which the trial court properly admitted, "succinctly indicated what had caused John's injury" (maj. opn., ante, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 809 , 155 P.3d a 2007Because admission of those statements violated the federal Constitution, the error may be found harmless only if, on appeal, the Attorney General demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same notwithstanding the error. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) In characterizing the error as harmless, the majority reasons that John's statement at the hospital to Dr. Russell, which the trial court properly admitted, "succinctly indicated what had caused John's injury" (maj. opn., ante, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 809 , 155 P.3d a | 3 | 5 |
Butt v. City of Richmondgreen1 sentence2023(Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) This point is reinforced by Becerra’s recognition that the notwithstanding clause “cannot reasonably be read to do away with the entire CPRA”; rather, “ ‘only those provisions of the law that conflict with’ section 832.7(b)—‘not . . . every provision of law’—are inapplicable.” (Ibid.) Consequently, like the catchall exemption addressed in Becerra, other statutory disclosure exemptions that do not pose a direct conflict with section 832.7(b)—whether mentioned by name within the CPRA or incorporated into 16 the CPRA by Government Code section 7927.705— | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wallachgreen2 sentences1955Probation having been granted and the proceedings thereupon suspended, there was in fact no judgment, and this is true notwithstanding the requirement that defendant pay a fine and make certain restitution as conditions of probation (People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 133 [ 47 P.2d 1071 ]; In re Marquez, 3 Cal.2d 625, 627 [ 45 P.2d 342 ]). 1955Probation having been granted and the proceedings thereupon suspended, there was in fact no judgment, and this is true notwithstanding the requirement that defendant pay a fine and make certain restitution as conditions of probation (People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 133 [ 47 P.2d 1071 ]; In re Marquez, 3 Cal.2d 625, 627 [ 45 P.2d 342 ]). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marquezgreen2 sentences1955Probation having been granted and the proceedings thereupon suspended, there was in fact no judgment, and this is true notwithstanding the requirement that defendant pay a fine and make certain restitution as conditions of probation (People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 133 [ 47 P.2d 1071 ]; In re Marquez, 3 Cal.2d 625, 627 [ 45 P.2d 342 ]). 1955Probation having been granted and the proceedings thereupon suspended, there was in fact no judgment, and this is true notwithstanding the requirement that defendant pay a fine and make certain restitution as conditions of probation (People v. Wallach, 8 Cal.App.2d 129, 133 [ 47 P.2d 1071 ]; In re Marquez, 3 Cal.2d 625, 627 [ 45 P.2d 342 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Romanowski
green
1 sentence2023As the California Supreme Court explains, “[w]e deny a phrase like ‘any other provision of law’ its proper impact if we expect a . . . statute . . . to further enumerate every provision . . . to which it is relevant.” (People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 , 908–909 [construing Pen. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Cardinale v. Miller
green
1 sentence2020This is true notwithstanding the principle that “‘[g]enerally, when a judgment is rendered in a case involving a contract that includes an attorney fees and costs provision, the “judgment extinguishes all further contractual rights, including the contractual attorney fees clause.”’” (Cardinale v. Miller (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026 .) That rule is certainly true in general, but not as to an alter ego claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Cage
green
2 sentences2007Because admission of those statements violated the federal Constitution, the error may be found harmless only if, on appeal, the Attorney General demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same notwithstanding the error. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) In characterizing the error as harmless, the majority reasons that John's statement at the hospital to Dr. Russell, which the trial court properly admitted, "succinctly indicated what had caused John's injury" (maj. opn., ante, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 809 , 155 P.3d a 2007Because admission of those statements violated the federal Constitution, the error may be found harmless only if, on appeal, the Attorney General demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same notwithstanding the error. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) In characterizing the error as harmless, the majority reasons that John's statement at the hospital to Dr. Russell, which the trial court properly admitted, "succinctly indicated what had caused John's injury" (maj. opn., ante, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 809 , 155 P.3d a | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District
red
2 sentences1964Its theory is that the acts of the sheriff and his deputies were discretionary acts for which neither they nor the county are liable either under the government tort liability legislation of 1963 (Stats. 1963, ch. 1681) or the common law—this notwithstanding the rule in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 [ 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], holding that the doctrine of governmental immunity could no longer be used to shield a public entity from liability for torts for which its agents were liable. 1964Its theory is that the acts of the sheriff and his deputies were discretionary acts for which neither they nor the county are liable either under the government tort liability legislation of 1963 (Stats. 1963, ch. 1681) or the common law—this notwithstanding the rule in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 [ 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], holding that the doctrine of governmental immunity could no longer be used to shield a public entity from liability for torts for which its agents were liable. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.