13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1974–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kassab v. Soyagreen2 sentences1983English Company and Walter Mueller and his wife. [7] The first time on appeal this court abolished the requirement of horizontal privity under § 2318 of the Code, finding Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848, 849 (1968) effectively overruled Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610 , 187 A.2d 575 (1963) and permitted Mr. Salvador, as an employee of the purchaser, to maintain a suit for breach of warranty. 1983English Company and Walter Mueller and his wife. [7] The first time on appeal this court abolished the requirement of horizontal privity under § 2318 of the Code, finding Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848, 849 (1968) effectively overruled Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610 , 187 A.2d 575 (1963) and permitted Mr. Salvador, as an employee of the purchaser, to maintain a suit for breach of warranty. | 1 | 2 |
Parker v. Griswoldgreen1 sentence2019In Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1965), this Court abolished the rule that charitable hospitals were immune from liability in tort, stating that “every member of society [is guaranteed] a remedy for a palpable wrong inflicted on him by another member of that society.” Id. at 195 (quoting Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 303 (1844) (“An injury is a wrong; and for the redress of every wrong there is a remedy; a wrong is a violation of one’s right, and for the vindication of every right there is a [J-83-2018] - 10 remedy.”). | 1 | 1 |
Catherwood Trustgreen2 sentences1994The appellants contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Catherwood’s Trust, supra 405 Pa. at 61 , 173 A.2d at 86 which overruled Crawford’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 458, 67 A.2d at 124 and In re Pew’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 468, 67 A.2d at 129 and held that it was not unconstitutional to give retroactive effect to the Principal and Income Act of 1947 with respect to a trust created before the effective date of the Act rendered the trustees’ payment of the extraordinary stock dividends from 1949 to 1953 pursuant to the abolished rule of apportionment improper. 1994The appellants contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Catherwood’s Trust, supra 405 Pa. at 61 , 173 A.2d at 86 which overruled Crawford’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 458, 67 A.2d at 124 and In re Pew’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 468, 67 A.2d at 129 and held that it was not unconstitutional to give retroactive effect to the Principal and Income Act of 1947 with respect to a trust created before the effective date of the Act rendered the trustees’ payment of the extraordinary stock dividends from 1949 to 1953 pursuant to the abolished rule of apportionment improper. | 1 | 1 |
Free's Estategreen2 sentences1994“Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the court which turn out to have been improper.” Heaney v. Riddle 343 Pa. 453, 457 , 23 A.2d 456, 459 (1942); see also In re Free’s Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 368 , 194 A. 492, 495 (1937); In re White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90 , 185 A. 589, 591 (1936). 1994“Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the court which turn out to have been improper.” Heaney v. Riddle 343 Pa. 453, 457 , 23 A.2d 456, 459 (1942); see also In re Free’s Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 368 , 194 A. 492, 495 (1937); In re White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90 , 185 A. 589, 591 (1936). | 1 | 1 |
White's Estategreen2 sentences1994“Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the court which turn out to have been improper.” Heaney v. Riddle 343 Pa. 453, 457 , 23 A.2d 456, 459 (1942); see also In re Free’s Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 368 , 194 A. 492, 495 (1937); In re White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90 , 185 A. 589, 591 (1936). 1994“Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the court which turn out to have been improper.” Heaney v. Riddle 343 Pa. 453, 457 , 23 A.2d 456, 459 (1942); see also In re Free’s Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 368 , 194 A. 492, 495 (1937); In re White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90 , 185 A. 589, 591 (1936). | 1 | 1 |
Pew Trustgreen2 sentences1994The appellants contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Catherwood’s Trust, supra 405 Pa. at 61 , 173 A.2d at 86 which overruled Crawford’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 458, 67 A.2d at 124 and In re Pew’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 468, 67 A.2d at 129 and held that it was not unconstitutional to give retroactive effect to the Principal and Income Act of 1947 with respect to a trust created before the effective date of the Act rendered the trustees’ payment of the extraordinary stock dividends from 1949 to 1953 pursuant to the abolished rule of apportionment improper. 1994The appellants contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Catherwood’s Trust, supra 405 Pa. at 61 , 173 A.2d at 86 which overruled Crawford’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 458, 67 A.2d at 124 and In re Pew’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 468, 67 A.2d at 129 and held that it was not unconstitutional to give retroactive effect to the Principal and Income Act of 1947 with respect to a trust created before the effective date of the Act rendered the trustees’ payment of the extraordinary stock dividends from 1949 to 1953 pursuant to the abolished rule of apportionment improper. | 1 | 1 |
Heaney v. Riddlegreen2 sentences1994“Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the court which turn out to have been improper.” Heaney v. Riddle 343 Pa. 453, 457 , 23 A.2d 456, 459 (1942); see also In re Free’s Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 368 , 194 A. 492, 495 (1937); In re White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90 , 185 A. 589, 591 (1936). 1994“Fiduciaries who distribute funds in their hands without an accounting and an audit of their accounts do so at their own risk, and when they assume that risk they must be held responsible for payments made without the approval of the court which turn out to have been improper.” Heaney v. Riddle 343 Pa. 453, 457 , 23 A.2d 456, 459 (1942); see also In re Free’s Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 368 , 194 A. 492, 495 (1937); In re White’s Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 90 , 185 A. 589, 591 (1936). | 1 | 1 |
Crawford Estategreen2 sentences1994The appellants contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Catherwood’s Trust, supra 405 Pa. at 61 , 173 A.2d at 86 which overruled Crawford’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 458, 67 A.2d at 124 and In re Pew’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 468, 67 A.2d at 129 and held that it was not unconstitutional to give retroactive effect to the Principal and Income Act of 1947 with respect to a trust created before the effective date of the Act rendered the trustees’ payment of the extraordinary stock dividends from 1949 to 1953 pursuant to the abolished rule of apportionment improper. 1994The appellants contend that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Catherwood’s Trust, supra 405 Pa. at 61 , 173 A.2d at 86 which overruled Crawford’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 458, 67 A.2d at 124 and In re Pew’s Estate, supra 362 Pa. at 468, 67 A.2d at 129 and held that it was not unconstitutional to give retroactive effect to the Principal and Income Act of 1947 with respect to a trust created before the effective date of the Act rendered the trustees’ payment of the extraordinary stock dividends from 1949 to 1953 pursuant to the abolished rule of apportionment improper. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital
green
2 sentences2019In Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1965), this Court abolished the rule that charitable hospitals were immune from liability in tort, stating that “every member of society [is guaranteed] a remedy for a palpable wrong inflicted on him by another member of that society.” Id. at 195 (quoting Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 303 (1844) (“An injury is a wrong; and for the redress of every wrong there is a remedy; a wrong is a violation of one’s right, and for the vindication of every right there is a [J-83-2018] - 10 remedy.”). 2019In Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1965), this Court abolished the rule that charitable hospitals were immune from liability in tort, stating that “every member of society [is guaranteed] a remedy for a palpable wrong inflicted on him by another member of that society.” Id. at 195 (quoting Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 303 (1844) (“An injury is a wrong; and for the redress of every wrong there is a remedy; a wrong is a violation of one’s right, and for the vindication of every right there is a [J-83-2018] - 10 remedy.”). | 2 | 2015–2019 |
Medoff v. Feldmeier
green
1 sentence2015Thereafter, [t]he concept of hospital liability in Pennsylvania further evolved in Tonsic v. Wagner, [ 458 Pa. 246 , 329 A.2d 497 (1974),] when we held that the hospital was not as a matter of law immunized from any liability for negligence of its *29 personnel during an operation, thereby recognizing respon-deat superior as a basis for hospital liability. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
TONSIC Et Vir. v. Wagner
green
1 sentence2015Thereafter, [t]he concept of hospital liability in Pennsylvania further evolved in Tonsic v. Wagner, [ 458 Pa. 246 , 329 A.2d 497 (1974),] when we held that the hospital was not as a matter of law immunized from any liability for negligence of its *29 personnel during an operation, thereby recognizing respon-deat superior as a basis for hospital liability. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2014The WCJ further recognized that in PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Cmwlth.2003) (en bane), this Court abolished the doctrine of common-law marriage prospectively from the September 17, 2003 date of the decision. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hopkins v. Blanco
green
2 sentences1993Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90 , 320 A.2d 139 (1974). 1993Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90 , 320 A.2d 139 (1974). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Webb v. Zern
green
2 sentences1993Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966). 1993Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Speck v. Finegold
red
2 sentences1993Speck v. Feingold, 497 Pa. 77 , 439 A.2d 110 (1981). 1993Speck v. Feingold, 497 Pa. 77 , 439 A.2d 110 (1981). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Rice v. Shuman
green
2 sentences1991In addition, the city contends that its position is supported by our Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. Shuman, 513 Pa. 204 , 519 A.2d 391 (1986), in which the court abolished the presumption of due care of -a deceased or incapacitated party. 1991In addition, the city contends that its position is supported by our Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. Shuman, 513 Pa. 204 , 519 A.2d 391 (1986), in which the court abolished the presumption of due care of -a deceased or incapacitated party. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.
green
2 sentences1983English Company and Walter Mueller and his wife. [7] The first time on appeal this court abolished the requirement of horizontal privity under § 2318 of the Code, finding Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848, 849 (1968) effectively overruled Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610 , 187 A.2d 575 (1963) and permitted Mr. Salvador, as an employee of the purchaser, to maintain a suit for breach of warranty. 1983English Company and Walter Mueller and his wife. [7] The first time on appeal this court abolished the requirement of horizontal privity under § 2318 of the Code, finding Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217 , 246 A.2d 848, 849 (1968) effectively overruled Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610 , 187 A.2d 575 (1963) and permitted Mr. Salvador, as an employee of the purchaser, to maintain a suit for breach of warranty. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.
green
2 sentences1983Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Company, 224 Pa.Super. 377 , 307 A.2d 398 (1973). 1983Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Company, 224 Pa.Super. 377 , 307 A.2d 398 (1973). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1983In Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 A.2d 114 (1974), this Court abolished the doctrine of “plain and fundamental error” and held that only issues properly preserved at trial would be considered on appeal. 1983In Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255 , 322 A.2d 114 (1974), this Court abolished the doctrine of “plain and fundamental error” and held that only issues properly preserved at trial would be considered on appeal. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Allegheny County Police Pension Fund v. Casey
neutral
2 sentences1983City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 490 Pa. 264 , 416 A.2d 461 (1980); see also: Allegheny County Police Pension Fund v. Casey, 476 Pa. 261 , 382 A.2d 461 (1978). 1983City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 490 Pa. 264 , 416 A.2d 461 (1980); see also: Allegheny County Police Pension Fund v. Casey, 476 Pa. 261 , 382 A.2d 461 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1983City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 490 Pa. 264 , 416 A.2d 461 (1980); see also: Allegheny County Police Pension Fund v. Casey, 476 Pa. 261 , 382 A.2d 461 (1978). 1983City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 490 Pa. 264 , 416 A.2d 461 (1980); see also: Allegheny County Police Pension Fund v. Casey, 476 Pa. 261 , 382 A.2d 461 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Tagnani v. Lew
green
2 sentences1983In Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371 , 426 A.2d 595 (1981), this Court further held that Dilliplaine precludes a court en banc from granting relief on post-verdict motions when the same relief has not been requested at trial. 1983In Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371 , 426 A.2d 595 (1981), this Court further held that Dilliplaine precludes a court en banc from granting relief on post-verdict motions when the same relief has not been requested at trial. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education
red
2 sentences1981Bd. of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973), in which the Court abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity which protected political subdivisions of the Commonwealth from tort liability. 1981Bd. of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973), in which the Court abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity which protected political subdivisions of the Commonwealth from tort liability. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Butler v. Butler
green
2 sentences1980Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290 , 368 A.2d 635 (1977) the supreme court struck down the judicially fabricated presumption that a child of tender years is best suited to remain in the custody of the mother, and in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522 , 347 A.2d 477 (1975), the court abolished the presumption which held that a husband who purchases property and places it in an entireties estate is deemed to have intended to give one-half of the estate as a gift, whereas a wife in similar circumstances is presumed not to have intended a gift but instead is deemed to have intended to create a resulting tr 1980Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290 , 368 A.2d 635 (1977) the supreme court struck down the judicially fabricated presumption that a child of tender years is best suited to remain in the custody of the mother, and in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522 , 347 A.2d 477 (1975), the court abolished the presumption which held that a husband who purchases property and places it in an entireties estate is deemed to have intended to give one-half of the estate as a gift, whereas a wife in similar circumstances is presumed not to have intended a gift but instead is deemed to have intended to create a resulting tr | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Spriggs v. Carson
green
2 sentences1980Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290 , 368 A.2d 635 (1977) the supreme court struck down the judicially fabricated presumption that a child of tender years is best suited to remain in the custody of the mother, and in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522 , 347 A.2d 477 (1975), the court abolished the presumption which held that a husband who purchases property and places it in an entireties estate is deemed to have intended to give one-half of the estate as a gift, whereas a wife in similar circumstances is presumed not to have intended a gift but instead is deemed to have intended to create a resulting tr 1980Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290 , 368 A.2d 635 (1977) the supreme court struck down the judicially fabricated presumption that a child of tender years is best suited to remain in the custody of the mother, and in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522 , 347 A.2d 477 (1975), the court abolished the presumption which held that a husband who purchases property and places it in an entireties estate is deemed to have intended to give one-half of the estate as a gift, whereas a wife in similar circumstances is presumed not to have intended a gift but instead is deemed to have intended to create a resulting tr | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways
green
2 sentences1979No. 2 is a relevant consideration at the present time: Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A. 2d 709 (1978) (the court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity). 1979No. 2 is a relevant consideration at the present time: Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A. 2d 709 (1978) (the court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.