remote possibility violation in Texas

2026“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice.” Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 .

2026See Spears v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (“[E]vidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.”).

2025Because “[d]isqualification is a severe remedy,” “‘[m]ere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice’ to merit disqualification.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Spears v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 5 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)).

2024See Garza, 373 S.W.3d at 118 (“[D]isqualification is inappropriate under Rule 3.08 when opposing counsel merely announces their intention to call the attorney as a fact witness without establishing both a genuine need for the attorney’s testimony and that the testimony goes to an essential fact.”) (citing In re A.M., 974 S.W.2d 857, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57 (“‘Mere allegations . . . or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice’ to merit disqualification.”) (alteration omitted) (quoting Spears, 797

2024“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.” Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 . “[L]awyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).

2020“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.” Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990)(orig. proceeding). “[L]awyers who violate the conflict-of-interest rules must be disqualified because there is an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer obtains a client’s confidential information during representation.” In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019)(orig. proceeding).

2007The “substantial relationship” standard requires the former client to prove specific factual similarities, liability issues, or strategies from the prior representation that are so closely related to those of the subsequent representation as to “create[] a 8 genuine threat that confidences revealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present adversary.” Texaco, Inc. v. Garcia, 891 S.W.2d 253, 256-57 (Tex. 1995); Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 399-400 ; see Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (“[M]ere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote p

2007The "substantial relationship" standard requires the former client to prove specific factual similarities, liability issues, or strategies from the prior representation that are so closely related to those of the subsequent representation as to "create[] a genuine threat that confidences revealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present adversary." Texaco, Inc. v. Garcia , 891 S.W.2d 253, 256-57 (Tex. 1995); Coker , 765 S.W.2d at 399-400 ; see Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals , 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) ("[M]ere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote

2008While courts often look to the disciplinary rules to decide disqualification issues, the rules are “merely guidelines — not controlling standards — for disqualification motions.” Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d at 422 (citing In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex.1998)).

2006While courts often look to the disciplinary rules to decide disqualification issues, the rules are “merely guidelines — not controlling standards — for disqualification motions.” Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d at 422 (citing Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 350 ).

2024See Garza, 373 S.W.3d at 118 (“[D]isqualification is inappropriate under Rule 3.08 when opposing counsel merely announces their intention to call the attorney as a fact witness without establishing both a genuine need for the attorney’s testimony and that the testimony goes to an essential fact.”) (citing In re A.M., 974 S.W.2d 857, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57 (“‘Mere allegations . . . or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice’ to merit disqualification.”) (alteration omitted) (quoting Spears, 797

2018In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57 ; In re Garza, 373 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, orig. proceeding).

2019“As a rule, ‘[a] party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely manner waives the complaint.’” In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 52 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 690 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (finding waiver after six-and-a-half month delay)); see HECI Expl.

2018A “party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely manner waives the complaint.” Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 690-91 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam).

2016Id.

2013“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing 23 a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice to merit disqualification.” Id.; In re Dalco, 186 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding) (“Nevertheless, because disqualification is such a severe remedy, the burden is on the movant to establish with specificity any alleged violation of one or more disciplinary rules.”).

2025In re Wallingford, 64 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) The “[m]ere In re Alexandria Smith Page 2 allegation of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice under this standard.” See Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).

2025“Mandamus is appropriate to correct an erroneous order disqualifying counsel because there is no adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 56–57. “[T]he right to be represented by counsel of choice is a valuable one and the unwarranted denial of that right has been held to be fundamental error.” In re Vossdale Townhouse Ass’n, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding).

2024See Garza, 373 S.W.3d at 118 (“[D]isqualification is inappropriate under Rule 3.08 when opposing counsel merely announces their intention to call the attorney as a fact witness without establishing both a genuine need for the attorney’s testimony and that the testimony goes to an essential fact.”) (citing In re A.M., 974 S.W.2d 857, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.); Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57 (“‘Mere allegations . . . or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice’ to merit disqualification.”) (alteration omitted) (quoting Spears, 797

2022See In re Luecke, 569 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, orig. proceeding) (“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice.”).

2021Fourth, even taking the State at its word, the potential content of Mims’s testimony—his description of Spratt’s jailhouse confession—is arguably cumulative of other testimony—namely, the testimony of Spears—and, thus, was not necessary in this Clay v. State Page 19 case, apart from the State’s use of it to disqualify Freud just prior to trial.4 See Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 319 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Gonzalez, 117 S.W.3d at 837 (“Allegations of one or more violations of the disciplinary rules or evidence showing only a possible future violation are not sufficient.”); Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (“Mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice,” then, to merit disqualification); see also In re Fletcher, 584 S.W.3d 584 , 589 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding) (“The appearance of a conflict of interest may not suffice to sh

2020Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (citations omitted); see also In re Chonody, 49 S.W.3d 376, 379-80 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding).

2019“As a rule, ‘[a] party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely manner waives the complaint.’” In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 52 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 690 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (finding waiver after six-and-a-half month delay)); see HECI Expl.

2016Servs., Inc., 476 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding).

2015Keith v. Solls, 256 S.W.3d 912, 917-918 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding) (citing Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990)).

2013“Although Rule 3.08 was promulgated as a disciplinary standard, rather than a procedural disqualification standard, [the Texas Supreme Court has] recognized that the rule articulates considerations relevant to a procedural disqualification determination.” Anderson Producing, 929 S.W.2d at 421 (quotation omitted).

2008Therefore, “ ‘[m]ere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules will not suffice’ to merit disqualification.” Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57 (quoting Spears, 797 *918 S.W.2d at 656).