91 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc.green2 sentences2022See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009) (stating that a jury instruction must “find[] support in the pleadings and evidence”); Hill v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992) (concluding that an unavoidable-accident instruction was erroneous when there was no affirmative evidence to support it); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (holding the trial court erred in submitting an element of damages to the jury for which there was no evidence); Eldridge v. Collard, 834 S. 2014“An unavoidable accident instruction is proper only when there is evidence that the event was proximately caused by a nonhuman condition and not by the negligence of any party to the event.” Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex.1992) (citing Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 190-91 (Tex.1971)). | 22 | 26 |
Reinhart v. Younggreen2 sentences2023Further, a sudden emergency instruction “reiterates much of the unavoidable accident instruction.” Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 474 . 2020The purpose of the unavoidable-accident instruction is to advise the jurors that “they do not have to place blame on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that 9 Gregory and New Prime did not object to testimony from witnesses stating they had been told Deol exited his vehicle to check on others. 10 The trial court instructed the jury on sudden emergency as follows: If a person is confronted by an “emergency” arising suddenly and unexpectedly, which was not proximately caused by any negligence on his or her part and which, to a reasonable person, requires immediate action without time for | 21 | 36 |
Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooperativegreen2 sentences2024But TEC had not argued at trial that Brown was to blame for the accident, and the Texas Supreme Court held that the unavoidable accident instruction given was sufficiently broad to include “all shades of TEC’s inferential rebuttal theories concerning the cattle.” Id. at 433 . 2020The purpose of the unavoidable-accident instruction is to advise the jurors that “they do not have to place blame on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that 9 Gregory and New Prime did not object to testimony from witnesses stating they had been told Deol exited his vehicle to check on others. 10 The trial court instructed the jury on sudden emergency as follows: If a person is confronted by an “emergency” arising suddenly and unexpectedly, which was not proximately caused by any negligence on his or her part and which, to a reasonable person, requires immediate action without time for | 17 | 25 |
Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Uristagreen2 sentences2024Regardless, any error in providing an unavoidable accident instruction “is ordinarily harmless,” given that the instruction merely “explains to the jury that they are not required to find someone at fault.” Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. 2006). 2019But the supreme court further recognized that an inferential rebuttal instruction reinforces for the jury that “no such implication is intended.” Id.; see also Urista, 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“The truth is, sometimes accidents are no one’s fault, and an unavoidable accident instruction, like the one in this case, simply explains to the jury that [it is] not required to find someone at fault.”). | 16 | 25 |
Crawford v. Hopegreen2 sentences2008While historically permitted in the medical malpractice arena, Texas courts have required a defendant to “first present evidence that the event was caused by some condition other than the negligence of the parties.” Crawford v. Hope, 898 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied). 2008While historically permitted in the medical malpractice arena, Texas courts have required a defendant to “first present evidence that the event was caused by some condition other than the negligence of the parties.” Crawford v. Hope, 898 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied). | 8 | 8 |
Williams v. Viswanathangreen2 sentences2003See Williams v. Viswanathan, 64 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (stating that “[t]he purpose of an unavoidable accident instruction is to inform the jury that, although conduct may have been negligent, it must produce the outcome of which the party complains”); Ordonez v. M.W. 2003See Williams v. Viswanathan , 64 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (stating that "[t]he purpose of an unavoidable accident instruction is to inform the jury that, although conduct may have been negligent, it must produce the outcome of which the party complains ") ; Ordenez v. M.W. | 6 | 6 |
Yarborough v. Bernergreen2 sentences2014“An unavoidable accident instruction is proper only when there is evidence that the event was proximately caused by a nonhuman condition and not by the negligence of any party to the event.” Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex.1992) (citing Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 190-91 (Tex.1971)). 2007We think Yarborough makes clear that the same considerations are applicable to a trial court’s decision whether to include an unavoidable accident instruction in the charge when a child’s conduct is involved. 467 S.W.2d at 190 - 91. | 5 | 13 |
Hicks v. Browngreen2 sentences2022Rouhani, 296 S.W.3d at 300 (citing Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399 , 151 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1941)). 2009Hicks v. Brown, 151 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1941); Hukill v. H.E.B. | 5 | 5 |
In Re VLKgreen2 sentences2011Accord In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex.2000) (explaining that trial court's decision to submit or to refuse a particular jury instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard); La.-Pac. 2011See Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 434 (explaining that redundancy created by submission of multiple inferential rebuttal instructions is contrary to the spirit of broad-form submission); V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 341 (recognizing that trial court possesses considerable *637 discretion to determine necessary and proper jury instructions). | 4 | 4 |
Urista v. Bed, Bath, & Beyond, Inc.green2 sentences2006In a divided opinion, the First Court of Appeals held on rehearing that the trial court erred when it submitted the unavoidable accident instruction and that it was likely, although not conclusively established, that the erroneous instruction formed the sole basis for the jury’s negative answer to the liability question. 132 S.W.3d 517, 523 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. granted). 2006The court of appeals relied on Reinhart v. Young to hold that the unavoidable accident instruction was harmful in this case. 132 S.W.3d at 522 . | 3 | 7 |
Ordonez v. MW McCurdy & Co., Inc.green2 sentences2004Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 472 ; Ordonez, 984 S.W.2d at 271 . 2004Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 472 ; Ordonez, 984 S.W.2d at 271 . | 3 | 5 |
Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawleygreen2 sentences2022See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009) (stating that a jury instruction must “find[] support in the pleadings and evidence”); Hill v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992) (concluding that an unavoidable-accident instruction was erroneous when there was no affirmative evidence to support it); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (holding the trial court erred in submitting an element of damages to the jury for which there was no evidence); Eldridge v. Collard, 834 S. 2020See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009). | 3 | 3 |
In Re U.S. Silica Co.green2 sentences2011See Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 434 (explaining that redundancy created by submission of multiple inferential rebuttal instructions is contrary to the spirit of broad-form submission); V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 341 (recognizing that trial court possesses considerable *637 discretion to determine necessary and proper jury instructions). 2011See Dillard, 157 S.W.3d at 434 (explaining that redundancy created by submission of multiple inferential rebuttal instructions is contrary to the spirit of broad-form submission); V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 341 (recognizing that trial court possesses considera ble discretion to determine necessary and proper jury instructions). | 3 | 3 |
Young v. Thotagreen2 sentences2012Id. 2012We simply cannot determine, on this evidence, whether the jury properly found Dr. Thota not negligent, properly found that his negligence was excused based upon the unavoidable accident instruction, or improperly found that his negligence was excused based upon the new and independent cause instruction alone or combined with its improper finding of Ronnie’s negligence. 271 S.W.3d at 839 . | 2 | 5 |
Towers of Town Lake Condominium Ass'n v. Rouhanigreen2 sentences2022The purpose of an unavoidable accident instruction is to “advise the jurors, in the appropriate case, that they do not have to place blame on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that conditions beyond the party’s control caused the accident in question or that the conduct of some person not a party to the litigation caused it.” Rouhani, 296 S.W.3d at 300 (citing Dillard v. Texas Elec. 2022Rouhani, 296 S.W.3d at 300 (citing Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399 , 151 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1941)). | 2 | 3 |
Thota v. Younggreen2 sentences2015Inferential rebuttal whether the jury properly found Dr. issues are distinct from theories of liability Thota not negligent, properly found that and damage elements because they ‘‘can- his negligence was excused based upon not be submitted in the jury charge as the unavoidable accident instruction, or separate questions and instead must be improperly found that his negligence presented through jury instructions.’’ Id. was excused based upon the new and Like the inferential rebuttal instruction on independent cause instruction alone or unavoidable accident in Urista, the new combined with its i 2015Inferential rebuttal whether the jury properly found Dr. issues are distinct from theories of liability Thota not negligent, properly found that and damage elements because they ‘‘can- his negligence was excused based upon not be submitted in the jury charge as the unavoidable accident instruction, or separate questions and instead must be improperly found that his negligence presented through jury instructions.’’ Id. was excused based upon the new and Like the inferential rebuttal instruction on independent cause instruction alone or unavoidable accident in Urista, the new combined with its i | 2 | 3 |
Gunn v. McCoygreen2 sentences2018See 489 S.W.3d at 115 ; see also Towers of Town Lake Condo. 2018See 489 S.W.3d at 115 ; see also Towers of 18 The court of appeals held that the instruction was improper in part because “there was no testimony that Shannon’s placental abruption and DIC were ‘catastrophic’ complications ‘predetermined’ to result in severe brain damage from the moment she arrived at Woman’s.” 489 S.W.3d at 115 (quoting Williams v. Viswanathan, 64 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.)). | 2 | 2 |
Wisenbarger v. Gonzales Warm Springs Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences1993Cf. Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex.1984) (the circumstances of the case and the nature of the improper instruction determine whether the instruction constituted reversible error); see also Wisenbarger v. Gonzales Warm Springs Hosp., 789 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (submission of an unavoidable accident instruction was improper but did not constitute reversible error under the circumstances). 1993Cf. Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex.1984) (the circumstances of the case and the nature of the improper instruction determine whether the instruction constituted reversible error); see also Wisenbarger v. Gonzales Warm Springs Hosp., 789 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex.AppCorpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (submission of an unavoidable accident instruction was improper but did not constitute reversible error under the circumstances). | 1 | 4 |
Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toenniesgreen2 sentences2004In Reinhart , the Supreme Court found that "no evidence in this case even remotely suggests that the unavoidable accident instruction in any way caused the case to be decided differently than it would have been without it." Id., 906 S.W.2d at 473 . 2004In ReinhaH, the Supreme Court found that “no evidence in this case even remotely suggests that the unavoidable accident instruction in any way caused the case to be decided differently than it would have been without it.” Id., 906 S.W.2d at 473 . | 1 | 2 |
Friday v. Spearsgreen2 sentences2003See Friday v. Spears , 975 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (holding that testimony that defendant's car hydroplaned into the plaintiff's car was some evidence supporting an unavoidable accident instruction); Clark v. Cotten , 573 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. 2002Thus, “foreseeability of the road conditions did not negate the propriety of the unavoidable accident instruction.” Friday, 975 S.W.2d at 702 . | 1 | 2 |
Hukill v. H.E.B. Food Stores, Inc.green2 sentences1993See Hukill, 756 S.W.2d at 844 ; see also 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC § 3.05 (1987) (an occurrence is caused by an act of God if it is caused directly and exclusively by the violence of nature, without human intervention or cause, and could not have been prevented by reasonable foresight or care). 1992Food Stores, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1988, no writ), to support his contention that an unavoidable accident instruction was improper. | 1 | 2 |
Dale L. Johnson v. National Oilwell Varco, LPgreen1 sentence2026When a trial court errs in refusing to submit an otherwise proper instruction, the question on appeal is whether the request was reasonably necessary to enable the jury to render a proper verdict. . . . [W]e conclude that an unavoidable-accident instruction would have merely reiterated the defense’s causation theory and therefore was not necessary for the jury to render a proper verdict.”) (cleaned up); Johnson, 574 S.W.3d at 12 (no abuse of discretion; instruction was not reasonably necessary); Collie, 2015 WL 1094825 , at *1, 4 (no abuse of discretion; “[t]o establish an abuse of discretion, | 1 | 1 |
Eldridge v. Collardgreen1 sentence2022See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009) (stating that a jury instruction must “find[] support in the pleadings and evidence”); Hill v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992) (concluding that an unavoidable-accident instruction was erroneous when there was no affirmative evidence to support it); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (holding the trial court erred in submitting an element of damages to the jury for which there was no evidence); Eldridge v. Collard, 834 S. | 1 | 1 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reddinggreen1 sentence2022See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009) (stating that a jury instruction must “find[] support in the pleadings and evidence”); Hill v. Winn Dixie Tex., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. 1992) (concluding that an unavoidable-accident instruction was erroneous when there was no affirmative evidence to support it); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (holding the trial court erred in submitting an element of damages to the jury for which there was no evidence); Eldridge v. Collard, 834 S. | 1 | 1 |
| Dow Chemical Co. v. Francisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foley's Department Store v. Gardnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Goldsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rauch v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Priest v. Myersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Otis Elevator Co. v. Showsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeLeon v. Pickensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Allwhitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Knightengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Caingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crown Life Insurance Company v. Casteelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. Cottengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sadorus v. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Howard v. Sanborngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Athey v. Binghamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reinhart v. Younggreen2 sentences2023Further, a sudden emergency instruction “reiterates much of the unavoidable accident instruction.” Reinhart, 906 S.W.2d at 474 . 2020The purpose of the unavoidable-accident instruction is to advise the jurors that “they do not have to place blame on a party to the suit if the evidence shows that 9 Gregory and New Prime did not object to testimony from witnesses stating they had been told Deol exited his vehicle to check on others. 10 The trial court instructed the jury on sudden emergency as follows: If a person is confronted by an “emergency” arising suddenly and unexpectedly, which was not proximately caused by any negligence on his or her part and which, to a reasonable person, requires immediate action without time for | 1 | 36 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2011An unavoidable accident "is an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it." Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex.1995) (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359 , 250 S.W.2d 379 , 385 (1952)); Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 836-37 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). 2011An unavoidable accident “is an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it.” Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex.1995) (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359 , 250 S.W.2d 379 , 385 (1952)); Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 836-37 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). | 5 | 2002–2011 |
Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry
green
2 sentences2007Cf. 97 S.W.2d at 168 with Sorrentino, 122 S.W.2d at 725 . 5 made the subject of an unavoidable accident instruction. 2007Based on that statement and the court’s description of the result in Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry , 128 Tex. 347 , 97 S.W.2d 166 (1936), (footnote: 4) Kerr concludes that a child under five is incapable of negligence, but a five- or six-year-old is not too young to be capable of negligence, and his conduct thus cannot properly be made the subject of an unavoidable accident instruction. | 4 | 2005–2007 |
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2011An unavoidable accident "is an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it." Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex.1995) (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359 , 250 S.W.2d 379 , 385 (1952)); Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 836-37 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). 2011An unavoidable accident “is an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it.” Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex.1995) (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359 , 250 S.W.2d 379 , 385 (1952)); Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 836-37 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). | 3 | 2002–2011 |
Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry
neutral
2 sentences2007Based on that statement and the court’s description of the result in Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry , 128 Tex. 347 , 97 S.W.2d 166 (1936), (footnote: 4) Kerr concludes that a child under five is incapable of negligence, but a five- or six-year-old is not too young to be capable of negligence, and his conduct thus cannot properly be made the subject of an unavoidable accident instruction. 2007Based on that statement and the court's description of the result in Gulf Production Co. v. Quisenberry , 128 Tex. 347 , 97 S.W.2d 166 (1936), (4) Kerr concludes that a child under five is incapable of negligence, but a five- or six-year-old is not too young to be capable of negligence, and his conduct thus cannot properly be made the subject of an unavoidable accident instruction. | 3 | 2005–2007 |
Hicks v. Brown
green
2 sentences2022Rouhani, 296 S.W.3d at 300 (citing Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399 , 151 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1941)). 2009Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399 , 151 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1941); Hukill v. H.E.B. | 2 | 2009–2022 |
Banks v. Columbia Hospital at Medical City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.
green
1 sentence2024An unavoidable accident instruction is proper if there is evidence that the accident “was proximately caused by a condition or circumstance beyond the control of any party.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Brown v. Goldstein green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Harris County v. Smith green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sorrentino v. McNeill green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Randle v. Allen green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Thomas v. Oldham green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Hill v. Winn Dixie Texas, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Wheeler v. Glazer green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.