legislative intent bar in Pennsylvania

2015The Supreme Court also agreed that SEPTA is a Commonwealth agency. 11 However, it concluded that this Court failed to do the legislative intent analysis announced in Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association, 505 Pa. 614 , 483 A.2d 448 (1984), and used to determine when a state agency may be regulated by a local agency. 12 The Supreme Court stated as follows: In conclusion, although the • Commonwealth Court correctly determined that SEPTA was not required in this instance to exhaust its administrative remedies before commencin'g this declaratory judgment action, it er

2015The Supreme Court also agreed that SEPTA is a Commonwealth agency. 11 However, it concluded that this Court failed to do the legislative intent analysis announced in Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association, 505 Pa. 614 , 483 A.2d 448 (1984), and used to determine when a state agency may be regulated by a local agency. 12 The Supreme Court stated as follows: In conclusion, although the • Commonwealth Court correctly determined that SEPTA was not required in this instance to exhaust its administrative remedies before commencin'g this declaratory judgment action, it er

2015Accordingly, we do that analysis here.13 11 The Supreme Court stated that “SEPTA has mistaken our insistence that courts seek out and effectuate the intent of the legislature for a requirement that the legislature state its intent clearly or explicitly that a municipality is to have ‘preeminent powers’ over a state agency in a given area of law.” SEPTA v. Philadelphia II, 101 A.3d at 87 . 12 Three Justices authored dissents, with two of them opining that this Court had already performed the legislative intent analysis. 13 This case involves an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a pure

2014See Watley, supra; Matteson, supra. I believe the Newman Court and the trial court opinions it discussed misperceived the legislative intent analysis pertaining to the severability doctrine and did not consider what the legislature would have intended had it known that the burden of proof provisions of its mandatory statutes were unconstitutional.

1997Id. at 461, 422 A.2d at 561 .

1997Id. at 461, 422 A.2d at 561 .

1992We are unswayed by these arguments, and, for the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court. *298 The Commonwealth's first argument, i.e. whether delay damages are recoverable against it, was disposed of by this Court's decisions in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52 , 436 A.2d 147 (1981), and in Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 Pa. 588 , 606 A.2d 427 (1992).

1992We are unswayed by these arguments, and, for the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court. *298 The Commonwealth's first argument, i.e. whether delay damages are recoverable against it, was disposed of by this Court's decisions in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52 , 436 A.2d 147 (1981), and in Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 Pa. 588 , 606 A.2d 427 (1992).

1992We are unswayed by these arguments, and, for the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court. *298 The Commonwealth's first argument, i.e. whether delay damages are recoverable against it, was disposed of by this Court's decisions in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52 , 436 A.2d 147 (1981), and in Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 Pa. 588 , 606 A.2d 427 (1992).

1992We are unswayed by these arguments, and, for the reasons stated below, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court. *298 The Commonwealth's first argument, i.e. whether delay damages are recoverable against it, was disposed of by this Court's decisions in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52 , 436 A.2d 147 (1981), and in Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 Pa. 588 , 606 A.2d 427 (1992).

1983In support of its conclusion, the court relied upon DeMedio v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. 255 , 257 A.2d 290 (1969), where the Superior Court stated: “Our [annulment] statute is clear: Either party can apply for the annulment of a void marriage; the application is not restricted to an innocent and injured spouse and therefore the annulment can be obtained regardless of *422 plaintiff’s knowledge either before or after the void marriage ceremony.

1983In support of its conclusion, the court relied upon DeMedio v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. 255 , 257 A.2d 290 (1969), where the Superior Court stated: “Our [annulment] statute is clear: Either party can apply for the annulment of a void marriage; the application is not restricted to an innocent and injured spouse and therefore the annulment can be obtained regardless of *422 plaintiff’s knowledge either before or after the void marriage ceremony.

1980In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, supra, interprets section 515K to manifest the legislative intent to bar all actions except for an appraisal after the merger has been consummated.

1929The fact that an offense may be punishable under either of two acts does not prevent the Commonwealth from proceeding under whichever statute may be more convenient and susceptible of proof: Com. v. Sabo, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 168; Com. v. O ’Donnell, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 17, 19 .