legislative intent bar in California

2025And in any event, none of them hold that section 527.6 authorizes pursuit of a civil harassment claim that exceeds the bounds of the statute.16 (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered”].) Lastly, Morris repeats his prior arguments against using a legislative intent analysis to determine whether a statute provides a private right of action.

2025And in any event, none of them hold that section 527.6 authorizes pursuit of a civil harassment claim that exceeds the bounds of the statute.16 (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered”].) Lastly, Morris repeats his prior arguments against using a legislative intent analysis to determine whether a statute provides a private right of action.

1995However, state regulation of a matter does not necessarily preempt the power of local voters to act through initiative and/or referendum [citations]." ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 571 ; see also City of Dublin v. County of Alameda (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 264, 280 [ 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 845 ] [California Integrated Waste Management Act, mandating city and county compliance with a number of statewide recycling goals, does not preclude adoption by initiative of a recycling plan required by the act].) As our decision in Yost illustrates, it is erroneous to assume that a statute or statutory scheme that both assert

1995However, state regulation of a matter does not necessarily preempt the power of local voters to act through initiative and/or referendum [citations].’ ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 571 ; [citations].) As our decision in Yost illustrates, it is erroneous to assume that a statute or statutory scheme that both asserts certain state interests and defers in other respects to local decisionmaking implies a legislative intent to bar the right of initiative.

2013As the California Supreme Court has stated in another context: “Generally a demand is not a prerequisite where it would be futile or an idle gesture.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 721 [ 160 P.2d 816 ].) “The law does not require useless acts from litigants as prerequisites to seeking relief from the courts.” (Van Gammeren v. City of Fresno (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 240 [ 124 P.2d 621 ]; see Foster v. County of San Diego (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 257, 262 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 507 ] [“The law does not require a party to participate in futile acts.”]; Civ.

2013As the California Supreme Court has stated in another context: “Generally a demand is not a prerequisite where it would be futile or an idle gesture.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 721 [ 160 P.2d 816 ].) “The law does not require useless acts from litigants as prerequisites to seeking relief from the courts.” (Van Gammeren v. City of Fresno (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 240 [ 124 P.2d 621 ]; see Foster v. County of San Diego (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 257, 262 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 507 ] [“The law does not require a party to participate in futile acts.”]; Civ.

2013As the California Supreme Court has stated in another context: “Generally a demand is not a prerequisite where it would be futile or an idle gesture.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 721 [ 160 P.2d 816 ].) “The law does not require useless acts from litigants as prerequisites to seeking relief from the courts.” (Van Gammeren v. City of Fresno (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 240 [ 124 P.2d 621 ]; see Foster v. County of San Diego (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 257, 262 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 507 ] [“The law does not require a party to participate in futile acts.”]; Civ.

2013As the California Supreme Court has stated in another context: “Generally a demand is not a prerequisite where it would be futile or an idle gesture.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 721 [ 160 P.2d 816 ].) “The law does not require useless acts from litigants as prerequisites to seeking relief from the courts.” (Van Gammeren v. City of Fresno (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 240 [ 124 P.2d 621 ]; see Foster v. County of San Diego (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 257, 262 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 507 ] [“The law does not require a party to participate in futile acts.”]; Civ.

2013As the California Supreme Court has stated in another context: “Generally a demand is not a prerequisite where it would be futile or an idle gesture.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 721 [ 160 P.2d 816 ].) “The law does not require useless acts from litigants as prerequisites to seeking relief from the courts.” (Van Gammeren v. City of Fresno (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 240 [ 124 P.2d 621 ]; see Foster v. County of San Diego (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 257, 262 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 507 ] [“The law does not require a party to participate in futile acts.”]; Civ.

2013As the California Supreme Court has stated in another context: “Generally a demand is not a prerequisite where it would be futile or an idle gesture.” (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 721 [ 160 P.2d 816 ].) “The law does not require useless acts from litigants as prerequisites to seeking relief from the courts.” (Van Gammeren v. City of Fresno (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 235, 240 [ 124 P.2d 621 ]; see Foster v. County of San Diego (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 257, 262 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 507 ] [“The law does not require a party to participate in futile acts.”]; Civ.

2010These holdings are consistent with the general rule that privileges are to be “narrowly construed . . . because they operate to prevent the admission of relevant evidence and impede the correct determination of *631 issues.” (Saeta v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 261, 272 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ].) Moreover, the Legislature has demonstrated that when it intends to preclude information from discovery, it is capable of saying so.

2010These holdings are consistent with the general rule that privileges are to be “narrowly construed . . . because they operate to prevent the admission of relevant evidence and impede the correct determination of *631 issues.” (Saeta v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 261, 272 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 ].) Moreover, the Legislature has demonstrated that when it intends to preclude information from discovery, it is capable of saying so.

1995However, state regulation of a matter does not necessarily preempt the power of local voters to act through initiative and/or referendum [citations]." ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 571 ; see also City of Dublin v. County of Alameda (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 264, 280 [ 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 845 ] [California Integrated Waste Management Act, mandating city and county compliance with a number of statewide recycling goals, does not preclude adoption by initiative of a recycling plan required by the act].) As our decision in Yost illustrates, it is erroneous to assume that a statute or statutory scheme that both assert

1995However, state regulation of a matter does not necessarily preempt the power of local voters to act through initiative and/or referendum [citations]." ( 36 Cal.3d at p. 571 ; see also City of Dublin v. County of Alameda (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 264, 280 [ 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 845 ] [California Integrated Waste Management Act, mandating city and county compliance with a number of statewide recycling goals, does not preclude adoption by initiative of a recycling plan required by the act].) As our decision in Yost illustrates, it is erroneous to assume that a statute or statutory scheme that both assert

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1995Although, as plaintiffs point out, Elections Code section 9118 and related sections only refer to "ordinances" being enacted by initiative, it is well established that any legislative act may be enacted by initiative and may be subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated an "ordinance" or "resolution." ( Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610 [ 150 P. 977 ]; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 765, 781-782 [ 269 Cal. Rptr. 796 ]; Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 141, 153 ; se

1987Rather, subdivision (a) reveals only a legislative intent to bar double recovery. ( De Cruz v. Reid (1968) 69 Cal.2d 217, 225-226 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 550 , 444 P.2d 342 ].) There is also nothing in the history of section 877 suggesting that it was intended to further the equitable sharing of costs among parties adjudged liable for the plaintiff's injury.

1987Rather, subdivision (a) reveals only a legislative intent to bar double recovery. ( De Cruz v. Reid (1968) 69 Cal.2d 217, 225-226 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 550 , 444 P.2d 342 ].) There is also nothing in the history of section 877 suggesting that it was intended to further the equitable sharing of costs among parties adjudged liable for the plaintiff's injury.

1986(Stafford v. Realty BondService Corp. (1952) 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) It is “. . . well established that where the legislature uses terms already judicially construed, ‘the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts. ’ ” (City of Long Beach v. Marshall (1938) 11 Cal.2d 609, 620 [ 82 P.2d 362 ].) Therefore, the incorporation of the phrase “ineffective assistance of counsel” in Penal Code section 1387 indicates a legislative intent that the exception only applies where an error is committed by

1986(Stafford v. Realty BondService Corp. (1952) 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) It is “. . . well established that where the legislature uses terms already judicially construed, ‘the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts. ’ ” (City of Long Beach v. Marshall (1938) 11 Cal.2d 609, 620 [ 82 P.2d 362 ].) Therefore, the incorporation of the phrase “ineffective assistance of counsel” in Penal Code section 1387 indicates a legislative intent that the exception only applies where an error is committed by

1986(Stafford v. Realty BondService Corp. (1952) 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) It is “. . . well established that where the legislature uses terms already judicially construed, ‘the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts. ’ ” (City of Long Beach v. Marshall (1938) 11 Cal.2d 609, 620 [ 82 P.2d 362 ].) Therefore, the incorporation of the phrase “ineffective assistance of counsel” in Penal Code section 1387 indicates a legislative intent that the exception only applies where an error is committed by

1986(Stafford v. Realty BondService Corp. (1952) 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) It is “. . . well established that where the legislature uses terms already judicially construed, ‘the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts. ’ ” (City of Long Beach v. Marshall (1938) 11 Cal.2d 609, 620 [ 82 P.2d 362 ].) Therefore, the incorporation of the phrase “ineffective assistance of counsel” in Penal Code section 1387 indicates a legislative intent that the exception only applies where an error is committed by

1986(Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., supra; City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra.) While the phrase “denial of effective counsel” has been applied to errors committed by a court which prevents counsel from adequately serving the *800 client’s interests (e.g., In re Ali (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 585, 591 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 108 ]), the absence of such language in Penal Code section 1387 indicates that the Legislature did not intend the exception to have such a broad application.

1986(Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., supra; City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra.) While the phrase “denial of effective counsel” has been applied to errors committed by a court which prevents counsel from adequately serving the *800 client’s interests (e.g., In re Ali (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 585, 591 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 108 ]), the absence of such language in Penal Code section 1387 indicates that the Legislature did not intend the exception to have such a broad application.

1980(See In re Marley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 525, at p. 529 [ 175 P.2d 832 ], quoting from State v. Weisberg (1943) 74 Ohio App. 91 [ 55 N.E.2d 870, at p. 872 ].) Defendant notes, and correctly so, that strict liability offenses usually result in light sentences and are the type of crimes that do no damage to reputation.

1980(See In re Marley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 525, at p. 529 [ 175 P.2d 832 ], quoting from State v. Weisberg (1943) 74 Ohio App. 91 [ 55 N.E.2d 870, at p. 872 ].) Defendant notes, and correctly so, that strict liability offenses usually result in light sentences and are the type of crimes that do no damage to reputation.