90 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 40 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re DWgreen2 sentences2024See In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 , 315 (2005). ¶ 24 Here, the evidence showed that, although the respondent completed some tasks in the service plan, she made little overall progress. 2024Id. ¶ 16 Unfitness Hearing. ¶ 17 Before beginning the unfitness hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the adjudication order from June 2018, finding neglect and injurious environment, physical abuse, and abuse/substantial risk of injury and excessive corporal punishment. | 6 | 7 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2005See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61 , 102 S.Ct. at 1398 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 611 . 2005See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61 , 102 S.Ct. at 1398 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 611 . | 4 | 4 |
In Re DTgreen2 sentences2026“At the unfitness hearing, the focus is on the parent’s conduct relative to the ground or grounds of unfitness alleged by the State.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. 2026Viewed as a 10 whole, the evidence supported the circuit court’s determination that Mother made neither reasonable efforts nor reasonable progress toward reunification. ¶ 34 Once the court makes a finding of unfitness, “[t]he issue is no longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphases in original.) D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Martha R.green2 sentences2023In re Deandre D., 405 Ill. 2021In re Deandre D., 405 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
In Re D.F.green2 sentences2014Although proof of neglect as to one child might be relevant to the issue of a parent’s fitness with respect to another child (see In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 500-01 (2002); In re G.V., 292 Ill. 2014Although proof of neglect as to one child might be relevant to the issue of a parent’s fitness with respect to another child (see In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 500-01 (2002); In re G.V., 292 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
In Interest of Jggreen2 sentences2024However, this court has been clear “wholesale judicial -8- notice of everything that took place prior to the unfitness hearing is unnecessary and inappropriate.” J.G., 298 Ill. 2022This concept is of paramount importance because, “[a]bove all, the trial court’s decision as to whether a parent is unfit should be based only upon evidence properly admitted at the unfitness hearing.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 84 For example, although a trial court presiding over the fitness portion of termination proceedings may take judicial notice of its prior dispositional orders, it may not take judicial notice of testimony that was presented at the dispositional hearing. | 2 | 11 |
In Re Adoption of Syckgreen2 sentences1995Under the ICWA, an allegation of parental unfitness must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f) (1988).) However, in a traditional unfitness hearing under Illinois law, the proper standard is proof by clear and convincing evidence. (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1992); see, e.g., In re Adoption of Syck (1990), 138 Ill.2d 255 , 149 Ill.Dec. 710 , 562 N.E.2d 174 .) Thus it is unclear which burdens of proof would apply in the instant proceedings. 1995Under the ICWA, an allegation of parental unfitness must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f) (1988).) However, in a traditional unfitness hearing under Illinois law, the proper standard is proof by clear and convincing evidence. (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1992); see, e.g., In re Adoption of Syck (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 255 .) Thus it is unclear which burdens of proof would apply in the instant proceedings. | 2 | 4 |
In Re ABgreen2 sentences2021In re A.B., 308 Ill. 2000A.B., 308 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
In Re GVgreen2 sentences2014Although proof of neglect as to one child might be relevant to the issue of a parent’s fitness with respect to another child (see In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 500-01 (2002); In re G.V., 292 Ill. 2014Although proof of neglect as to one child might be relevant to the issue of a parent’s fitness with respect to another child (see In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 500-01 (2002); In re G.V., 292 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
In re Z.J.green2 sentences2025In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 71 (citing J.G., 298 Ill. 2025In re Z.J., 2020 IL App (2d) 190824, ¶ 71 (citing J.G., 298 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
In Re JPgreen2 sentences2021Therefore, “[w]holesale judicial notice of all matters occurring prior to the unfitness hearing is unnecessary and inappropriate, and a trial court should only take judicial notice of those portions of the underlying court files that had been proffered by the State and to which the respondent is given an opportunity to object.” In re J.P., 316 Ill. 2020Therefore, “[w]holesale judicial notice of all matters occurring prior to the unfitness hearing is unnecessary and inappropriate, and a trial court should only take judicial notice of those portions of the underlying court files that had been proffered by the State and to which the respondent is given an opportunity to object.” In re J.P., 316 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
In Re JAgreen2 sentences2004I also note Detra W.'s case bears little resemblance to the cases on repeated incarceration cited by the majority. [4] A related point needs to be addressed, although mentioned by the majority, they properly did not highlight it: the special needs of Gwynne P. The record is clear that as of the unfitness hearing, Gwynne P. had progressed to the point where she receives therapy only at the school she attends and only on an "as needed basis." There is no evidence that Detra W. could not meet the "special needs" of Gwynne P. As the majority implicitly recognizes in rejecting the trial court's fin 2004I also note Detra W.'s case bears little resemblance to the cases on repeated incarceration cited by the majority. [4] A related point needs to be addressed, although mentioned by the majority, they properly did not highlight it: the special needs of Gwynne P. The record is clear that as of the unfitness hearing, Gwynne P. had progressed to the point where she receives therapy only at the school she attends and only on an "as needed basis." There is no evidence that Detra W. could not meet the "special needs" of Gwynne P. As the majority implicitly recognizes in rejecting the trial court's fin | 2 | 2 |
| In Re FSgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. R.G.green | 2 | 2 |
| In Re Atgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Maurice B. (In Re M.B.)green2 sentences2022See In re M.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 181008, ¶ 14 , 129 N.E.3d 631 (holding defaulted father’s “due process rights were violated when the trial court dismissed his appointed counsel before the unfitness hearing”). 2022See In re M.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 181008, ¶ 14 , 129 N.E.3d 631 (holding defaulted father’s “due process rights were violated when the trial court dismissed his appointed counsel before the unfitness hearing”). | 1 | 2 |
In re Dal D.green2 sentences2023D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 31 (“In determining whether a factual basis exists, a court need not rely on the State’s -7- factual basis provided at the unfitness hearing, but it could sua sponte rely on evidence heard during earlier proceedings.”). 2022D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 31 . | 1 | 2 |
| In Interest of BRgreen | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Adoption of ASVgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Syck v. Snydergreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re J.B.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re MWgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foutch v. O'BRYANTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hodgesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re MSgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re CWgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re MAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wellsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re CMgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Daltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re S.W.
green
2 sentences2026S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶ 31 . ¶ 68 Here, the respondent had received in-court notice of the best-interest hearing approximately six weeks beforehand, while attending the unfitness hearing. 2019However, at this particular hearing, respondent acknowledged that the court had previously admonished him and that he wished to proceed without counsel. ¶ 72 This situation is analogous to that presented in In re S.W. , 2015 IL App (3d) 140981 , ¶ 32, 393 Ill.Dec. 117 , 33 N.E.3d 861 , where the court held an unfitness hearing after appointing four different attorneys to represent respondent when she expressed dissatisfaction with their representation. | 3 | 2017–2026 |
In Re Gwynne P.
green
2 sentences2022Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at 354 . ¶ 30 At the unfitness hearing, the State admitted into evidence respondent’s seven felony convictions. 2021Id. ¶ 34 At the unfitness hearing, Bulman testified that Jaymi’s level of progress was unsatisfactory because she had had no contact with the Bethany agency since June 2018. | 3 | 2020–2022 |
In Re Austin
green
2 sentences1988Because it is impossible to measure progress without referring to a prior status, current status and the process by which movement from the one status to the other occurred, absence of evidence regarding the prior status would render a determination of `reasonable progress' meaningless." (Emphasis added.) ( 61 Ill. 1988Because it is impossible to measure progress without referring to a prior status, current status and the process by which movement from the one status to the other occurred, absence of evidence regarding the prior status would render a determination of ‘reasonable progress’ meaningless.” (Emphasis added.) ( 61 Ill. | 3 | 1986–1988 |
Taylor v. County of Cook
green
2 sentences2026App. 3d 395 , 404 (2002)), which occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it (Taylor v. County of Cook, 2011 IL App (1st) 093085 , ¶ 23). ¶ 67 Here, Delgado filed the motion to withdraw only two days before the unfitness hearing began. 2026App. 3d 395 , 404 (2002)), which occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it (Taylor v. County of Cook, 2011 IL App (1st) 093085 , ¶ 23). ¶ 68 Here, Delgado filed the motion to withdraw only two days before the unfitness hearing began. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
In re Tajannah O.
green
2 sentences2025In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19 . 18 ¶ 61 In support of his claim that the circuit court’s best interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, Father points out that neither party asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of the unfitness hearing. 2019In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 20 . -9- No. 1-18-1024 ¶ 31 On appeal, R.S. faults the trial court for focusing too heavily on the evidence presented at the unfitness hearing and for purportedly giving “only cursory consideration to the factors as set forth in the statute.” As evidence of the trial court’s preoccupation with the evidence presented at the unfitness hearing, R.S. points to the trial court’s observation that—as opposed to the minors’ biological parents—there was no evidence of any substance-abuse or domestic violence in the minors’ foster home. | 2 | 2019–2025 |
In re B'Yata I.
green
2 sentences2022Id. ¶ 47 Here, virtually no evidence was presented during the unfitness hearing concerning the respondent’s efforts to visit and communicate with her children or to inquire about their welfare. 2013Although proof of neglect as to one child might be relevant to the issue of a parent’s fitness with respect to another child (see In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 500-01 (2002); In re -20- 2013 IL App (2d) 130558 G.V., 292 Ill. | 2 | 2013–2022 |
People v. Sarah N. (In Re G v.
green
2 sentences2021In support of this contention, she cites In re G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272 , and In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861 . 2021In In re G.V., 2018 IL App (3rd) 180272, ¶ 34 , the Third District held that the admission into evidence of an investigatory report as an indicated report did not comply with the Juvenile Court Act and deprived the parents of due process. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
In re J.C.
green
2 sentences2021In support of this contention, she cites In re G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272 , and In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861 . 2020In support of this contention she cites In re G.V., 2018 IL App (3d) 180272 , and In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861 . | 2 | 2020–2021 |
In Re Precious W.
green
2 sentences2021“It is sufficient to show that a person has demonstrated an inability to control his or her habitual craving.” Id. ¶ 30 The parties agree that the State failed to prove habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs because the State did not present any evidence at the unfitness hearing regarding Jaymi’s habitual drinking or drug use and did not ask the court to take judicial notice of any of the ample evidence of Jaymi’s drinking in this record. 2020“It is sufficient to show that a person has demonstrated an inability to control his or her habitual craving.” Id. ¶ 31 The parties agree that the State failed to prove habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs because the State did not present any evidence at the unfitness hearing regarding Jaymi’s habitual drinking or drug use nor did the State ask the court to take judicial notice of any of the ample evidence of Jaymi’s drinking in this record. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
In Re MJ
green
2 sentences2020Failure of a parent to comply with the directives of a service plan “is tantamount to objectively unreasonable interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare.” Id. ¶ 51 Here, the service plans and Williams’s testimony at the unfitness hearing established respondent’s failure to comply with the goals set forth in her service plans. 2020Failure of a parent to comply with the directives of a service plan “is tantamount to objectively unreasonable interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare.” Id. ¶ 51 Here, the service plans and Williams’s testimony at the unfitness hearing established respondent’s failure to comply with the goals set forth in her service plans. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
In re S.P.
green
2 sentences2019Where there was no notice to respondent of the unfitness hearing and no notice that his counsel would be discharged-and accordingly the State's evidence was uncontested-we cannot say that the Rule 13(c) violations were harmless and did not infringe due process. ¶ 24 We acknowledge that, in the recent decision In re S.P. , 2019 IL App (3d) 180476 , ¶¶ 43-44, 429 Ill.Dec. 42 , 123 N.E.3d 1101 , the Third District held that, despite Rule 13(c) violations, allowing the respondent father's counsel to withdraw did not constitute a due process violation. 2019Where there was no notice to respondent of the unfitness hearing and no notice that his counsel would be discharged-and accordingly the State's evidence was uncontested-we cannot say that the Rule 13(c) violations were harmless and did not infringe due process. ¶ 24 We acknowledge that, in the recent decision In re S.P. , 2019 IL App (3d) 180476 , ¶¶ 43-44, 429 Ill.Dec. 42 , 123 N.E.3d 1101 , the Third District held that, despite Rule 13(c) violations, allowing the respondent father's counsel to withdraw did not constitute a due process violation. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
In Re CJ
neutral
2 sentences2017C.J., 2011 IL App (4th) 110476, ¶ 56 , 960 N.E.2d 694 . 2017C.J., 2011 IL App (4th) 110476, ¶ 56 , 960 N.E.2d 694 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In re C.J.
green
2 sentences2017C.J., 2011 IL App (4th) 110476, ¶ 56 , 960 N.E.2d 694 . 2017C.J., 2011 IL App (4th) 110476, ¶ 56 , 960 N.E.2d 694 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In Re MC
green
2 sentences2004A related point needs to be addressed; although mentioned by the majority, they properly did not highlight it: the special needs of Gwynne P. The record is clear that as of the unfitness hearing, Gwynne P. had progressed to the point where she receives therapy only at the school she attends and only on an “as needed basis.” There is no evidence that Detra W could not meet the “special needs” of Gwynne P. As the majority implicitly recognize in rejecting the trial court’s finding of unfitness as to the ground of reasonable progress, Detra W made “measurable or demonstrable movement toward the g 2004I also note Detra W.'s case bears little resemblance to the cases on repeated incarceration cited by the majority. [4] A related point needs to be addressed, although mentioned by the majority, they properly did not highlight it: the special needs of Gwynne P. The record is clear that as of the unfitness hearing, Gwynne P. had progressed to the point where she receives therapy only at the school she attends and only on an "as needed basis." There is no evidence that Detra W. could not meet the "special needs" of Gwynne P. As the majority implicitly recognizes in rejecting the trial court's fin | 2 | 2004–2004 |
In Re DD
green
2 sentences2004Because a "proceeding to involuntary terminate parental rights is a drastic measure" ( In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d at 417 , 256 Ill.Dec. 870 , 752 N.E.2d 1112 ), and we have reversed the trial court on four of its five findings of parental unfitness, we must not rely on the principle of review that a trial court's finding of unfitness is entitled to *346 great deference in assessing the adequacy of the evidence as to this remaining ground. 2004Because a "proceeding to involuntary terminate parental rights is a drastic measure" ( In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d at 417 , 256 Ill.Dec. 870 , 752 N.E.2d 1112 ), and we have reversed the trial court on four of its five findings of parental unfitness, we must not rely on the principle of review that a trial court's finding of unfitness is entitled to *346 great deference in assessing the adequacy of the evidence as to this remaining ground. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Adams v. Adams
green
2 sentences2004If the trial court had considered the entire period of time between the neglect adjudication and the unfitness hearing, as I believe it is required to do (see, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 103 Ill. 2004If the trial court had considered the entire period of time between the neglect adjudication and the unfitness hearing, as I believe he is required to do (See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 103 Ill.App.3d 126 , 58 Ill.Dec. 712 , 430 N.E.2d 744 (1982) (in evaluating fitness of parents or the exercise of parental rights, court must look to the entirety of parents' conduct over the period in question)), which clearly demonstrates the substantial rehabilitation on the part of Detra W., the finding that Detra W. was unable to carry out her parental responsibilities at the time of the unfitness hearing coul | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re Adoption of Burton green | 2 | 1980–1980 |
| Anders v. California green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Alms v. Peoria County Election Comm'n green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Adeline E. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| In re Charles W. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| In re M.D. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| In re M.I. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| In re Nicholas C. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| In re L.S. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In re Jeanette L. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Jacob R. (In Re P.J.) green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re J.C. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In re N.T. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In re Nevaeh R. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In Re Marriage of Wolff green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Gill neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re Robertson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.