6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
JONATHAN L. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009Based on substantive due process principles, a strict scrutiny standard is typically applied in cases that impact a fundamental liberty interest. ( In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 85 P.3d 2 ]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 939-940 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 952 P.2d 1139 ]; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1102-1103 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ].) Under this standard, a state may not infringe on an individual's fundamental right unless the countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference and the 2009Based on substantive due process principles, a strict scrutiny standard is typically applied in cases that impact a fundamental liberty interest. ( In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 85 P.3d 2 ]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 939-940 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 952 P.2d 1139 ]; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1102-1103 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ].) Under this standard, a state may not infringe on an individual's fundamental right unless the countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference and the | 1 | 1 |
Dawn D. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009Based on substantive due process principles, a strict scrutiny standard is typically applied in cases that impact a fundamental liberty interest. ( In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 85 P.3d 2 ]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 939-940 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 952 P.2d 1139 ]; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1102-1103 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ].) Under this standard, a state may not infringe on an individual's fundamental right unless the countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference and the 2009Based on substantive due process principles, a strict scrutiny standard is typically applied in cases that impact a fundamental liberty interest. ( In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 85 P.3d 2 ]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 939-940 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 952 P.2d 1139 ]; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1102-1103 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ].) Under this standard, a state may not infringe on an individual's fundamental right unless the countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference and the | 1 | 1 |
In Re Cody W.green2 sentences1997(See In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 224-226 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ].) 4 In a tangential argument, Lawrence contends SSA should be estopped from opposing the benefit exception because “it did nothing to assist appellant in maintaining his relationship with the minors and opposed the bonding study.” The assertion is frivolous. 1997(See In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 224-226 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ].) 4 In a tangential argument, Lawrence contends SSA should be estopped from opposing the benefit exception because “it did nothing to assist appellant in maintaining his relationship with the minors and opposed the bonding study.” The assertion is frivolous. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Guardianship of Ann S.
green
2 sentences2026Code, § 1511.)” (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1122 , fns. omitted (Ann S.).) “Early authorities held that in contested guardianship cases, parents were entitled to retain custody unless affirmatively found unfit. [Citation.] However, the unfitness standard fell out of favor and the best interest of the child, as determined under the custody statutes, became the controlling consideration. [Citations.] The Probate Code now specifies that the appointment of a guardian is governed by the Family Code chapters beginning with sections 3020 and 3040. 2021Code, § 2250 et seq.; Ann S., at p. 1122, fn. 3.) “Early authorities held that in contested guardianship cases, parents were entitled to retain custody unless affirmatively found unfit. [Citation.] However, the unfitness standard fell out of favor and the best interest of the child, as determined under the custody statutes, became the controlling consideration. [Citations.] The Probate Code now specifies that the appointment of a guardian is governed by the Family Code chapters beginning with sections 3020 and 3040.” (Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1122–1123; see Prob. | 3 | 2013–2026 |
In Re Jesusa
green
2 sentences2009Based on substantive due process principles, a strict scrutiny standard is typically applied in cases that impact a fundamental liberty interest. ( In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 85 P.3d 2 ]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 939-940 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 952 P.2d 1139 ]; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1102-1103 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ].) Under this standard, a state may not infringe on an individual's fundamental right unless the countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference and the 2009Based on substantive due process principles, a strict scrutiny standard is typically applied in cases that impact a fundamental liberty interest. ( In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 611 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 , 85 P.3d 2 ]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 939-940 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 952 P.2d 1139 ]; Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1102-1103 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 ].) Under this standard, a state may not infringe on an individual's fundamental right unless the countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference and the | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Lehr v. Robertson
green
1 sentence2009(Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 264-265.) But the court made the following useful observations about the connection between parental rights and responsibilities. “[T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.