13 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1910–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eddins-Walcher Butane Company v. Calvertgreen2 sentences2008In order to find that such a conflict existed, and then to reach the State’s desired analysis, we would have to completely disregard the word “other” as contained in Section 481.132(h) of the Texas Health and Safety Code and then determine that the two provisions are irreconcilable before applying the general versus specific analysis. 4 Because every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose, Eddins-Walcher Butane Co. v. Calvert, 156 Tex. 587 , 298 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1957), we need not do so. 2008In order to find that such a conflict existed, and then to reach the State’s desired analysis, we would have to completely disregard the word “other” as contained in Section 481.132(h) of the Texas Health and Safety Code and then determine that the two provisions are irreconcilable before applying the general versus specific analysis. 4 Because every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose, Eddins-Walcher Butane Co. v. Calvert, 156 Tex. 587 , 298 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1957), we need not do so. | 4 | 4 |
Rogers v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Rogers, 105 S.W.3d at 640 (2) Appellant did not preserve this complaint for appellate review, therefore the trial court did not err The parties disagree as to whether the evidence affirmatively raised an issue as to voluntariness. | 1 | 1 |
Vega, Jose Luis Jr.green1 sentence2022PROC. art. 36.14 (West 2007); Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 518 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Stategreen1 sentence2000Chapman v. State , 921 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Posey v. State
green
2 sentences2012Posey , 966 S.W.2d at 63 . 2012Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 63 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Gilgon, Inc. v. Hart
green
1 sentence2018To obtain the desired instruction, the employer would have had to present more than a scintilla of evidence that the employee would have gone on the same errand even if he had to cancel the work-related trip and that the employee would not have made the work-related trip if the personal errand were cancelled, but the record there “barely hint[ed] that [the employee] may have departed from the course of his employment.” Id. at 568 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Arana v. State
green
2 sentences2003Id. 2003Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Enloe
neutral
2 sentences1954It also stated, "Thus it is seen that the insurance carrier was not objecting to the definitions given by the trial court, but was requesting the trial court to give additional instructions which the insurance carrier thought would be beneficial to it." In the case of Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Enloe, 1949, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 225 S.W.2d 431 , writ refused, n. r. e., the court said that where a standard definition omits elements which a party considers should be included therein, an objection does not suffice to preserve any error and a complainant must tender a desired instruction in 1954It also stated, “Thus it is seen that the insurance carrier was not objecting to the definitions given by the trial court, but was requesting the trial court to give additional instructions which the insurance carrier thought would be beneficial to it.” In the case of Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Enloe, 1949, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 225 S.W.2d 431 , writ refused, n. r. e., the court said that where a standard definition omits elements which a party considers should be included therein, an objection does not suffice to preserve any error and a complainant must tender a desired instruction in | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Texas Employers' Insurance v. Mallard
green
2 sentences1954The case did not turn upon the question here involved, and it is cited merely because it premised its authority for the above statement as to the law upon the Great American Indemnity Co. v. Sams case, supra. In the case of Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Mallard, 1944, 143 Tex. 77 , 182 S.W.2d 1000, 1002 , Chief Justice Hickman, then a Commissioner, said, "* * * Rule 279 applies when there is a failure to submit a definition, while Rule 274 applies when a definition is actually contained in the charge, but the complaining party objects to it because it is thought to be erroneous. * * *" T 1954The case did not turn upon the question here involved, and it is cited merely because it premised its authority for the above statement as to the law upon the Great American Indemnity Co. v. Sams case, supra. In the case of Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Mallard, 1944, 143 Tex. 77 , 182 S.W.2d 1000, 1002 , Chief Justice Hickman, then a Commissioner, said, "* * * Rule 279 applies when there is a failure to submit a definition, while Rule 274 applies when a definition is actually contained in the charge, but the complaining party objects to it because it is thought to be erroneous. * * *" T | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Cowan v. Brett
green
2 sentences1910App., 569 ( 97 S. W., 330 ), it was held that a desired instruction is not properly requested when contained only in a requested instruction which covers other propositions and is properly refused on other grounds. 1910App. 569 ] ( 97 S.W. 330 ), it was held that a desired instruction is not properly requested when contained only in a requested instruction which covers other propositions and is properly refused on other grounds. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.