agreement with an arbitration clause in California

2024In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot . . . ‘on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he sine qua non for application of equitable estoppel as the basis for allowing a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration clause is that the claims the plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined

2024In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot . . . ‘on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non- signatory.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he sine qua non for application of equitable estoppel as the basis for allowing a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration clause is that the claims the plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwine

2025As noted by Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209 , “merely ‘mak[ing] reference to’ an agreement with an arbitration clause is not enough” to trigger estoppel.

2024In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot ‘have it both ways’; the signatory ‘cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.’ ” (Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.) “[T]he sine qua non for application of equitable estoppel as the basis for allowing a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration clause is that the claims [the] plaintiff asserts against the nonsi

2024In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot . . . ‘on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non- signatory.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he sine qua non for application of equitable estoppel as the basis for allowing a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration clause is that the claims the plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwine

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2022In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot ‘ “have it both ways” ’; the signatory ‘cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non- signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.’ ” (Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220 (Goldman), quoting Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency (5th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 524, 528 .4) As Grigson explained, “[t]he linchpin for equitable estoppel is equity—fairness.” (G

2009In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot “ ‘have it both ways’ the signatory “cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.” (Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency (5th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 524, 528 (Grigson).) As Grigson sums it up, “[t]he linchpin for equitable estoppel is equity—fairness.” (Ibid.) *221 In short, and couched in terms of this case, Goldman and H

2022The first is “ ‘when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause “must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting [its] claims” against the nonsignatory.’ (MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin (11th Cir.1999) 177 F.3d 942 , 4 Where, as here, “the agreements relied upon to compel arbitration . . . evidence transactions involving commerce, as defined in the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), federal law governs the interpretation of the agreements. [Citation.] Accordingly, decisions of the lower federal courts, while not binding, are persuasive

2009Equitable estoppel applies “when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause ‘must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting [its] claims’ against the nonsignatory.” (MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin (11th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 942, 947 (MS Dealer).) The difference between “reference,” the word chosen by KPMG/Sidley, and “reliance,” as employed by MS Dealer and others, is significant. — As to the second circumstance, while the cases recite the language which KPMG and Sidley proffer (interdependent and concerted misconduct by signatories and nonsignatori

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2007(Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303, 315-316 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 ] (Cruz).) Thus, if she had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause, Lee’s claim for damages under the CLRA would be arbitrable.

2007(Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303, 315-316 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 , 66 P.3d 1157 ] (Cruz).) Thus, if she had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause, Lee’s claim for damages under the CLRA would be arbitrable.

2002(Holmes v. Jones (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 882, 888 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 ] [the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal].) *1045 Disposition The order is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its stay order and enter a new order denying Buckhead’s application for a stay.

2002(Holmes v. Jones (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 882, 888 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 ] [the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal].) *1045 Disposition The order is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its stay order and enter a new order denying Buckhead’s application for a stay.

2002(Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 [§ 1281.2 “provides the remedy for a party to an agreement with an arbitration clause where the other party refuses to arbitrate a dispute”]; cf. Melander v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 542, 548 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 592 ] [a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement has no standing to vacate the arbitration award]; see also Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115-1116 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 261 ].) 4 The trial court’s ruling is wrong as a matter of

2002(Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 [§ 1281.2 “provides the remedy for a party to an agreement with an arbitration clause where the other party refuses to arbitrate a dispute”]; cf. Melander v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 542, 548 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 592 ] [a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement has no standing to vacate the arbitration award]; see also Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115-1116 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 261 ].) 4 The trial court’s ruling is wrong as a matter of

2002(Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 [§ 1281.2 “provides the remedy for a party to an agreement with an arbitration clause where the other party refuses to arbitrate a dispute”]; cf. Melander v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 542, 548 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 592 ] [a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement has no standing to vacate the arbitration award]; see also Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115-1116 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 261 ].) 4 The trial court’s ruling is wrong as a matter of

2002(Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 [§ 1281.2 “provides the remedy for a party to an agreement with an arbitration clause where the other party refuses to arbitrate a dispute”]; cf. Melander v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 542, 548 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 592 ] [a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement has no standing to vacate the arbitration award]; see also Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115-1116 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 261 ].) 4 The trial court’s ruling is wrong as a matter of

1994Co. (1916) 174 Cal. 156, 159 [ 162 P. 631 ] .... ‘Typically, those who enter into arbitration agreements expect that their dispute will be resolved without necessity for any contact with the courts.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Section 1281.2 provides the remedy for a party to an agreement with an arbitration clause where the other party refuses to arbitrate a dispute.