12 California opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Keohanegreen2 sentences2001This ultimate determination, we hold, presents a `mixed question of law and fact' qualifying for independent review." ( Thompson, supra, 516 U. S. at pp. 112-113, 116 S.Ct. 457 , fn. omitted.) The high court in Thompson distinguished the mixed question before it from two other mixed questions to which it had applied a deferential standard of review: juror bias and competency to stand trial. 1999This ultimate determination . . . presents a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ . . . .” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Accordingly, we apply a deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 826 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219 , 905 P.2d 1305 ]) to the trial court’s conclusions regarding “ ‘basic, primary, or historical facts: facts “in the sense of recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators . . . ” (Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 110 [ 116 S.Ct. at p. 464 ].) Having determined the propriety of the court’s findings under that standard, we indepen | 2 | 2 |
California Ass'n of Professional Scientists v. Department of Financegreen2 sentences2017(See California Assn. of Professional Scientists v. Department of Finance (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228 , 1232, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 328 ["[t]he Legislature has delegated to DPA the authority to set salaries for state employees excluded from collective bargaining"]; see also Gov. 2017(See California Assn. of Professional Scientists v. Department of Finance (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228 , 1232, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 328 ["[t]he Legislature has delegated to DPA the authority to set salaries for state employees excluded from collective bargaining"]; see also Gov. | 1 | 2 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2020(See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471 [“children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers”].) However obvious it may seem to “most 13-year-olds” that kicking a police officer is wrongful conduct, the controlling legal inquiry requires us to step into J.E.’s shoes and “consider the particular circumstances and perspective of the individual child before [us], rather than [relying] on generalizations about what children of a certain age should know.” (In re J.E., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 314–315.) The Court of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Memrogreen2 sentences1999This ultimate determination . . . presents a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ . . . .” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Accordingly, we apply a deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 826 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219 , 905 P.2d 1305 ]) to the trial court’s conclusions regarding “ ‘basic, primary, or historical facts: facts “in the sense of recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators . . . ” (Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 110 [ 116 S.Ct. at p. 464 ].) Having determined the propriety of the court’s findings under that standard, we indepen 1999This ultimate determination . . . presents a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ . . . .” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Accordingly, we apply a deferential substantial evidence standard (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 826 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219 , 905 P.2d 1305 ]) to the trial court’s conclusions regarding “ ‘basic, primary, or historical facts: facts “in the sense of recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators . . . ” (Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 110 [ 116 S.Ct. at p. 464 ].) Having determined the propriety of the court’s findings under that standard, we indepen | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc.green2 sentences1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct 1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct | 1 | 1 |
Herbert v. Lankershimgreen2 sentences1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct 1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct | 1 | 1 |
Agarwal v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct 1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct | 1 | 1 |
Lysick v. Walcomgreen2 sentences1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct 1987(Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ].) “In the interest of a full and complete understanding of the law applicable to the case it was necessary that the jury be instructed on the major subjects raised by the [evidence] even if a modification in [the instruction] was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.” (Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, 482 [ 71 P.2d 220 ], and quoted in Thomas v. Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [ 297 P.2d 768 ].) “[I]t was incumbent upon the trial court properly to instruct | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
green
1 sentence2024(FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367 .) FPI involved an “amorphous controversy” arising out of complex real estate deal involving multiple parties and issues. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Software Design & Application, Ltd. v. Price Waterhouse
green
1 sentence2024A “collateral agreement will be looked to only insofar as it does not directly contradict the express terms of the writing.” (Software Design & Application, Ltd. v. Price Waterhouse (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 464, 470 .) Defendants’ own authority confirms this controlling legal principle. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Stanley-Taylor Co. v. Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences2022So long as the District actually exercised such discretion, this court may not issue a writ contravening the District’s decision. 9 Citing Stanley-Taylor, supra, 135 Cal. at page 488 , the trial court here formulated a general principle that, as a matter of law, “a writ of mandate will lie to correct illegal, but not capricious rationale determined by an irrigation district board of directors to be in the best interest of the district.” For the reasons discussed above, we disagree with this formulation of the controlling legal standard. 2022So long as the District actually exercised such discretion, this court may not issue a writ contravening the District’s decision. 9 Citing Stanley-Taylor, supra, 135 Cal. at page 488 , the trial court here formulated a general principle that, as a matter of law, “a writ of mandate will lie to correct illegal, but not capricious rationale determined by an irrigation district board of directors to be in the best interest of the district.” For the reasons discussed above, we disagree with this formulation of the controlling legal standard. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Miyamoto v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2020(Miyamoto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 .) Even if the City admitted that it owed Waterwood money to repair the parking lot, and assuming arguendo the jury based its damage award on repairing the parking lot, the trial court abused its discretion in relying on that purported admission to conclude the City was a prevailing party. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Nino v. Gladys R.
green
1 sentence2020(See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 471 [“children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers”].) However obvious it may seem to “most 13-year-olds” that kicking a police officer is wrongful conduct, the controlling legal inquiry requires us to step into J.E.’s shoes and “consider the particular circumstances and perspective of the individual child before [us], rather than [relying] on generalizations about what children of a certain age should know.” (In re J.E., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 314–315.) The Court of | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Board
green
1 sentence2020The findings of fact made following issuance of a writ of mandate and further 9 “[S]ubdivision (f) of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1094.5 provides that, when granting mandamus relief, the court may ‘order the reconsideration of the case in the light of the court’s opinion and judgment.’ (Italics added.) This clearly implies that, in the final judgment itself, the court may direct the agency’s attention to specific portions of its decision that need attention, and need not necessarily require the agency to reconsider, de novo, the entirety of its prior action.” (Voices of the Wetlands, sup | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2007Petroleum, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559, set forth the controlling legal principle: “[J]ust as appellate courts generally may not consider evidence not contained in the trial record when reviewing such findings, courts generally may not consider evidence not contained in the administrative record when reviewing the substantiality of the evidence supporting a quasi-legislative administrative decision under Public Resources Code section 21168.5. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance
green
1 sentence1995(See Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 321 .) County has pointed to no contrary provision of law *630 which governs this situation. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.