failure to comply rule in California

1990We decline to do so. [¶]In reaching our conclusion that the failure to comply with rule 244(a) does not void the judgment, we rely, in the first instance, on the plain language of article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution, which requires only that there be a ‘stipulation of the parties litigant.’ The cases interpreting the constitutional provision have rejected any requirement that the stipulation be express. [Citations.] If a valid stipulation may be implied from conduct, then, a fortiori, an express, albeit oral, stipulation to a hearing by a retired juvenile court referee actin

1990We decline to do so. [¶]In reaching our conclusion that the failure to comply with rule 244(a) does not void the judgment, we rely, in the first instance, on the plain language of article VI, section 21, of the California Constitution, which requires only that there be a ‘stipulation of the parties litigant.’ The cases interpreting the constitutional provision have rejected any requirement that the stipulation be express. [Citations.] If a valid stipulation may be implied from conduct, then, a fortiori, an express, albeit oral, stipulation to a hearing by a retired juvenile court referee actin

2014We agree with the Oaxaca court that ‘“‘It would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceeding to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.’”’ (People v. Oaxaca [(1974)] 39 Cal.App.3d 153, 164 .)” (Robert S., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1265 .) Rejecting In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214 and In re Damian V. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 933 , the courts in In re Richard S. (1991

1990In Oaxaca the court found that it would be “ ‘ “intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 164.) The holding in Oaxaca itself was later cited with approval by the Supreme Court in In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 178 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ], With due respect to the court which decided In re Heather P., supra, 20

2014We agree with the Oaxaca court that ‘“‘It would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceeding to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.’”’ (People v. Oaxaca [(1974)] 39 Cal.App.3d 153, 164 .)” (Robert S., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1265 .) Rejecting In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214 and In re Damian V. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 933 , the courts in In re Richard S. (1991

1990In Oaxaca the court found that it would be “ ‘ “intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 164.) The holding in Oaxaca itself was later cited with approval by the Supreme Court in In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 178 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ], With due respect to the court which decided In re Heather P., supra, 20

2015(In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1419 ; In re Charles B. (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 16 1204 .) “‘A failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 546 .) Due process only requires “‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and affo

2015(In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1419 ; In re Charles B. (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 16 1204 .) “‘A failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 546 .) Due process only requires “‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and affo

2015(In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1419 ; In re Charles B. (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 16 1204 .) “‘A failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 546 .) Due process only requires “‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and affo

2014(Reynolds v. Sorosis Fruit Co. (1901) 133 Cal. 625, 630 .) “An attorney suing upon a contract for an agreed fee is not required to prove the reasonable value of his services.” (Berk, supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 637 ; see MacInnis v. Pope (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 528, 530 [finding no reason to consider “‘reasonable value’” where “[p]laintiff [attorney] sued on a written contract fully performed”; “when an attorney fully performs the services required by the contract he is entitled to the fee stipulated in the contract”].) Our review of the record below indicates that the Hovanesians presented no d

2014We agree with the Oaxaca court that ‘“‘It would seem . . . intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceeding to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.’”’ (People v. Oaxaca [(1974)] 39 Cal.App.3d 153, 164 .)” (Robert S., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1265 .) Rejecting In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214 and In re Damian V. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 933 , the courts in In re Richard S. (1991

2014The court found that the claim for breach of contract for failure to pay fees for services rendered by B&L to the Hovanesians under the October 2006 retainer agreement was “barred because of the violation of . . . rule 3-300 . . . per Fletcher [v. Davis, supra, 33 Cal.4th 61 ].” With respect to the open account/account stated claim, the Hovanesians testified to their understanding that the majority of the fees for which they had been billed by appellants had been paid at the time the settlement was received, shortly before the trial against the Couveaus commenced.

2014The court found that the claim for breach of contract for failure to pay fees for services rendered by B&L to the Hovanesians under the October 2006 retainer agreement was “barred because of the violation of . . . rule 3-300 . . . per Fletcher [v. Davis, supra, 33 Cal.4th 61 ].” With respect to the open account/account stated claim, the Hovanesians testified to their understanding that the majority of the fees for which they had been billed by appellants had been paid at the time the settlement was received, shortly before the trial against the Couveaus commenced.

2014(Reynolds v. Sorosis Fruit Co. (1901) 133 Cal. 625, 630 .) “An attorney suing upon a contract for an agreed fee is not required to prove the reasonable value of his services.” (Berk, supra, 201 Cal.App.2d at p. 637 ; see MacInnis v. Pope (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 528, 530 [finding no reason to consider “‘reasonable value’” where “[p]laintiff [attorney] sued on a written contract fully performed”; “when an attorney fully performs the services required by the contract he is entitled to the fee stipulated in the contract”].) Our review of the record below indicates that the Hovanesians presented no d

1979(See Raphael v. Silverberg (1949) 274 App.Div. 625 [ 86 N.Y.S.2d 421 ] (contractual provision requiring that “all claims must be made within ten days” held not to bar arbitration of claim made after expiration of 10-day period); Tuttman v. Kattan, Talamas Export Corporation (1948) 274 App.Div. 395 [ 83 N.Y.S.2d 651 ] (10-day clause held not to constitute a “statute of limitations” for the institution of arbitration proceedings).) These cases hold that the issue as to whether the claim period has been complied with, or if not whether the failure to comply should bar relief, is a question for th

1979(See Raphael v. Silverberg (1949) 274 App.Div. 625 [ 86 N.Y.S.2d 421 ] (contractual provision requiring that “all claims must be made within ten days” held not to bar arbitration of claim made after expiration of 10-day period); Tuttman v. Kattan, Talamas Export Corporation (1948) 274 App.Div. 395 [ 83 N.Y.S.2d 651 ] (10-day clause held not to constitute a “statute of limitations” for the institution of arbitration proceedings).) These cases hold that the issue as to whether the claim period has been complied with, or if not whether the failure to comply should bar relief, is a question for th

1979(See Raphael v. Silverberg (1949) 274 App.Div. 625 [ 86 N.Y.S.2d 421 ] (contractual provision requiring that “all claims must be made within ten days” held not to bar arbitration of claim made after expiration of 10-day period); Tuttman v. Kattan, Talamas Export Corporation (1948) 274 App.Div. 395 [ 83 N.Y.S.2d 651 ] (10-day clause held not to constitute a “statute of limitations” for the institution of arbitration proceedings).) These cases hold that the issue as to whether the claim period has been complied with, or if not whether the failure to comply should bar relief, is a question for th

1979(See Raphael v. Silverberg (1949) 274 App.Div. 625 [ 86 N.Y.S.2d 421 ] (contractual provision requiring that “all claims must be made within ten days” held not to bar arbitration of claim made after expiration of 10-day period); Tuttman v. Kattan, Talamas Export Corporation (1948) 274 App.Div. 395 [ 83 N.Y.S.2d 651 ] (10-day clause held not to constitute a “statute of limitations” for the institution of arbitration proceedings).) These cases hold that the issue as to whether the claim period has been complied with, or if not whether the failure to comply should bar relief, is a question for th

1974Several cases collected in Hoskins v. United States (3d Cir. 1972) 462 F.2d 271, 274 , hold that a failure to comply with rule 32(a)(2) at the time of sentencing *621 does not automatically entitle the defendant to a late appeal, at least “[w]here notice of the appeal rights is placed on the record in a formal judicial proceeding prior to sentencing and the interval between the proceeding and the sentencing is of a brief enough duration to ensure beyond a reasonable doubt that the notification will be fresh in the mind of the defendant at the time of the sentencing . . . .” (See also Johnson v

1974Several cases collected in Hoskins v. United States (3d Cir. 1972) 462 F.2d 271, 274 , hold that a failure to comply with rule 32(a)(2) at the time of sentencing *621 does not automatically entitle the defendant to a late appeal, at least “[w]here notice of the appeal rights is placed on the record in a formal judicial proceeding prior to sentencing and the interval between the proceeding and the sentencing is of a brief enough duration to ensure beyond a reasonable doubt that the notification will be fresh in the mind of the defendant at the time of the sentencing . . . .” (See also Johnson v

1974Again we point to the language of the 1972 Annual Report quoted in In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d 72, 84 , footnote 12: The writer’s expectation that compliance with rule 250 “will serve to rebut” claims of ignorance does not intimate that nothing but such compliance will do the job.