12 California opinions name it 1 courts 1965–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Parksgreen2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Brentsgreen2 sentences2025(People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 (Brents).) Subdivision (a) of section 654 states in pertinent part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” The statute precludes more than one punishment for multiple violations arising from a single act, and also forbids more than one punishment for a course of conduct comprising multiple acts undertaken with a single intent or objective. 2021(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13 ; People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 .) “It has long been recognized that where a defendant is convicted of robbery and other crimes incidental to the robbery such as assault, section 654 precludes punishment for both crimes.” (People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, 354 .) But 31 there is an exception to this principle. “[A]n act of ‘gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim . . . has traditionally been viewed as not “incidental” to robbery for purposes of Penal Code section 654.’ [Citations.]” (People v. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Colemangreen1 sentence2022(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 164-165 [dual use of facts to support a sentence imposed and as factors in aggravation prohibited]; 19 People v. Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237 [killing an intimate partner is “ ‘the ultimate form of domestic violence’ ”].) Accordingly, we have no constitutional concerns with defendant’s upper term sentences. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Blackgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 812 [“as long as a single aggravating circumstance that renders a defendant eligible for the upper term sentence has been established in accordance with the requirements of Apprendi [v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 ] and its progeny, any additional factfinding engaged in by the trial court in selecting the appropriate sentence among the three available options does not violate the defendant’s right to jury trial”].) Yet here the court relied upon additional factors that were not admitted by defendant, proven through certified records of convictio | 1 | 1 |
People v. Browngreen1 sentence2022(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 164-165 [dual use of facts to support a sentence imposed and as factors in aggravation prohibited]; 19 People v. Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237 [killing an intimate partner is “ ‘the ultimate form of domestic violence’ ”].) Accordingly, we have no constitutional concerns with defendant’s upper term sentences. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kam Hing Wonggreen2 sentences2022As pointed out by the Second District Court of Appeal in People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972 (Wong), the base term of a sentence imposed for a violation of section 664, subdivision (a) is commonly referred to “as ‘7 years to 11 life.’ ” (Id. at p. 977, fn. 4.) “This is common shorthand to refer to a life sentence with minimum parole eligibility.” (Ibid.) “For example, the Penal Code specifies ‘every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.’ (§ 190, subd. (a).) Thus, a sentence for second degree murde 2022As pointed out by the Second District Court of Appeal in People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972 (Wong), the base term of a sentence imposed for a violation of section 664, subdivision (a) is commonly referred to “as ‘7 years to 11 life.’ ” (Id. at p. 977, fn. 4.) “This is common shorthand to refer to a life sentence with minimum parole eligibility.” (Ibid.) “For example, the Penal Code specifies ‘every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.’ (§ 190, subd. (a).) Thus, a sentence for second degree murde | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sandersgreen1 sentence2021(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13 ; People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 .) “It has long been recognized that where a defendant is convicted of robbery and other crimes incidental to the robbery such as assault, section 654 precludes punishment for both crimes.” (People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, 354 .) But 31 there is an exception to this principle. “[A]n act of ‘gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim . . . has traditionally been viewed as not “incidental” to robbery for purposes of Penal Code section 654.’ [Citations.]” (People v. | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2016Given the stringent requirements of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), if the statute were deemed to provide an adequate remedy for defendants serving a sentence imposed in violation of Miller, it is all but certain that many defendants would be required to continue to serve LWOP sentences without any sentencing court ever having considered whether such defendants were the “ ‘ “rare juvenile offender [s] whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” ’ ” as is required. ( Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S. at p. _ [136 S.Ct. at p. 724],) 8 Such a result would be inconsistent with Montgomery’s central t 2016Given the stringent requirements of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), if the statute were deemed to provide an adequate remedy for defendants serving a sentence imposed in violation of Miller, it is all but certain that many defendants would be required to continue to serve LWOP sentences without any sentencing court ever having considered whether such defendants were the “ ‘ “rare juvenile offender [s] whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” ’ ” as is required. ( Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S. at p. _ [136 S.Ct. at p. 724],) 8 Such a result would be inconsistent with Montgomery’s central t | 1 | 1 |
Michelle K. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) does not provide an adequate remedy for a defendant seeking collateral relief for Miller error “[H]abeas corpus is appropriate only when there are no other available and adequate remedies; it may not be used to avoid otherwise available and adequate remedies.” (Michelle K. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 433 [ 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 ].) Thus, we must determine whether section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) provides an adequate remedy for a defendant, such as Berg, imprisoned under a sentence imposed in violation of Miller and its progeny. 2016Section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) does not provide an adequate remedy for a defendant seeking collateral relief for Miller error “[H]abeas corpus is appropriate only when there are no other available and adequate remedies; it may not be used to avoid otherwise available and adequate remedies.” (Michelle K. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 433 [ 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 ].) Thus, we must determine whether section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) provides an adequate remedy for a defendant, such as Berg, imprisoned under a sentence imposed in violation of Miller and its progeny. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2016In Gutierrez, the California Supreme Court rejected the People’s argument that the enactment of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) eliminated the possibility that a defendant serving an LWOP sentence under California law for a crime committed as a juvenile, had suffered a Miller violation. ( Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387.) The Gutierrez court reasoned in part: “The Attorney General contends that section 1170[, subdivision (d)(2)] removes life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders from the ambit of Miller s concerns because the statute provides a meaningful opportunity for suc | 1 | 1 |
People v. Venegasgreen2 sentences1994The Third Division of this court, in People v. Venegas (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1742-1744 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 ], recently held that such a sentence violates Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivisions (a) and (c), providing as relevant, that where the sentences for “new offenses” are to be served consecutively, the greatest term of imprisonment will be selected as the principal term, the other or others will be the subordinate term or terms, and such subordinate term or terms shall consist of one-third of the statutory middle term. 5 For the reasons stated by the Third Division, the sentence i 1994The Third Division of this court, in People v. Venegas (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1742-1744 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 ], recently held that such a sentence violates Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivisions (a) and (c), providing as relevant, that where the sentences for “new offenses” are to be served consecutively, the greatest term of imprisonment will be selected as the principal term, the other or others will be the subordinate term or terms, and such subordinate term or terms shall consist of one-third of the statutory middle term. 5 For the reasons stated by the Third Division, the sentence i | 1 | 1 |
Pollard v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen | 1 | 1 |
| Arruda v. Arrudagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Browne v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wangenheim v. Garnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2020As we shall explain, appellant claims that the court’s alleged error resulted in an unauthorized sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi) and its progeny. “‘If a trial court imposes a sentence unauthorized by law, a reviewing court may correct that sentence whenever the error is called to the court’s attention.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] sentence is generally “unauthorized” where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518 .) This includes a sentence 2020As we shall explain, appellant claims that the court’s alleged error resulted in an unauthorized sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi) and its progeny. “‘If a trial court imposes a sentence unauthorized by law, a reviewing court may correct that sentence whenever the error is called to the court’s attention.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] sentence is generally “unauthorized” where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518 .) This includes a sentence | 2 | 2020–2022 |
King v. United States
green
2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1978Cir. 1938) 98 F.2d 291, 296 ; see also State v. Parks (1941) 67 Ohio App. 96 [ 36 N.E.2d 42 ]; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 167, p. 232.) Bozza, supra, is the seminal case in this area. | 2 | 1978–1980 |
Henry Hayes v. United States
green
2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1978Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defendant in double jeopardy though the defendant “has not appealed from the judgment embodying the invalid sentence, has not begun to serve it, and steps to correct it are not initiated by him but by the government.” (At p. 354.) The federal cases cited, as well as other cases, support that view (see Blankenship v. Parratt (8th Cir. 1977) 554 F.2d 850 ; Kennedy v. United States (9th Cir. 1964) 330 F.2d 26 ; King v. United States (D.C. | 2 | 1978–1980 |
Robert Eugene Kennedy v. United States
green
2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1978Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defendant in double jeopardy though the defendant “has not appealed from the judgment embodying the invalid sentence, has not begun to serve it, and steps to correct it are not initiated by him but by the government.” (At p. 354.) The federal cases cited, as well as other cases, support that view (see Blankenship v. Parratt (8th Cir. 1977) 554 F.2d 850 ; Kennedy v. United States (9th Cir. 1964) 330 F.2d 26 ; King v. United States (D.C. | 2 | 1978–1980 |
Gary L. Blankenship v. Robert F. Parratt, Warden, Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex
green
2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1978Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defendant in double jeopardy though the defendant “has not appealed from the judgment embodying the invalid sentence, has not begun to serve it, and steps to correct it are not initiated by him but by the government.” (At p. 354.) The federal cases cited, as well as other cases, support that view (see Blankenship v. Parratt (8th Cir. 1977) 554 F.2d 850 ; Kennedy v. United States (9th Cir. 1964) 330 F.2d 26 ; King v. United States (D.C. | 2 | 1978–1980 |
People v. Tarris
green
1 sentence2021(In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78 , 94; People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612 , 626–627.) Because a sentence imposed in violation of section 654 is unauthorized, it may be corrected at any time even if the defendant did not object below. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Cleveland
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13 ; People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 .) “It has long been recognized that where a defendant is convicted of robbery and other crimes incidental to the robbery such as assault, section 654 precludes punishment for both crimes.” (People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, 354 .) But 31 there is an exception to this principle. “[A]n act of ‘gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim . . . has traditionally been viewed as not “incidental” to robbery for purposes of Penal Code section 654.’ [Citations.]” (People v. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Bui
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13 ; People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 .) “It has long been recognized that where a defendant is convicted of robbery and other crimes incidental to the robbery such as assault, section 654 precludes punishment for both crimes.” (People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, 354 .) But 31 there is an exception to this principle. “[A]n act of ‘gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim . . . has traditionally been viewed as not “incidental” to robbery for purposes of Penal Code section 654.’ [Citations.]” (People v. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13 ; People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 .) “It has long been recognized that where a defendant is convicted of robbery and other crimes incidental to the robbery such as assault, section 654 precludes punishment for both crimes.” (People v. Mitchell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 349, 354 .) But 31 there is an exception to this principle. “[A]n act of ‘gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim . . . has traditionally been viewed as not “incidental” to robbery for purposes of Penal Code section 654.’ [Citations.]” (People v. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
The People v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2020As we shall explain, appellant claims that the court’s alleged error resulted in an unauthorized sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (Apprendi) and its progeny. “‘If a trial court imposes a sentence unauthorized by law, a reviewing court may correct that sentence whenever the error is called to the court’s attention.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] sentence is generally “unauthorized” where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518 .) This includes a sentence | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Moser
green
1 sentence2013In analyzing whether the sentence imposed was in violation of what was promised him when he pleaded guilty, we follow the two-step approach enunciated by our high court in Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 1019 to 1020, namely, whether (1) the defendant has been properly admonished before pleading guilty under a negotiated plea, and (2) there has been adherence to the terms of the plea bargain. ( Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th a p. 351.) Here, we ask (1) whether defendant was properly admonished when he 11 entered his guilty plea, insofar as the court’s recital that he would receive a three-year paro | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Walker
green
1 sentence2013In analyzing whether the sentence imposed was in violation of what was promised him when he pleaded guilty, we follow the two-step approach enunciated by our high court in Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 1019 to 1020, namely, whether (1) the defendant has been properly admonished before pleading guilty under a negotiated plea, and (2) there has been adherence to the terms of the plea bargain. ( Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th a p. 351.) Here, we ask (1) whether defendant was properly admonished when he 11 entered his guilty plea, insofar as the court’s recital that he would receive a three-year paro | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Massengale green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Bozza v. United States
green
2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Serrato
green
2 sentences1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen 1980(People v. Serrato, 9 Cal.3d 753 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 512 P.2d 289 ].)’ (People v. Superior Court (Gon zales), supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at [134] at p. 143.) “In People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 354 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 257 ], the court, relying upon Bozza v. United States (1947) 330 U.S. 160 [ 91 L.Ed. 818 , 67 S.Ct. 645 ], Pollard v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 354, 361 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 , 77 S.Ct. 481 ], and Hayes v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1957) 249 F.2d 516 , held the correction of a sentence imposed in violation of statute to conform with the applicable statute does not place a defen | 1 | 1980–1980 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences1980As stated in People v. Serrato, supra: “[A] defendant who successfully attacks a judgment which is in excess of the court’s jurisdiction is not necessarily entitled to claim the protection of that invalid judgment as an absolute limitation upon what the court may do thereafter.” ( 9 Cal.3d at p. 765 .) (See also, North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 ]; In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 412 P.2d 806 ]; People v. Massengale, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 689 ; People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553 [20 *437 Cal.Rptr. 480]; In re Robinson 1980As stated in People v. Serrato, supra: “[A] defendant who successfully attacks a judgment which is in excess of the court’s jurisdiction is not necessarily entitled to claim the protection of that invalid judgment as an absolute limitation upon what the court may do thereafter.” ( 9 Cal.3d at p. 765 .) (See also, North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 ]; In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 412 P.2d 806 ]; People v. Massengale, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 689 ; People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553 [20 *437 Cal.Rptr. 480]; In re Robinson | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| In Re Sandel green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Wong
green
2 sentences1980In People v. Wong (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 453 ], division four of this court held that an indigent had no right to appointed counsel on appeal where the sentence imposed for a violation of Vehicle Code section 40508 was a fine and penalty totaling $65. 1980In People v. Wong (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 151 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 453 ], division four of this court held that an indigent had no right to appointed counsel on appeal where the sentence imposed for a violation of Vehicle Code section 40508 was a fine and penalty totaling $65. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
In Re Robinson
green
2 sentences1980As stated in People v. Serrato, supra: “[A] defendant who successfully attacks a judgment which is in excess of the court’s jurisdiction is not necessarily entitled to claim the protection of that invalid judgment as an absolute limitation upon what the court may do thereafter.” ( 9 Cal.3d at p. 765 .) (See also, North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 ]; In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 412 P.2d 806 ]; People v. Massengale, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 689 ; People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553 [20 *437 Cal.Rptr. 480]; In re Robinson 1980As stated in People v. Serrato, supra: “[A] defendant who successfully attacks a judgment which is in excess of the court’s jurisdiction is not necessarily entitled to claim the protection of that invalid judgment as an absolute limitation upon what the court may do thereafter.” ( 9 Cal.3d at p. 765 .) (See also, North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 656 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 ]; In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 412 P.2d 806 ]; People v. Massengale, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 689 ; People v. Orrante (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 553 [20 *437 Cal.Rptr. 480]; In re Robinson | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Orrante green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Hospelhorn v. Newhoff green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Ridout v. State green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.