principles that govern standard in Connecticut

2024We have determined, [however], that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpre- tation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmen- 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5 0 Conn. 1 ,0 7 Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc. tal agency’s time-tested interpretation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vitti v. Milford, 336 Conn. 654, 659 , 249 A.3d 726 (2020).

2024We have determined, [however], that the traditional deference accorded to an agency’s interpre- tation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute . . . has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] . . . a governmen- 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5 0 Conn. 1 ,0 7 Ajdini v. Frank Lill & Son, Inc. tal agency’s time-tested interpretation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vitti v. Milford, 336 Conn. 654, 659 , 249 A.3d 726 (2020).

2015The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346, 355 , 10 A.3d 1 (2010). ‘‘[Moreover, it] is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board. . . .

2015The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346, 355 , 10 A.3d 1 (2010). ‘‘[Moreover, it] is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board. . . .

1998Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441, 449 , 562 A.2d 1086 (1989).

1998Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441, 449 , 562 A.2d 1086 (1989).

2016Partnership , 108 Conn.App. 426 , 432, 949 A.2d 483 (2008).

2016Partnership , 108 Conn.App. 426 , 432, 949 A.2d 483 (2008).

2013The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dechio v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 376, 388 , 10 A.3d 20 (2010).

2013The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dechio v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 376, 388 , 10 A.3d 20 (2010).

2012The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564, 572 , 986 A.2d 1023 (2010).

2012The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564, 572 , 986 A.2d 1023 (2010).

2010“The principles that govern our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established.” Cerrero v. Mory’s Assn., Inc., 122 Conn. App. 82, 90 , 996 A.2d 1247 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 908 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010).

2010“The principles that govern our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established.” Cerrero v. Mory’s Assn., Inc., 122 Conn. App. 82, 90 , 996 A.2d 1247 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 908 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010).

2010“The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner. . . . [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patemostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 218-19 , 742 A.2d 409 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 788 (2000). “[T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . .” Keenan v. Union Camp C

2010“The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner. . . . [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patemostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 218-19 , 742 A.2d 409 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 788 (2000). “[T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . .” Keenan v. Union Camp C

2010“The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner. . . . [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patemostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 218-19 , 742 A.2d 409 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 788 (2000). “[T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . .” Keenan v. Union Camp C

2010“The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner. . . . [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patemostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 218-19 , 742 A.2d 409 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 788 (2000). “[T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . .” Keenan v. Union Camp C

2010“The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner. . . . [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patemostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 218-19 , 742 A.2d 409 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 788 (2000). “[T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . .” Keenan v. Union Camp C

2010“The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner. . . . [T]he review [board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Patemostro v. Arborio Corp., 56 Conn. App. 215, 218-19 , 742 A.2d 409 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 788 (2000). “[T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . .” Keenan v. Union Camp C

2010“The principles that govern our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established.” Cerrero v. Mory’s Assn., Inc., 122 Conn. App. 82, 90 , 996 A.2d 1247 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 908 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010).

2010“The principles that govern our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established.” Cerrero v. Mory’s Assn., Inc., 122 Conn. App. 82, 90 , 996 A.2d 1247 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 908 , 3 A.3d 68 (2010).

2007The conclusion drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trac0y v. Scherwitzky Gutter Co., 279 Conn. 265, 272 , 901 A.2d 1176 (2006).

2007The conclusion drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trac0y v. Scherwitzky Gutter Co., 279 Conn. 265, 272 , 901 A.2d 1176 (2006).

1994For a waiver of a constitutional right to be effective, it must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 10 “A waiver is defined as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’. . . .” Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328, 334 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.

1994For a waiver of a constitutional right to be effective, it must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 10 “A waiver is defined as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’. . . .” Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328, 334 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.

1994For a waiver of a constitutional right to be effective, it must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 10 “A waiver is defined as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’. . . .” Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328, 334 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.

1994For a waiver of a constitutional right to be effective, it must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 10 “A waiver is defined as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’. . . .” Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328, 334 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978), quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.