12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hickenbottom v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Boardgreen2 sentences1999Hickenbottom's definition of misconduct was as follows: Misconduct must be [1] an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interest, [2] a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, [3] a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or [4] negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer. 273 A.2d at 477-78 (citation omitted). 7 . 1994In Hickenbottom v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Bd., 273 A.2d 475, 477-78 (D.C.1971), we defined misconduct as: [1] an act of wanton or wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, [2] a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, [3] a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or [4] negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer. | 4 | 7 |
Williams v. District Unemployment Compensation Boardgreen2 sentences1994Id. (citations omitted); see also Williams v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 383 A.2d 345, 349 (D.C.1978). 1983(Citation omitted.) Any one of these grounds constitutes “misconduct” justifying disqualification. 2 But we also have stated that a “discharge from employment for violation of an employer’s rules, or for any other type of alleged misconduct, does not constitute ‘misconduct’ per se.” Williams v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 383 A.2d 345, 349 (D.C.1978) (citing Hickenbottom, supra). | 2 | 3 |
Riddick v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015On the 1 Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 contrary, I think the trial judge reasonably concluded, after a full and deliberate inquiry, that the proffered evidence lacked legitimate probative value, and thus its exclusion was well within the ambit of the judge‟s discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1990In Curtis v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 490 A.2d 178, 179 (D.C.1985), we stated: The burden of proving misconduct within the meaning of § 46-lll(b) is upon the employer. [Citations omitted.] *446 Where the misconduct consists of a violation of rules of the employer, the rules must be reasonable; their existence must have been made known to the employees, and they must be consistently enforced. [Citations omitted.] Sworn testimony is required in contested cases_ [Citations omitted.] The agency must make a finding of fact on each material issue of fact and those findings mu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. Seibert
green
1 sentence2007He agreed with the plurality that Elstad was rightly decided, but believed that Seibert was different because “[t]he police used a two-step questioning technique based on a deliberate violation of Miranda.” Id. at 620, 124 S.Ct. 2601 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Montgomery v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences1997When the District finally opposed the motion for judgment against NationsBank and sought to quash the writ, it was clear that the District did not intend for its previous inaction to be interpreted as a deliberate waiver. 5 Appellant’s reliance on Montgomery v. Montgomery, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 344 , 153 F.2d 634 (1946), is thus unavailing. 1997When the District finally opposed the motion for judgment against NationsBank and sought to quash the writ, it was clear that the District did not intend for its previous inaction to be interpreted as a deliberate waiver. 5 Appellant’s reliance on Montgomery v. Montgomery, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 344 , 153 F.2d 634 (1946), is thus unavailing. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Marshall v. District Unemployment Compensation Board
green
1 sentence1978Marshall v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., D.C.App., 377 A.2d 429 (1977). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.