defendant waived claim in New York

2008In People v D'Amico ( 76 NY2d 877 [1990]), for example, the Court addressed a case where, as here, the defendant waived a hearing on a felony complaint and then waived indictment.

1992The defendant waived his claim that there was a defect in the proceedings, since the formal acceptance of his plea was deferred at his specific request (cf., People v D’Amico, 150 AD2d 276, 279-280 , affd 76 NY2d 877 ).

2025"A defendant may waive the issue of lack of personal [*2]jurisdiction by appearing in an action, either formally or informally, without raising the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in an answer or pre-answer motion to dismiss" ( Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v Kierstedt , 119 AD3d 627, 628 ).

2019Co. , 294 AD2d 582 , 583-584 [2002]), and it has been held that a waiver may occur where payments were [*2] made pursuant to a wage garnishment for a substantial period of time ( see Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v Kierstedt , 119 AD3d 627 [2014]; Calderock Joint Ventures, L.P. v Mitiku , 45 AD3d 452 [2007] [the defendant waived the defense of personal jurisdiction by making payments on the deficiency judgment under a wage garnishment order for over one year before moving to vacate the judgment]; see West 187 St.

2024Here, the defendant waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by filing a notice of appearance and opposing the plaintiff's motions, inter alia, to confirm the referee's report without simultaneously asserting an affirmative objection to jurisdiction ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Whitelock , 214 AD3d 855, 856 ; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Lee , 186 AD3d 685 , 686-687; Taveras v City of New York , 108 AD3d at 617-618 ).

2024Here, the defendant waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by filing a notice of appearance and opposing the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference without simultaneously asserting an affirmative objection to jurisdiction ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Jong Shin , 224 AD3d at 935; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Whitelock , 214 AD3d 855, 856 ; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Lee , 186 AD3d 685 , 686-687).

2021The defendant waived his claim that the two counts of the indictment of which he was convicted were barred by the statute of limitations by not making a timely, written motion to dismiss on that ground ( see CPL 255.10[1][a]; 255.20[1]; People v Sylvestre , 123 AD3d 743, 744 ; People v Bones , 17 AD3d 689, 691 ; People v Verkey , 185 AD2d 622, 623-624 ; People v De Pillo , 168 AD2d 899 ).

2014The defendant waived his claim that the two misdemeanor counts of which he was convicted were barred by the statute of limitations by not making a timely motion to dismiss on that ground (see People v Verkey, 185 AD2d 622 [1992]; People v De Pillo, 168 AD2d 899, 900 [1990]).

2020Corp. , 179 AD3d 995, 1001 ).

2020Corp. , 179 AD3d 995, 1001 ).

2019By pleading guilty, the defendant waived his claim that the evidence submitted to the grand jury was not sufficient to support the third count of the indictment ( see People v Dunbar , 53 NY2d 868, 871 ; People v Smith , 147 AD3d 791 ; People v Kennington , 283 AD2d 658 ; People v Caleca , 273 AD2d 476 ).

2000By pleading guilty, the defendant waived his claim that the evidence submitted to the Grand Jury was not sufficient to support the indictment (see, e.g., People v Dunbar, 53 NY2d 868 ; People v Thomas, 74 AD2d 317 , affd 53 NY2d 338 ; People v Cherlea, 265 AD2d 338 ; People v McKinney, 215 AD2d 407 ; People v Contestabile, 202 AD2d 442 ; People v Prentice, 175 AD2d 315 ; People v Vulpis, 159 AD2d 530 ).

2019The defendant's remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Erobobo , 127 AD3d 1176, 1178 ).

2018The defendant waived the defense of lack of standing ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Erobobo , 127 AD3d 1176 ; Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Mastropaolo , 42 AD3d 239 ).

2012By failing to provide the People with reasonable notice of his motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30, the defendant waived his claim (see People v Williams, 233 AD2d at 536 ; People v Baxter, 216 AD2d 931 [1995]; People v Hunyadi, 96 AD2d 647, 648 [1983]; cf. People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200, 203 [1984]). in Next, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a defect in the grand jury proceedings.

2012By failing to provide the People with reasonable notice of his motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30, the defendant waived his claim (see People v Williams, 233 AD2d at 536 ; People v Baxter, 216 AD2d 931 [1995]; People v Hunyadi, 96 AD2d 647, 648 [1983]; cf. People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200, 203 [1984]). in Next, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a defect in the grand jury proceedings.

2012By failing to provide the People with reasonable notice of his motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30, the defendant waived his claim (see People v Williams, 233 AD2d at 536 ; People v Baxter, 216 AD2d 931 [1995]; People v Hunyadi, 96 AD2d 647, 648 [1983]; cf. People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200, 203 [1984]). in Next, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a defect in the grand jury proceedings.

2012By failing to provide the People with reasonable notice of his motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30, the defendant waived his claim (see People v Williams, 233 AD2d at 536 ; People v Baxter, 216 AD2d 931 [1995]; People v Hunyadi, 96 AD2d 647, 648 [1983]; cf. People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200, 203 [1984]). in Next, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a defect in the grand jury proceedings.

2011Trust Co. v Young, supra, compare U.S. Bank N.A. v Pia, 73 AD3d 752 [2d Dept 2010]; Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274 [2d Dept 2011]).

2010Trust Co. v Young, 66 AD3d 819 [2009]; HSBC Bank, USA v Dammond, 59 AD3d 679, 680 [2009]; Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Mastropaolo, 42 AD3d 239, 244 [2007]).

2011Accordingly, the defendant waived his claim of repugnancy (see People v Cervantes, 242 AD2d 730 [1997]; People v Abreu, 184 AD2d 707 [1992]; People v Gupta, 86 AD2d 960 [1982]).

1992Analogously, in People v Gupta ( 86 AD2d 960 ), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, precluded the defendant from raising a repugnancy claim.

2006The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

1990We find that the sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ).

1999The defendant waived his claim that the court failed to hold an indigency hearing (see, People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 281 ; People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662 ; People v Claudio, 64 NY2d 858 ; People v McGourty, 125 AD2d 417 ).

1999The defendant waived the claim that her sentence is harsh and excessive by waiving the right to appeal (see, People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 736 ; People v Allen, 82 NY2d 761 ; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273 ).

1999The defendant waived the claim that her sentence is harsh and excessive by waiving the right to appeal (see, People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 736 ; People v Allen, 82 NY2d 761 ; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273 ).

1997The defendant waived his claim that the sentence was excessive (see, People v Allen, 82 NY2d 761 ; People v Burk, 181 AD2d 74 ; see also, People v Kazepis, 101 AD2d 816 ).

1997However, the defendant waived this claim by failing to contest or controvert his status as a violent predicate felon when he had an opportunity to do so (see, People v Shriay, 240 AD2d 783 ; People v Hall, 233 AD2d 946 ; People v Hamilton, 205 AD2d 706 ; People v Khatib, 166 AD2d 668, 669 ).

1994The defendant waived this claim, in that he did not contest or controvert his status as a second felony offender when he had the opportunity to do so, after having been arraigned upon the second felony offender statement (see, People v Khatib, 166 AD2d 668, 669 ; see also, People v Smith, 73 NY2d 961 ).

1992Under the circumstances, the defendant waived his claim that he was tried by a jury which was not of his own choosing (see, People v Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245 ; CPL 470.05).

1990The defendant waived his claim that the indictment was defective by failing to move to dismiss the indictment on that ground within 45 days of his arraignment (see, CPL 255.10, 255.20; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589 ; People v Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245 ).

1992The defendant waived his claim that there was a defect in the proceedings, since the formal acceptance of his plea was deferred at his specific request (cf., People v D’Amico, 150 AD2d 276, 279-280 , affd 76 NY2d 877 ).

1992Accordingly, the defendant waived his claim that the offenses of which he was convicted constituted a single act, barring the imposition of consecutive sentences (cf., People v D’Amico, 150 AD2d 276 , affd 76 NY2d 877 ).

1990Similarly, by failing to oppose the People’s request for closure of the courtroom during the testimony of the undercover police officers, the defendant waived his claim that the closure resulted in the denial of his right to a public trial (see, People v Palasciano, 155 AD2d 623 ; People v Scott, 134 AD2d 379 ).

1989By failing to oppose the People’s request that the courtroom be closed during the testimony of certain undercover officers, the defendant waived his claim that the closure resulted in the denial of his right to a public trial (see, People v Scott, 134 AD2d 379 ; see also, People v Kersch, 135 AD2d 570 ).

2024Dismissal of an action for nonjoinder of a necessary party "'is only a last resort'" ( U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v Germoso , 216 AD3d 1046, 1047 , quoting Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki , 100 NY2d 801, 821 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see David D.

2024Here, as the Supreme Court properly found, the defendant waived his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis of improper service of process, as the defendant failed to move to dismiss on that basis within 60 days after serving his answer and further failed to satisfy the strict undue hardship standard ( see CPLR 3211[e]; Wilmington Trust, N.A. v Meyerhoeffer , 219 AD3d at 553 ).

2024Here, the defendant waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by filing a notice of appearance and opposing the plaintiff's motions, inter alia, to confirm the referee's report without simultaneously asserting an affirmative objection to jurisdiction ( see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Whitelock , 214 AD3d 855, 856 ; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Lee , 186 AD3d 685 , 686-687; Taveras v City of New York , 108 AD3d at 617-618 ).

2023In any event, "a creditor's right to foreclose on the mortgage survives or passes through the bankruptcy" ( Johnson v Home State Bank , 501 US 78, 83 ; see 11 USC § 522 [c][2]; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v Vitellas , 131 AD3d 52, 63 ).