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16 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Fanelligreen2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 500 (1992) ("A defendant's guilty plea, made knowingly, voluntarily and with the benefit of competent counsel, waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the entry of the guilty plea"). 4 The expert, Dr. Fabian M. 1994The Commonwealth, citing Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 500-501 (1992), argues that by pleading guilty, the defendant waived the claim of a violation of the Act. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Durlinggreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 111-114 (1990) (detailing the minimum requirements of due process at a probation violation hearing). 2017See Commonwealth v. Durling , 407 Mass. 108 , 111-114, 551 N.E.2d 1193 (1990) (detailing the minimum requirements of due process at a probation violation hearing). | 2 | 2 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen1 sentence2026In response the defendant contends that the futility doctrine entitles him to harmless error review because his trial predated New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Crawfordgreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294-295 (2002); Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 685 (2002); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 685 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Azargreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294-295 (2002); Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 685 (2002); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 685 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Randolphgreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294-295 (2002); Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 685 (2002); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 685 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Peters v. Wallachgreen1 sentence2013Cf. Peters v. Wallach, 366 Mass. 622, 627-628 (1975) (“[c]ommunications between an attorney and his client are not privileged . . . if it is understood that the information is to be conveyed to others”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hortongreen1 sentence2010See Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823 , 836 & n.15 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Sarin v. Ochsnergreen1 sentence2003Sarin v. Ochsner, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 421, 422-23 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Richardsgreen1 sentence2001See Commonwealth v. Richards, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 481 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Amiraultgreen2 sentences1999The defendant waived the claim of appellate ineffective assistance of counsel because she had a fair opportunity to raise the denial of her confrontation right and “may not belatedly invoke that right to reopen a proceeding that has already run its course.” Id. at 639. “[T]he concern for finality demands that a defendant present every claim and argument he might fairly have had available to him the first time around.” Id. 1999The defendant waived the claim of appellate ineffective assistance of counsel because she had a fair opportunity to raise the denial of her confrontation right and “may not belatedly invoke that right to reopen a proceeding that has already run its course.” Id. at 639. “[T]he concern for finality demands that a defendant present every claim and argument he might fairly have had available to him the first time around.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Naxgreen1 sentence1947Co. v. Nax, 142 Fed. 653, 657 (C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Diaz
green
1 sentence2004Where the defendant places at issue his mental ability voluntarily to waive his Miranda rights and make a voluntary statement thereafter, it is a natural and reasonable extension of Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753 (1977); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822 (2000); and Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19 (2001), to require the defendant to submit to an examination so that the Commonwealth may rebut the defendant’s expert testimony on the subject. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Contos
green
1 sentence2004Where the defendant places at issue his mental ability voluntarily to waive his Miranda rights and make a voluntary statement thereafter, it is a natural and reasonable extension of Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753 (1977); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822 (2000); and Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19 (2001), to require the defendant to submit to an examination so that the Commonwealth may rebut the defendant’s expert testimony on the subject. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Blaisdell v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2004Where the defendant places at issue his mental ability voluntarily to waive his Miranda rights and make a voluntary statement thereafter, it is a natural and reasonable extension of Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753 (1977); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822 (2000); and Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19 (2001), to require the defendant to submit to an examination so that the Commonwealth may rebut the defendant’s expert testimony on the subject. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Therrien
green
1 sentence2000The Commonwealth’s second waiver argument, that the defendant waived his challenge to the moral certainty language by not raising it in his third motion for a new trial in 1983, relies on our dictum in Commonwealth v. Therrien, 428 Mass. 607 , 609 n.4 (1998), in which we stated, inter alia, that “[w]e disagree with the implication inherent in Simpson v. Matesanz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Simpson v. Matesanz
green
1 sentence2000Mass. 1998)[, vacated, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 803 (2000)], that the problems associated with ‘moral certainty’ language were not foreshadowed prior to the decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990).” We need not reach the issue whether there was a waiver at the time of the third motion because the defendant clearly waived the instruction issue by failing to seek leave to appeal the denial of his fourth motion for a new trial. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cage v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2000A single justice of this court allowed the defendant’s application for leave to appeal from an order denying his fifth motion for a new trial on two issues: (1) whether the defendant waived his claim challenging the trial judge’s reasonable doubt instructions in light of Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), and (2) if the defendant did not waive this claim, whether the instructions require a new trial. 2000Mass. 1998)[, vacated, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 803 (2000)], that the problems associated with ‘moral certainty’ language were not foreshadowed prior to the decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990).” We need not reach the issue whether there was a waiver at the time of the third motion because the defendant clearly waived the instruction issue by failing to seek leave to appeal the denial of his fourth motion for a new trial. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Simpson v. Matesanz
green
1 sentence2000Mass. 1998)[, vacated, 175 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 803 (2000)], that the problems associated with ‘moral certainty’ language were not foreshadowed prior to the decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990).” We need not reach the issue whether there was a waiver at the time of the third motion because the defendant clearly waived the instruction issue by failing to seek leave to appeal the denial of his fourth motion for a new trial. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Simpson v. Matesanz
green
1 sentence2000The Commonwealth’s second waiver argument, that the defendant waived his challenge to the moral certainty language by not raising it in his third motion for a new trial in 1983, relies on our dictum in Commonwealth v. Therrien, 428 Mass. 607 , 609 n.4 (1998), in which we stated, inter alia, that “[w]e disagree with the implication inherent in Simpson v. Matesanz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. L'Italien
neutral
1 sentence1994Although a valid plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of a defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, see Commonwealth v. L’Italien, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 763 (1975), we need not rely on the ground of waiver. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Fitchburg Savings Bank v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance
green
1 sentence1951Co. 274 Mass. 135, 151 ) held — and correctly we think — that the defendant was estopped to rely on any defect in the original notice because of its letter to the plaintiff stating that it had submitted the matter to its claim department. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
King v. Fowler
neutral
1 sentence1919The case at bar is distinguishable from King v. Fowler, 16 Mass. 397 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.