cross-assignment error in Ohio

2026Although it is true that the trial court properly computed his maximum sentence, and it seems likely that the court intended the six, three, and two-year sentences to be the stated minimum terms for the stated convictions, “this does not change the fact that, as written, the court imposed a definite term instead of an indefinite one with a stated minimum term and a maximum term, as required by R.C. 2929.14(A).” See Chambers at ¶ 212 . “‘Where the trial court is imposing prison sentences on multiple counts under the Reagan Tokes Act, the trial court’s sentence for each individual count should m

2024Although it is true that the trial court properly computed his maximum sentence, and it seems likely that the court intended the six-year term to be the stated minimum term for the felonious assault conviction, this does not change the fact that, as written, the court imposed a definite term instead of an indefinite one with a stated minimum term and a maximum term, as required by R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a). “[W]here the trial court is imposing prison sentences on multiple counts under the Reagan Tokes Act, the trial court’s sentence for each individual count should make clear that the prison term

2025Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924); App.R. 3(C)(2) (“A person who intends to defend an order appealed by an appellant on a ground other than that relied on by the trial court but who does not seek to change the order is not required to file a notice of cross-appeal or to raise a cross-assignment of error.”) Here, the State claims that the trial court “disregarded” the totality-of-the-circumstances-standard set forth in Gates, and it argues that “the affidavit stated facts indicating a fair probability that contraband or evidence would be located at Apartment 4.” It urges this court to uphol

2024Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924). {¶ 78} Here, appellees do not seek to change the award of summary judgment in their favor that was entered on October 19, 2022.

2024App.R. 3(C)(1) instructs that “[w]hether or not an appellee intends to defend an order on appeal, an appellee who seeks to change the order * * * shall file a notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the trial court.” Conversely, App.R. 3(C)(2) instructs that “[a] person who intends to defend an order appealed by an appellant on a ground other than that relied on by the trial court but who does not seek to change the order is not required to file a notice of cross-appeal or to raise a cross-assignment of error.” {¶ 77} As recognized by the concurring opinion, “without filing a cross-appeal, an

2019Kaplysh v. Takieddine, 35 Ohio St.3d 170, 175 , 519 N.E.2d 382 (1988).” Murray v. State, 8th Dist.

2004R.C. 2505.22 ; Morgan v. City of Cincinnati (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 285 , 290 .

2003Morgan v. Cincinnati (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 285 , 290 .

2024Co. v. Joseph Chevrolet Co., 153 Ohio App.3d 95 , 2003-Ohio-1367 , 791 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).

2024Co. v. Joseph Chevrolet Co., 153 Ohio App.3d 95 , 2003-Ohio-1367 , 791 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).

2004Although the requirement of preliminary findings by the Ohio Elections Commission prior to the commencement of a prosecution may constitute a somewhat unusual procedure, the powers conferred upon the Ohio Elections Commission are not judicial powers but are more akin to the powers conferred upon a prosecutor in determining whether to proceed with the prosecution of an alleged violation of law. * * *” Id., 61 Ohio App.2d at 31 , 15 O.O.3d 28 , 399 N.E.2d 99 ; Van Meter, supra, 78 Ohio App.3d at 294 , 604 N.E.2d 775 (“The general lack of any appeal from commission decisions makes sense because,

2004Although the requirement of preliminary findings by the Ohio Elections Commission prior to the commencement of a prosecution may constitute a somewhat unusual procedure, the powers conferred upon the Ohio Elections Commission are not judicial powers but are more akin to the powers conferred upon a prosecutor in determining whether to proceed with the prosecution of an alleged violation of law. * * *” Id., 61 Ohio App.2d at 31 , 15 O.O.3d 28 , 399 N.E.2d 99 ; Van Meter, supra, 78 Ohio App.3d at 294 , 604 N.E.2d 775 (“The general lack of any appeal from commission decisions makes sense because,

2026Although it is true that the trial court properly computed his maximum sentence, and it seems likely that the court intended the six, three, and two-year sentences to be the stated minimum terms for the stated convictions, “this does not change the fact that, as written, the court imposed a definite term instead of an indefinite one with a stated minimum term and a maximum term, as required by R.C. 2929.14(A).” See Chambers at ¶ 212 . “‘Where the trial court is imposing prison sentences on multiple counts under the Reagan Tokes Act, the trial court’s sentence for each individual count should m

2026See State v. Wilson, 2026-Ohio-216, ¶ 107 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Chambers, 2024-Ohio-3341, ¶ 211-214 (6th Dist.). 13. {¶ 28} In response to the State’s cross-assignment of error, Smith argues that the trial court sentenced him appropriately because it correctly determined his maximum sentence under R.C. 2929.144(B)(2), which outlines how a trial court is to determine a maximum sentence when it orders an offender to serve sentences for multiple qualifying first- and second-degree felonies consecutively.

2026Although it is true that the trial court properly computed his maximum sentence, and it seems likely that the court intended the six, three, and two-year sentences to be the stated minimum terms for the stated convictions, “this does not change the fact that, as written, the court imposed a definite term instead of an indefinite one with a stated minimum term and a maximum term, as required by R.C. 2929.14(A).” See Chambers at ¶ 212 . “‘Where the trial court is imposing prison sentences on multiple counts under the Reagan Tokes Act, the trial court’s sentence for each individual count should m

2026See State v. Wilson, 2026-Ohio-216, ¶ 107 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Chambers, 2024-Ohio-3341, ¶ 211-214 (6th Dist.). 13. {¶ 28} In response to the State’s cross-assignment of error, Smith argues that the trial court sentenced him appropriately because it correctly determined his maximum sentence under R.C. 2929.144(B)(2), which outlines how a trial court is to determine a maximum sentence when it orders an offender to serve sentences for multiple qualifying first- and second-degree felonies consecutively.

2025See also State v. Boyd, 2020-Ohio-5181, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.) (noting that during the course of one incident, defendant “made three distinct decisions: first, to stab his wife with a knife; second, to drag her by her neck away from the neighbors’ house; and third, to try to hit her with a car in the front yard. [His] separate acts support the conclusion that the two felonious assault and abduction offenses are not allied offenses of similar import.”) Accordingly, the trial court erred in merging Anderson’s felonious assault conviction with the murder conviction. {¶ 70} Based on the preceding discus

2025HCF of Findlay, Inc. v. Bishop, 2019-Ohio-319, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.), citing Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390 , (2000).

2024Trumbull No. 2016- - 24 - Fayette CA2023-02-002 CA2023-03-004 T-0073, 2017-Ohio-6947, ¶ 17 ("A lack of standing defense may be raised at any time during the proceedings, but it does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court nor can it be used to collaterally attack a judgment"), citing Kuchta at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. {¶ 68} As the Heirs did not agree to arbitration, and none of the exceptions apply that would compel them to do so, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling Repple's motion to compel the Heirs to arbitration. {¶ 69} The cross-assig

2024State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-3015, ¶ 85 (3d Dist.). {¶24} On remand from the State’s cross-appeal, on November 28, 2023, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing.

2024However, the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—something short of substantial certainty—is not intent. {¶ 87} Courts that have applied the Fyffe test have looked to the existence of prior accidents as “probative of whether an employer knows that an injury is substantially certain to occur.” Taulbee v. Adience, Inc., BMI Div., 120 Ohio App.3d 11, 20 (10th Dist. 1997).

2023"The trial court's findings are given deference because 'the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.'" Weismuller, 2012-Ohio-1476 at ¶ 19, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).