cross-assignment error in Alabama

1955Hence under our holding in the recent case of Andrews v. Sullivan, 260 Ala. 291 , 69 So.2d 870 , this cross assignment of error will not be considered.

1955Hence under our holding in the recent case of Andrews v. Sullivan, 260 Ala. 291 , 69 So.2d 870 , this cross assignment of error will not be considered.

1915The cross-assignment of error is based on the following recital in the judgment-entry immediately following the order taxing the costs: “The defendant in open .court then and there duly and legally excepted to the judgment of the court in thus taxing the costs against the defendant.” And after examination of the bill of exceptions we find nothing in it showing that such exception was reserved, and the recital in the judgment that an exception was reserved is unavail ing. —Dorough v. Harrington, 148 Ala. 305 , 42 South. 557 ; Hoge v. Herzberg, 141 Ala. 439 , 37 South. 591 .

1915The cross-assignment of error is based on the following recital in the judgment-entry immediately following the order taxing the costs: “The defendant in open .court then and there duly and legally excepted to the judgment of the court in thus taxing the costs against the defendant.” And after examination of the bill of exceptions we find nothing in it showing that such exception was reserved, and the recital in the judgment that an exception was reserved is unavail ing. —Dorough v. Harrington, 148 Ala. 305 , 42 South. 557 ; Hoge v. Herzberg, 141 Ala. 439 , 37 South. 591 .

1915Where costs are improperly taxed against one not liable to pay them, the proper practice is to raise the question by motion to retax the costs, and, if this motion is overruled, reserve a bill of exceptions and appeal. — Code, § 3684; Stallworth v. State, 129 Ala. 118 , 30 South. 31 . (21) The second reason is that by the reversal of the judgment the judgment for costs was also annulled, and the question" presented by the cross-assignment of error became a moot ques tion. —Pulsifer v. McDaniel & Son, 169 Ala. 644 , 53 South. 772 . (22) Special or peculiar benefits, within the meaning of sectio

1915Where costs are improperly taxed against one not liable to pay them, the proper practice is to raise the question by motion to retax the costs, and, if this motion is overruled, reserve a bill of exceptions and appeal. — Code, § 3684; Stallworth v. State, 129 Ala. 118 , 30 South. 31 . (21) The second reason is that by the reversal of the judgment the judgment for costs was also annulled, and the question" presented by the cross-assignment of error became a moot ques tion. —Pulsifer v. McDaniel & Son, 169 Ala. 644 , 53 South. 772 . (22) Special or peculiar benefits, within the meaning of sectio

1915The plain purpose of section 223 of the Constitution, which was suggested by the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 , 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L.

1915The plain purpose of section 223 of the Constitution, which was suggested by the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 , 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L.

1915Where costs are improperly taxed against one not liable to pay them, the proper practice is to raise the question by motion to retax the costs, and, if this motion is overruled, reserve a bill of exceptions and appeal. — Code, § 3684; Stallworth v. State, 129 Ala. 118 , 30 South. 31 . (21) The second reason is that by the reversal of the judgment the judgment for costs was also annulled, and the question" presented by the cross-assignment of error became a moot ques tion. —Pulsifer v. McDaniel & Son, 169 Ala. 644 , 53 South. 772 . (22) Special or peculiar benefits, within the meaning of sectio

1915Where costs are improperly taxed against one not liable to pay them, the proper practice is to raise the question by motion to retax the costs, and, if this motion is overruled, reserve a bill of exceptions and appeal. — Code, § 3684; Stallworth v. State, 129 Ala. 118 , 30 South. 31 . (21) The second reason is that by the reversal of the judgment the judgment for costs was also annulled, and the question" presented by the cross-assignment of error became a moot ques tion. —Pulsifer v. McDaniel & Son, 169 Ala. 644 , 53 South. 772 . (22) Special or peculiar benefits, within the meaning of sectio

1915The cross-assignment of error is based on the following recital in the judgment-entry immediately following the order taxing the costs: “The defendant in open .court then and there duly and legally excepted to the judgment of the court in thus taxing the costs against the defendant.” And after examination of the bill of exceptions we find nothing in it showing that such exception was reserved, and the recital in the judgment that an exception was reserved is unavail ing. —Dorough v. Harrington, 148 Ala. 305 , 42 South. 557 ; Hoge v. Herzberg, 141 Ala. 439 , 37 South. 591 .

1910Section 91 of tbe Constitution is plain and unambiguous, exempting from taxation all cemeteries, without qualification, and tbe Legislature has no authority to attach a qualification to it. —Anniston v. State, 160 Ala. 253 , 48 South. 659 .

1910Section 91 of tbe Constitution is plain and unambiguous, exempting from taxation all cemeteries, without qualification, and tbe Legislature has no authority to attach a qualification to it. —Anniston v. State, 160 Ala. 253 , 48 South. 659 .

1901If Maria Finley neither had nor claimed any interest in the mortgaged property except by title paramount to that of the mortgagor then no decree could properly have been rendered against her, for in general it is true as land down in Bolling v. Pace, 99 Ala. 607 , that the purpose of a foreclosure suit is not to determine in Avhom title resides, but “to settle interests claimed' or existing in subordination to the mortgage.” But notwithstanding her assertion of title paramount, the mortgagee and purchaser under the mortgage could not haAm disputed the title of the mortgagors, and therefore Avo

1893The appellee is not within the rule, and we .can not'eonsider her assignments of error. — Code, p. 800, Rule 3. - In the case of John Downey v. Sarah Downey, 98 Ala. 373 , after full consideration of the question this court held : “Thatwhen an absolute divorce has been decreed at the suit of the husband, the wife can not afterwards maintain a suit for alimony. ’ ’ The complainant alleges in her bill, that she was not served with a subpoena in the case of Patrick Golden against Mary Golden, and had no notice of the pendency of that suit until long after the decree of divorce had been granted, t

1877The decree of the Chancellor being silent as to the place of sale, it was the duty of the register to sell the lands at the door of the court-house. — Matheson v. Mearin, 29 Ala. 210 .