sexual offender registration requirement in Florida

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2019In Partlow, the supreme court was asked to resolve a conflict between the First and Fourth Districts on the issue of “whether, after being sentenced for a sexual offense pursuant to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant may withdraw his plea as involuntary because he was not informed of the sexual offender registration requirement.” 840 So. 2d at 1041 .

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2023Nor could it properly be considered by the trial court as a rule 3.800(a) or 3.850 motion for it is well-settled that the sexual offender registration requirement is not punishment and is not part of a sentence.”); State v. Whitt, 96 So. 3d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion, which sought the removal of his name from FDLE’s Sexual Offender Registry, and holding: “Because the sexual offender designation was not part of the plea or sentence, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider this matter.”). 2

2019See, e.g., Mills v. State, 150 So. 3d 272, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); R.B. v. State, 805 So. 2d 75, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2019We have held that there are “no exceptions” to the rule that “[i]f a trial court revokes a defendant’s probation, the court is required to render a written order noting the specific conditions of probation that were violated.” M.A.L. v. State, 110 So. 3d 493, 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Robinson v. State, 74 So. 3d 570, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)); see also § 985.439(4), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“Upon the child’s admission, . . . the court shall enter an order revoking, modifying, or continuing probation or postcommitment probation.”).

2019See, e.g., Mills v. State, 150 So. 3d 272, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); R.B. v. State, 805 So. 2d 75, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2019We have held that there are “no exceptions” to the rule that “[i]f a trial court revokes a defendant’s probation, the court is required to render a written order noting the specific conditions of probation that were violated.” M.A.L. v. State, 110 So. 3d 493, 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Robinson v. State, 74 So. 3d 570, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)); see also § 985.439(4), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“Upon the child’s admission, . . . the court shall enter an order revoking, modifying, or continuing probation or postcommitment probation.”).

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2005State v. Partlow, 840 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Fla.2003)(holding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has absolutely no effect on the range of the defendant's punishment for the crime); Gunn v. State, 841 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)(confirming that designation as either a sexual offender or predator is a collateral consequence about which a defendant does not have to be advised at the time of a plea).

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2005Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted). [4] Elam v. State, 636 So.2d 1312 (Fla.1994) (maintaining that trial court has discretion to determine good cause); Collins v. State, 858 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 783 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Davis failed to sustain his burden of proving good cause...."). [5] See Partlow, 840 So.2d at 1042 (stating that under rule 3.170(f), "a trial court plainly has broad discretion in determining motions to withdraw a plea.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla

2003Just as we amended the rule after State v. Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960, 961 (Fla.1987), to require that defendants be informed of potential deportation proceedings, the sexual offender registration requirement is an important enough consequence, even if collateral, to justify informing a defendant of its existence.

2003Just as we amended the rule after State v. Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960, 961 (Fla.1987), to require that defendants be informed of potential deportation proceedings, the sexual offender registration requirement is an important enough consequence, even if collateral, to justify informing a defendant of its existence.

2003In Major v. State, 814 So.2d 424, 431 (Fla.2002), we defined direct consequences as those having a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment." The sexual offender registration requirement of section 943.0435, Florida Statutes, fits within this definition.

2003In Major v. State, 814 So.2d 424, 431 (Fla.2002), we defined direct consequences as those having a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment." The sexual offender registration requirement of section 943.0435, Florida Statutes, fits within this definition.

2003The Fourth District Court of Appeal held below that the defendant's ignorance of this consequence rendered his plea involuntary, and therefore he must be allowed to withdraw his plea. 813 So.2d at 999-1000 .

2003I dissent because in my opinion the sexual offender registration requirement is a "direct" rather than a "collateral" consequence of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and because I agree with the Fourth District's conclusion that a plea entered in ignorance of this consequence may not "be thought sufficiently informed—and therefore genuinely voluntary—that a trial judge could rightfully refuse to allow it to be withdrawn so soon after the plea was made." Partlow v. State, 813 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (footnote omitted).