Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
89 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Batesgreen2 sentences2026As first articulated in State v. Bates, the officer-safety doctrine permits an officer “to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987). 2026As first articulated in State v. Bates, the officer-safety doctrine permits an officer “to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987). | 12 | 64 |
State v. Fostergreen2 sentences2026See also Foster, 347 Or at 12 (characterizing a separate pre-Bates officer-safety case as a “particular, and correct, application of the officer safety doctrine that [was] later articulated more thoroughly in Bates” and as “speak[ing] to the reasonableness of one particular type of officer safety response”). 2026See also Foster, 347 Or at 12 (characterizing a separate pre-Bates officer-safety case as a “particular, and correct, application of the officer safety doctrine that [was] later articulated more thoroughly in Bates” and as “speak[ing] to the reasonableness of one particular type of officer safety response”). | 4 | 9 |
State v. Ruddergreen2 sentences2021Accordingly, “the officer safety doctrine does not excuse protective measures that are disproportionate to any threat that the officers reasonably perceive.” State v. Rudder, 347 Or 14, 23 , 217 P3d 1064 (2009). 2021Accordingly, “the officer safety doctrine does not excuse protective measures that are disproportionate to any threat that the officers reasonably perceive.” State v. Rudder, 347 Or 14, 23 , 217 P3d 1064 (2009). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Steffensgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Zumbrum, 221 Or App 362, 369 , 189 P3d 1235 (2008) (officer’s knowledge that the defendant was on post-prison supervision did not contribute to reasonable officer-safety concerns because the officer “did not know the basis for defendant’s prior conviction, nor was he otherwise aware of whether defendant had a history of violent behavior”); see also State v. Steffens, 250 Or App 742, 750 , 282 P3d 888 (2012) (“An officer’s knowledge of the defendant’s past conduct is relevant to the officer-safety inquiry; however, where past conduct is not coupled with *97 any indication that the 2025See State v. Zumbrum, 221 Or App 362, 369 , 189 P3d 1235 (2008) (officer’s knowledge that the defendant was on post-prison supervision did not contribute to reasonable officer-safety concerns because the officer “did not know the basis for defendant’s prior conviction, nor was he otherwise aware of whether defendant had a history of violent behavior”); see also State v. Steffens, 250 Or App 742, 750 , 282 P3d 888 (2012) (“An officer’s knowledge of the defendant’s past conduct is relevant to the officer-safety inquiry; however, where past conduct is not coupled with *97 any indication that the | 3 | 4 |
State v. Maddengreen2 sentences2026In that way, the various components of the officer-safety test dovetail because “the kind and magnitude of the threat that an officer reasonably perceives will largely 814 State v. Castimore determine whether a given precaution taken in response to it was reasonable.” Madden, 363 Or at 714 . 2026In that way, the various components of the officer-safety test dovetail because “the kind and magnitude of the threat that an officer reasonably perceives will largely 814 State v. Castimore determine whether a given precaution taken in response to it was reasonable.” Madden, 363 Or at 714 . | 2 | 7 |
State v. Baileygreen2 sentences2024The warrant exception at issue here, the officer-safety exception, permits “ ‘an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987)). 1 ORS 166.270(2) provides, in relevant part: “Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the law of this state o 2024The warrant exception at issue here, the officer-safety exception, permits “ ‘an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987)). 1 ORS 166.270(2) provides, in relevant part: “Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the law of this state o | 2 | 4 |
State v. Amellgreen2 sentences2016Specifically, the officer-safety exception permits an officer to “take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” Id. (quoting Bates, 304 Or at 524 ). 2014See State v. Amell, 230 Or App 336, 341 , 215 P3d 910 (2009) (in the context of the officer safety exception to Article I, section 9, distinguishing between trial court’s factual findings and whether those findings satisfied the relevant legal standard). | 2 | 4 |
State Ex Rel. Juv. Dept. v. Madgreen2 sentences2014A. D., 348 Or at 391 ; see also id. at 393 (“We do not mean to suggest that the officer-safety doctrine and a school official’s search of a student for drugs are identical in all respects.”). 2014A. D., 348 Or at 391 ; see also id. at 393 (“We do not mean to suggest that the officer-safety doctrine and a school official’s search of a student for drugs are identical in all respects.”). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct— such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App at 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlawful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulging pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to r 2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct—such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlawful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulg- ing pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to run | 2 | 3 |
State v. Nyegreen2 sentences2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct—such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlawful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulg- ing pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to run 2025See State v. Nye, 295 Or App 559, 564 , 435 P3d 805 (2019) (describing prior case law as requiring furtive movements to be coupled with other alarming conduct—such as disobedience of a police instruction, reluctance to comply, or conduct inconsistent with police inquiry—for the officer-safety exception to apply); Davis, 282 Or App 660 (holding that an officer’s patdown search was unlawful, where the defendant made furtive movements inside his vehicle as the officer approached, refused to explain what was in his bulg- ing pockets, and showed other signs of recent drug use and preparation to run | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bakergreen2 sentences2024Such circumstances have been found, for example, to justify entry in the case of hot pursuit, the destruction of evidence, flight of a suspect, and where emergency aid was required by someone within.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649 , 260 P3d 476 (2011) (recognizing, in addition to the exceptions listed in Davis, an officer-safety exception). 2024Such circumstances have been found, for example, to justify entry in the case of hot pursuit, the destruction of evidence, flight of a suspect, and where emergency aid was required by someone within.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649 , 260 P3d 476 (2011) (recognizing, in addition to the exceptions listed in Davis, an officer-safety exception). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2018Thus, we explained, "even if defendant was stopped unconstitutionally, the officer safety doctrine could provide [the officer] with the lawful authority to order defendant to get out of the vehicle." Id. at 828 , 390 P.3d 1114 . 2018Thus, we explained, "even if defendant was stopped unconstitutionally, the officer safety doctrine could provide [the officer] with the lawful authority to order defendant to get out of the vehicle." Id. at 828 , 390 P.3d 1114 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Whitlockgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Whitlock, 334 Or App 107, 113 , 554 P3d 825 (2024) (“Even if [the] defendant’s behavior led to the officer fearing that [the] defendant might flee ‘or otherwise frustrate’ investigation efforts, those concerns do not equate with a threat of serious physical injury to the officer.” (Quoting Baily, 307 Or App at 788 .)). 2025See State v. Whitlock, 334 Or App 107, 113 , 554 P3d 825 (2024) (“Even if [the] defendant’s behavior led to the officer fearing that [the] defendant might flee ‘or otherwise frustrate’ investigation efforts, those concerns do not equate with a threat of serious physical injury to the officer.” (Quoting Baily, 307 Or App at 788 .)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Zumbrumgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Zumbrum, 221 Or App 362, 369 , 189 P3d 1235 (2008) (officer’s knowledge that the defendant was on post-prison supervision did not contribute to reasonable officer-safety concerns because the officer “did not know the basis for defendant’s prior conviction, nor was he otherwise aware of whether defendant had a history of violent behavior”); see also State v. Steffens, 250 Or App 742, 750 , 282 P3d 888 (2012) (“An officer’s knowledge of the defendant’s past conduct is relevant to the officer-safety inquiry; however, where past conduct is not coupled with *97 any indication that the 2025See State v. Zumbrum, 221 Or App 362, 369 , 189 P3d 1235 (2008) (officer’s knowledge that the defendant was on post-prison supervision did not contribute to reasonable officer-safety concerns because the officer “did not know the basis for defendant’s prior conviction, nor was he otherwise aware of whether defendant had a history of violent behavior”); see also State v. Steffens, 250 Or App 742, 750 , 282 P3d 888 (2012) (“An officer’s knowledge of the defendant’s past conduct is relevant to the officer-safety inquiry; however, where past conduct is not coupled with *97 any indication that the | 2 | 2 |
State v. Watsongreen2 sentences2023See State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987) (explaining the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement); see also State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 773-74 , 305 P3d 94 (2013) (explaining the reasonable suspicion exception). 2023See State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987) (explaining the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement); see also State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 773-74 , 305 P3d 94 (2013) (explaining the reasonable suspicion exception). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rodriguez-Perezgreen2 sentences2021One of those exceptions is the officer safety exception set forth in State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987): “Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution does not forbid an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” For the officer safety exception to apply, the state must prove “not only that t 2021One of those exceptions is the officer safety exception set forth in State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987): “Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution does not forbid an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” For the officer safety exception to apply, the state must prove “not only that t | 1 | 10 |
State v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2020See State v. Kennedy, 284 Or App 268, 272 , 392 P3d 382 (2017) (“Determining whether an officer’s safety concern was objectively reasonable requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the officer at the time of the warrantless search.”). 2020See State v. Kennedy, 284 Or App 268, 272 , 392 P3d 382 (2017) (“Determining whether an officer’s safety concern was objectively reasonable requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the officer at the time of the warrantless search.”). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Knoxgreen2 sentences1998Although the trial court found that the defendant “ ‘was not acting in any unusually angry or strange manner that would give the officer any immediate concern,’ ” id. at 157 , and that he “had never before exhibited any violence towards the police or made threats to them that the officer was aware of,” id., it nevertheless denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because it concluded that the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement provided authority for the officer to search for weapons. 1998Although the trial court found that the defendant “ ‘was not acting in any unusually angry or strange manner that would give the officer any immediate concern,’ ” id. at 157 , and that he “had never before exhibited any violence towards the police or made threats to them that the officer was aware of,” id., it nevertheless denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because it concluded that the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement provided authority for the officer to search for weapons. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Senngreen2 sentences2012Although we have recognized that fact matching is not always a useful exercise in the context of the officer-safety doctrine, Senn, 145 Or App at 545 , here, two cases provide particularly useful comparisons: Amell, 230 Or App 336 , and State v. Dyer, 157 Or App 326 , 970 P2d 249 (1998). 1999“An officer safety inquiry or frisk in the course of a traffic stop does not violate ORS 810.410(3)(b), so long as that *57 inquiry or frisk is justified by reasonable suspicion as prescribed in [State v.] Bates, [ 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987)].” State v. Senn, 145 Or App 538, 542 , 930 P2d 874 (1996). | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Shawgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Neillgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Neillgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Knoxgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Terry v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Michigan v. Longgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Ruizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Miglavsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Holmesred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Meekergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2024The warrant exception at issue here, the officer-safety exception, permits “ ‘an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987)). 1 ORS 166.270(2) provides, in relevant part: “Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the law of this state o 2024The warrant exception at issue here, the officer-safety exception, permits “ ‘an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987)). 1 ORS 166.270(2) provides, in relevant part: “Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the law of this state o | 6 | 2020–2026 |
State v. Kreis
green
2 sentences2026In conclusion, the officer-safety exception is “a rule of necessity that enables officers to take reasonable measures to carry out lawful police activity.” State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 676 , 451 P3d 954 (2019). 2026In conclusion, the officer-safety exception is “a rule of necessity that enables officers to take reasonable measures to carry out lawful police activity.” State v. Kreis, 365 Or 659, 676 , 451 P3d 954 (2019). | 3 | 2019–2026 |
State v. Jimenez
green
2 sentences2021At any rate, though “confronting a suspect in a high- crime area can contribute to officer-safety concerns, such a location has never been regarded as sufficient to support the officer-safety exception unless there were also a significant number of other indicia of danger.” State v. Jimenez, 263 Or App 150, 159 , 326 P3d 1222 , aff’d, 357 Or 417 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015). 2021At any rate, though “confronting a suspect in a high- crime area can contribute to officer-safety concerns, such a location has never been regarded as sufficient to support the officer-safety exception unless there were also a significant number of other indicia of danger.” State v. Jimenez, 263 Or App 150, 159 , 326 P3d 1222 , aff’d, 357 Or 417 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015). | 3 | 2019–2022 |
State v. Jimenez
neutral
2 sentences2021At any rate, though “confronting a suspect in a high- crime area can contribute to officer-safety concerns, such a location has never been regarded as sufficient to support the officer-safety exception unless there were also a significant number of other indicia of danger.” State v. Jimenez, 263 Or App 150, 159 , 326 P3d 1222 , aff’d, 357 Or 417 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015). 2021At any rate, though “confronting a suspect in a high- crime area can contribute to officer-safety concerns, such a location has never been regarded as sufficient to support the officer-safety exception unless there were also a significant number of other indicia of danger.” State v. Jimenez, 263 Or App 150, 159 , 326 P3d 1222 , aff’d, 357 Or 417 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015). | 3 | 2015–2021 |
State v. Dyer
green
2 sentences2018In Dyer , we concluded that the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement did not support a limited search of the defendant's car. 157 Or. 2015Accordingly, we concluded that the officer “had no basis for searching defendant’s truck.” Id.; see also State v. Walker, 181 Or App 548, 552-53 , 47 P3d 65 (2002) (search of defendant’s jacket during a stop was not justified by officer-safety concerns where there was no evidence that “defendant had a weapon, much less that he was likely to use it, or that in any other way defendant posed a threat to [the officer] or anyone else”); State v. Bridgeman, 173 Or App 37, 45 , 23 P3d 370 , (2001) (officer’s search of the car in which the defendant had been a passenger was not justified by the office | 3 | 2012–2018 |
State v. Ehly
green
2 sentences2016Defendant contends that the court erred when it determined that the patdown search was justified by the officer safety exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 1 On review for errors of law, State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75 , 854 P2d 421 (1993), we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the search was justified by the officer’s reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that defendant might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer. 2016Defendant contends that the court erred when it determined that the patdown search was justified by the officer safety exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 1 On review for errors of law, State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75 , 854 P2d 421 (1993), we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the search was justified by the officer’s reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that defendant might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer. | 3 | 1998–2016 |
State v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences2015When the state seeks to rely on the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement to justify a warrant-less search or seizure, the state must prove “that the officer had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the defendant posed an immediate threat of serious physical injury.” Id. at 212-13 (citing State v. Hendricks, 213 Or App 360, 364 , 160 P3d 1014 , rev den, 343 Or 467 (2007)). 5 To do so, the state must prove not only that the officer subjectively believed that the defendant posed a threat, but also that the officer’s belief was objectively reasonable 2015When the state seeks to rely on the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement to justify a warrant-less search or seizure, the state must prove “that the officer had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the defendant posed an immediate threat of serious physical injury.” Id. at 212-13 (citing State v. Hendricks, 213 Or App 360, 364 , 160 P3d 1014 , rev den, 343 Or 467 (2007)). 5 To do so, the state must prove not only that the officer subjectively believed that the defendant posed a threat, but also that the officer’s belief was objectively reasonable | 3 | 2014–2015 |
State v. Payne
green
2 sentences2026See Bates, 304 Or at 523 (explaining that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety”); State v. Payne, 310 Or App 672, 683 , 487 P3d 413 , rev den, 368 Or 514 (2021) (noting that we “have recognized * * * circumstances where police may have a reasonable circumstance-based fear for their safety even if there is no articulable fact specific to the defendant himself” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Foster, 347 Or 1, 9 , 217 P3d 168 (2009) (“[I]t is sufficient that the officers be able to point to specific and articulable facts * * * that would reasonabl 2026See Bates, 304 Or at 523 (explaining that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety”); State v. Payne, 310 Or App 672, 683 , 487 P3d 413 , rev den, 368 Or 514 (2021) (noting that we “have recognized * * * circumstances where police may have a reasonable circumstance-based fear for their safety even if there is no articulable fact specific to the defendant himself” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Foster, 347 Or 1, 9 , 217 P3d 168 (2009) (“[I]t is sufficient that the officers be able to point to specific and articulable facts * * * that would reasonabl | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Parras
green
2 sentences2025The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the initial search was justified by the officer-safety exception: “THE COURT: “[F]or the initial search, * * * the totality of the circumstances is reasonable suspicion and [ ]what Officer Farmer testified that both his experience, the movement, the area, the time of day, and the no lights, and the moving to the curb is enough for the proper opening the door and especially the—it looked like [defendant] might be trying to restart the car.” The trial court denied defendant’s demurrer, relying on State v. Parras, 326 Or App 2 2025The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the initial search was justified by the officer-safety exception: “THE COURT: “[F]or the initial search, * * * the totality of the circumstances is reasonable suspicion and [ ]what Officer Farmer testified that both his experience, the movement, the area, the time of day, and the no lights, and the moving to the curb is enough for the proper opening the door and especially the—it looked like [defendant] might be trying to restart the car.” The trial court denied defendant’s demurrer, relying on State v. Parras, 326 Or App 2 | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Keck
green
2 sentences2024We agree, and reverse. “ ‘We review [a trial court’s] denial of a motion to suppress for legal error and are bound by the trial court’s explicit and implicit factual findings if evidence in the record supports them.’ ” State v. Keck, 328 Or App 296, 298 , 537 P3d 163 (2023) (quoting State v. Bailey, 307 Or App 782, 783 , 479 P3d 304 (2020)). 2024We agree, and reverse. “ ‘We review [a trial court’s] denial of a motion to suppress for legal error and are bound by the trial court’s explicit and implicit factual findings if evidence in the record supports them.’ ” State v. Keck, 328 Or App 296, 298 , 537 P3d 163 (2023) (quoting State v. Bailey, 307 Or App 782, 783 , 479 P3d 304 (2020)). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences2024Such circumstances have been found, for example, to justify entry in the case of hot pursuit, the destruction of evidence, flight of a suspect, and where emergency aid was required by someone within.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649 , 260 P3d 476 (2011) (recognizing, in addition to the exceptions listed in Davis, an officer-safety exception). 2024Such circumstances have been found, for example, to justify entry in the case of hot pursuit, the destruction of evidence, flight of a suspect, and where emergency aid was required by someone within.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 649 , 260 P3d 476 (2011) (recognizing, in addition to the exceptions listed in Davis, an officer-safety exception). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Miller green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Miller green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Guggenmos green | 2 | 2013–2019 |
| State v. Cocke green | 2 | 2002–2019 |
| State v. Madden neutral | 2 | 2017–2018 |
| State v. Morgan green | 2 | 2011–2018 |
| State v. Messer green | 2 | 2015–2018 |
| State v. Ashbaugh green | 2 | 2015–2017 |
| State v. Paulson green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Davis green | 2 | 2002–2009 |
| State v. Scheirman green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Caster neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Caster green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Beylund green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Powell neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Navickas green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Miglavs green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Redmond green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Pope green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Thomas green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Lee green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Davenport green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Jackson neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Jackson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Bridgeman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Backstrand green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Amaya green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.