opportunity to prepare defense in Georgia

2018Otherwise, the defendant's "fair opportunity to present his defense," acknowledged in Ake , [supra, 470 U.S. at 76 (III), 105 S.Ct. 1087 ] will be impaired.

2018Otherwise, the defendant's "fair opportunity to present his defense," acknowledged in Ake , [supra, 470 U.S. at 76 (III), 105 S.Ct. 1087 ] will be impaired.

2018In either case, Brooks holds that a defendant “has the right to obtain [expert] assistance without losing the opportunity to prepare the defense in secret.” Id. at 565 (2). 5 See Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 41 (3) (d) ( 365 SE2d 115 ) (1988) (holding that a motion on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant for funds for expert assistance should disclose to the trial court why certain evidence is critical, what type of expert testimony is needed, what that expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs).

2018In either case, Brooks holds that a defendant “has the right to obtain [expert] assistance without losing the opportunity to prepare the defense in secret.” Id. at 565 (2). 5 See Roseboro v. State, 258 Ga. 39, 41 (3) (d) ( 365 SE2d 115 ) (1988) (holding that a motion on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant for funds for expert assistance should disclose to the trial court why certain evidence is critical, what type of expert testimony is needed, what that expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs).

2017M., 307 Ga. App. 751, 752-53 (2) ( 706 SE2d 683 ) (2011) (considering juvenile’s claims in direct appeal that juvenile court failed to merge two offenses as being a challenge to a void disposition). 29 Cf. e.g., von Thomas, 293 Ga. at 571-72 (2) (“[T]he sentencing court had jurisdiction of [the] motion [to vacate] only to the extent that it presented a cognizable claim that the sentence was void. . . .

2017M., 307 Ga. App. 751, 752-53 (2) ( 706 SE2d 683 ) (2011) (considering juvenile’s claims in direct appeal that juvenile court failed to merge two offenses as being a challenge to a void disposition). 29 Cf. e.g., von Thomas, 293 Ga. at 571-72 (2) (“[T]he sentencing court had jurisdiction of [the] motion [to vacate] only to the extent that it presented a cognizable claim that the sentence was void. . . .

2017W., *565 232 Ga. App. 777, 779 (1) (b) n.1 ( 503 SE2d 647 ) (1998) (“[U]nder principles of due process, a juvenile is entitled to the same protection against unfair surprise and to the opportunity to prepare a defense [as an adult who faces criminal charges].”). 27 See, e.g., OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (“At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, if a child who committed a delinquent act is determined to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation, then after considering the results of such child’s risk assessment if the court is contemplating placing such child in restrictive custody, the court sh

2017W., *565 232 Ga. App. 777, 779 (1) (b) n.1 ( 503 SE2d 647 ) (1998) (“[U]nder principles of due process, a juvenile is entitled to the same protection against unfair surprise and to the opportunity to prepare a defense [as an adult who faces criminal charges].”). 27 See, e.g., OCGA § 15-11-601 (a) (“At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, if a child who committed a delinquent act is determined to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation, then after considering the results of such child’s risk assessment if the court is contemplating placing such child in restrictive custody, the court sh

2003Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87, 89 (2) ( 560 SE2d 680 ) (2002).

2003Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87, 89 (2) ( 560 SE2d 680 ) (2002).

2002Jackson also contends that the diagrams prepared by the accident reconstruction expert are “scientific reports” and could not be *285 used absent disclosure, citing Wheeler v. State, 203 Ga. App. 831, 832 ( 418 SE2d 112 ) (1992).

2002Jackson also contends that the diagrams prepared by the accident reconstruction expert are “scientific reports” and could not be *285 used absent disclosure, citing Wheeler v. State, 203 Ga. App. 831, 832 ( 418 SE2d 112 ) (1992).

2002A court may issue attachments and *727 inflict summary punishment for contempt of court for misbehavior in the court’s presence “or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.” OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1); Barlow v. State, 237 Ga. App. 152, 156 (2) ( 513 SE2d 273 ) (1999).

2002A court may issue attachments and *727 inflict summary punishment for contempt of court for misbehavior in the court’s presence “or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.” OCGA § 15-1-4 (a) (1); Barlow v. State, 237 Ga. App. 152, 156 (2) ( 513 SE2d 273 ) (1999).

2002It is the importance of the evidence to the state’s main case and whether the withholding was intended or designed to deny the defendant an opportunity to prepare his defense in relation to that evidence which will determine if reversible error has occurred. [CitJ Id. at 93 (2).

1999See Allison, supra. According to Thompson, he stopped at the store, discovered that the store’s audible alarm system had been activated, and saw cartons of cigarettes and other items lying outside the store.

1988An indictment failing to specify the cause of death is sufficient “ ‘when the circumstances of the case will not admit of greater certainty in stating the means of death.’ ” Hicks v. State, 105 Ga. 627, 630 ( 31 SE 579 ) (1898); See Gardner v. State, 216 Ga. 146 ( 114 SE2d 852 ) (1960); Davis v. State, 97 Ga. App. 342 ( 103 SE2d 86 ) (1958).

1988An indictment failing to specify the cause of death is sufficient “ ‘when the circumstances of the case will not admit of greater certainty in stating the means of death.’ ” Hicks v. State, 105 Ga. 627, 630 ( 31 SE 579 ) (1898); See Gardner v. State, 216 Ga. 146 ( 114 SE2d 852 ) (1960); Davis v. State, 97 Ga. App. 342 ( 103 SE2d 86 ) (1958).

1988An indictment failing to specify the cause of death is sufficient “ ‘when the circumstances of the case will not admit of greater certainty in stating the means of death.’ ” Hicks v. State, 105 Ga. 627, 630 ( 31 SE 579 ) (1898); See Gardner v. State, 216 Ga. 146 ( 114 SE2d 852 ) (1960); Davis v. State, 97 Ga. App. 342 ( 103 SE2d 86 ) (1958).

1988Thus, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony in question.” (Emphasis supplied.) Madaris v. Madaris, 224 Ga. 577, 579 ( 163 SE2d 745 ) (1968).

1988Thus, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony in question.” (Emphasis supplied.) Madaris v. Madaris, 224 Ga. 577, 579 ( 163 SE2d 745 ) (1968).

1979The trial judge determined that the appellant’s unexcused absence from the courtroom after announcing ready for trial had disrupted the orderly administration of the court’s business, "[interference with the immediate process of litigation may be treated by the presiding judge as a facie curiae contempt. [Cit.]” Crudup v. State of Ga., 106 Ga. App. 833, 838 ( 129 SE2d 183 ) (1962), affd. 218 Ga. 819 ( 130 SE2d 733 ).

1979The trial judge determined that the appellant’s unexcused absence from the courtroom after announcing ready for trial had disrupted the orderly administration of the court’s business, "[interference with the immediate process of litigation may be treated by the presiding judge as a facie curiae contempt. [Cit.]” Crudup v. State of Ga., 106 Ga. App. 833, 838 ( 129 SE2d 183 ) (1962), affd. 218 Ga. 819 ( 130 SE2d 733 ).