plain feel doctrine in Georgia

2007And “for evidence to be admissible under the plain feel doctrine, the searching officer must express a degree of certainty in identifying the item.” Patman v. State, 244 Ga. App. 833, 834 ( 537 SE2d 118 ) (2000).

2007And “for evidence to be admissible under the plain feel doctrine, the searching officer must express a degree of certainty in identifying the item.” Patman v. State, 244 Ga. App. 833, 834 ( 537 SE2d 118 ) (2000).

2025W., 355 Ga. App. 151 , 155 (b) ( 842 SE2d 920 ) (2020). 50 State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 589 SE2d 647 ) (2003); see Ramsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 703 SE2d 339 ) (2010) (“A Terry pat-down, unlike a full search, is conducted for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to obtain evidence for use at trial.” (punctuation omitted)). 28 Fourth Amendment warrant requirements by recognizing the ‘plain feel’ doctrine.”51 Under this doctrine, if—during a lawful pat-down search—an officer “feels an object whose contours or mass makes it immediat

2025W., 355 Ga. App. 151 , 155 (b) ( 842 SE2d 920 ) (2020). 50 State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 589 SE2d 647 ) (2003); see Ramsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 703 SE2d 339 ) (2010) (“A Terry pat-down, unlike a full search, is conducted for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to obtain evidence for use at trial.” (punctuation omitted)). 28 Fourth Amendment warrant requirements by recognizing the ‘plain feel’ doctrine.”51 Under this doctrine, if—during a lawful pat-down search—an officer “feels an object whose contours or mass makes it immediat

2013See Springsteen v. State, 206 Ga. App. 150, 152-153 ( 424 SE2d 832 ) (1992) (officer authorized to reach into suspect’s pants pockets upon feeling a bulge where the suspect had responded to a request for consent to search by responding “okay,” and voluntarily assumed a search position).

2013See Springsteen v. State, 206 Ga. App. 150, 152-153 ( 424 SE2d 832 ) (1992) (officer authorized to reach into suspect’s pants pockets upon feeling a bulge where the suspect had responded to a request for consent to search by responding “okay,” and voluntarily assumed a search position).

2012Similarly, under the plain-feel doctrine, an officer may intrude under a suspect’s clothing only where, “during a lawful pat-down search, an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes it immediately identifiable as contraband,” and the officer, through his testimony, “express [es] a degree of certainty in identifying the item.” Mason v. State, 285 Ga.App. 596, 597 ( 647 SE2d 308 ) (2007).

2012Similarly, under the plain-feel doctrine, an officer may intrude under a suspect’s clothing only where, “during a lawful pat-down search, an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes it immediately identifiable as contraband,” and the officer, through his testimony, “express [es] a degree of certainty in identifying the item.” Mason v. State, 285 Ga.App. 596, 597 ( 647 SE2d 308 ) (2007).

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025W., 355 Ga. App. 151 , 155 (b) ( 842 SE2d 920 ) (2020). 50 State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 589 SE2d 647 ) (2003); see Ramsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 703 SE2d 339 ) (2010) (“A Terry pat-down, unlike a full search, is conducted for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to obtain evidence for use at trial.” (punctuation omitted)). 28 Fourth Amendment warrant requirements by recognizing the ‘plain feel’ doctrine.”51 Under this doctrine, if—during a lawful pat-down search—an officer “feels an object whose contours or mass makes it immediat

2025W., 355 Ga. App. 151 , 155 (b) ( 842 SE2d 920 ) (2020). 50 State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. App. 880, 882 ( 589 SE2d 647 ) (2003); see Ramsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 703 SE2d 339 ) (2010) (“A Terry pat-down, unlike a full search, is conducted for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to obtain evidence for use at trial.” (punctuation omitted)). 28 Fourth Amendment warrant requirements by recognizing the ‘plain feel’ doctrine.”51 Under this doctrine, if—during a lawful pat-down search—an officer “feels an object whose contours or mass makes it immediat

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025Indeed, the record is devoid of any testimony establishing what kind of contraband Officer Kelley believed was “immediately identifiable” in Staley’s pocket, much less why he believed it with a degree of certainty.60 Staley also presented no evidence on the scope of his consent to the pat-down search, as he testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he did not consent to the search at all.61 Indeed, at trial, one of the law-enforcement officers who responded 58 Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 348, 350 (2) ( 541 SE2d 634 ) (2001); see Sutton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 724, 732 (3) ( 791 SE2d 618

2025Indeed, the record is devoid of any testimony establishing what kind of contraband Officer Kelley believed was “immediately identifiable” in Staley’s pocket, much less why he believed it with a degree of certainty.60 Staley also presented no evidence on the scope of his consent to the pat-down search, as he testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he did not consent to the search at all.61 Indeed, at trial, one of the law-enforcement officers who responded 58 Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 348, 350 (2) ( 541 SE2d 634 ) (2001); see Sutton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 724, 732 (3) ( 791 SE2d 618

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025Indeed, the record is devoid of any testimony establishing what kind of contraband Officer Kelley believed was “immediately identifiable” in Staley’s pocket, much less why he believed it with a degree of certainty.60 Staley also presented no evidence on the scope of his consent to the pat-down search, as he testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he did not consent to the search at all.61 Indeed, at trial, one of the law-enforcement officers who responded 58 Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 348, 350 (2) ( 541 SE2d 634 ) (2001); see Sutton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 724, 732 (3) ( 791 SE2d 618

2025Indeed, the record is devoid of any testimony establishing what kind of contraband Officer Kelley believed was “immediately identifiable” in Staley’s pocket, much less why he believed it with a degree of certainty.60 Staley also presented no evidence on the scope of his consent to the pat-down search, as he testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he did not consent to the search at all.61 Indeed, at trial, one of the law-enforcement officers who responded 58 Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 348, 350 (2) ( 541 SE2d 634 ) (2001); see Sutton v. State, 338 Ga. App. 724, 732 (3) ( 791 SE2d 618

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2025For the sake of argument, we assume—without deciding—that Staley’s interactions with police constituted a second-tier encounter, which means law enforcement needed to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the seizure.54 And during the search, Kelley retrieved “a set of keys and a key fob”from Staley’s pocket that unlocked the Dodge. 51 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 882-83 (punctuation omitted). 52 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 730 . 53 Henderson, 263 Ga. App. at 883 (punctuation omitted); accord Ramsey, 306 Ga. App. at 7

2015Turning to the issue of whether the seizure of the contraband was allowed under the plain feel doctrine, the law is well established that “[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (II) (B) ( 113 SCt 2130 , 124 LE2d 334) (1993).

2015Turning to the issue of whether the seizure of the contraband was allowed under the plain feel doctrine, the law is well established that “[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (II) (B) ( 113 SCt 2130 , 124 LE2d 334) (1993).

2008An officer need not “ ‘conclusively identify’ what type of drug [the defendant] was carrying in order for the ‘plain feel’ doctrine to make the seizure of the contraband lawful.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holmes v. State, 267 Ga. App. 651, 653 ( 601 SE2d 134 ) (2004).

2008An officer need not “ ‘conclusively identify’ what type of drug [the defendant] was carrying in order for the ‘plain feel’ doctrine to make the seizure of the contraband lawful.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holmes v. State, 267 Ga. App. 651, 653 ( 601 SE2d 134 ) (2004).

2007This is so because a pat-down search is conducted solely for the purpose of insuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to procure evidence for use at a subsequent trial. [Patman v. State, 244 Ga. App. 833, 834-835 ( 537 SE2d 118 ) (2000).] (Punctuation omitted.) Parnell v. State, 280 Ga. App. 665, 670 (2) (b) ( 634 SE2d 763 ) (2006).

2007This is so because a pat-down search is conducted solely for the purpose of insuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to procure evidence for use at a subsequent trial. [Patman v. State, 244 Ga. App. 833, 834-835 ( 537 SE2d 118 ) (2000).] (Punctuation omitted.) Parnell v. State, 280 Ga. App. 665, 670 (2) (b) ( 634 SE2d 763 ) (2006).

2007See, e.g., Davis v. State, 232 Ga. App. 450, 451 ( 501 SE2d 241 ) (1998) (officer could open hard box found in defendant’s pocket because he could reasonably believe it might contain a weapon).

2007See, e.g., Davis v. State, 232 Ga. App. 450, 451 ( 501 SE2d 241 ) (1998) (officer could open hard box found in defendant’s pocket because he could reasonably believe it might contain a weapon).

2007At that point, the box was in plain view; but, just as in the plain-feel doctrine, the officer cannot seize it unless it is readily identifiable as contraband; see, e.g., Parks v. State, 150 Ga. App. 446 ( 258 SE2d 66 ) (1979) (motion to suppress was properly denied because marijuana seeds were in plain view and readily identifiable as contraband) or, there is a possibility that the box could contain a weapon.

2007At that point, the box was in plain view; but, just as in the plain-feel doctrine, the officer cannot seize it unless it is readily identifiable as contraband; see, e.g., Parks v. State, 150 Ga. App. 446 ( 258 SE2d 66 ) (1979) (motion to suppress was properly denied because marijuana seeds were in plain view and readily identifiable as contraband) or, there is a possibility that the box could contain a weapon.

1997Accordingly, his continued exploration of [the defendant’s] pocket was not authorized under the plain feel doctrine or Dickerson” Williams, supra at 101.