plain feel doctrine in Iowa

2021See, e.g., State v. Sherrod, No. 08-1136, 2009 WL 2170212, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2009) (relying on testimony that officer “absolutely” believed the object in defendant’s beltline was cash in finding that evidence admissible in a robbery case); Harriman, 737 N.W.2d at 320 (concluding it was immediately apparent the defendant had narcotics in his pocket from officer’s testimony that, based on his experience, the object he felt was narcotics); State v. Cain, No. 04-0167, 2005 WL 598791 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005) (finding officer credible in his testimony that he believed the pi

2019See State v. Harriman, 737 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

2022See, e.g., State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1107 (Conn. 1996); People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 (Ill. 1995); Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 856 .

2022See, e.g., State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1107 (Conn. 1996); People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 (Ill. 1995); Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 856 .

2022But when the Supreme Court actually applied the plain-feel doctrine to the facts presented, it found that the officer didn’t meet the plain-feel exception because the officer determined the lump was contraband only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.” Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)).

2022But when the Supreme Court actually applied the plain-feel doctrine to the facts presented, it found that the officer didn’t meet the plain-feel exception because the officer determined the lump was contraband only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.” Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)).

2022See, e.g., State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1107 (Conn. 1996); People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 (Ill. 1995); Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 856 .

2022See, e.g., State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1107 (Conn. 1996); People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 (Ill. 1995); Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 856 .

2022Ala. 1993); United States v. Winter, 826 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.

2022Ala. 1993); United States v. Winter, 826 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.

2022Ct. App. 1993); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 , 861–62 (Mich. 1996) (near certainty required for the plain-feel doctrine); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 744 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2000); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Tenn. 1997) (per curiam).

2022Ct. App. 1993); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 , 861–62 (Mich. 1996) (near certainty required for the plain-feel doctrine); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 744 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2000); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Tenn. 1997) (per curiam).

2022In a case decided just before the Supreme Court decided Dickerson, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the plain-feel doctrine under both the United States and New York Constitutions in People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. 20 1993).

2022Id. (cautioning additionally that to allow the plain-feel exception would risk “blurring of the limits to Terry searches”).

2022See State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80 , 81–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ill.

2022See State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80 , 81–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ill.

2022For example, in Mason v. State, the Georgia appellate court stated that under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer must express a degree of certainty in identifying the item because the search is being conducted solely for the safety of the police officer and others nearby, not to procure evidence. 647 S.E.2d 308, 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also United States v. Ross, 827 F. Supp. 711, 719 (S.D.

2022For example, in Mason v. State, the Georgia appellate court stated that under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer must express a degree of certainty in identifying the item because the search is being conducted solely for the safety of the police officer and others nearby, not to procure evidence. 647 S.E.2d 308, 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also United States v. Ross, 827 F. Supp. 711, 719 (S.D.

2022See State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80 , 81–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ill.

2022See State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80 , 81–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ill.

2022In Commonwealth v. Stackfield, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the discovery of contraband during a Terry-type search was valid under the plain-feel doctrine. 651 A.2d 558, 561 (Pa. Super.

2022In Commonwealth v. Stackfield, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the discovery of contraband during a Terry-type search was valid under the plain-feel doctrine. 651 A.2d 558, 561 (Pa. Super.

2022An officer has probable cause to investigate when “a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime has been committed or that evidence of a crime might be located in the particular area to be searched.” State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Iowa 2001); see 2 Wayne R.

2022An officer has probable cause to investigate when “a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime has been committed or that evidence of a crime might be located in the particular area to be searched.” State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Iowa 2001); see 2 Wayne R.

2022For example, in Mason v. State, the Georgia appellate court stated that under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer must express a degree of certainty in identifying the item because the search is being conducted solely for the safety of the police officer and others nearby, not to procure evidence. 647 S.E.2d 308, 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also United States v. Ross, 827 F. Supp. 711, 719 (S.D.

2022For example, in Mason v. State, the Georgia appellate court stated that under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer must express a degree of certainty in identifying the item because the search is being conducted solely for the safety of the police officer and others nearby, not to procure evidence. 647 S.E.2d 308, 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also United States v. Ross, 827 F. Supp. 711, 719 (S.D.

2022Ct. App. 1993); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 , 861–62 (Mich. 1996) (near certainty required for the plain-feel doctrine); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 744 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2000); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Tenn. 1997) (per curiam).

2022Ct. App. 1993); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849 , 861–62 (Mich. 1996) (near certainty required for the plain-feel doctrine); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 744 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2000); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Tenn. 1997) (per curiam).

2022But when the Supreme Court actually applied the plain-feel doctrine to the facts presented, it found that the officer didn’t meet the plain-feel exception because the officer determined the lump was contraband only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.” Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)).

2022But when the Supreme Court actually applied the plain-feel doctrine to the facts presented, it found that the officer didn’t meet the plain-feel exception because the officer determined the lump was contraband only after “squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.” Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)).

2021And the State must still prove “the officer ha[d] probable cause to believe that the item [was] contraband before seizing it.” Id. 2 Because the State does not argue we should apply a different standard under the state constitution than its federal counterpart, “we will apply the general standards as outlined by the United States Supreme Court for addressing [its] search and seizure challenge under the Iowa Constitution.” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2013). 7 After conducting a de novo review of the record, we find the district court erred in concluding the plain-feel exception di

2021See, e.g., State v. Sherrod, No. 08-1136, 2009 WL 2170212, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2009) (relying on testimony that officer “absolutely” believed the object in defendant’s beltline was cash in finding that evidence admissible in a robbery case); Harriman, 737 N.W.2d at 320 (concluding it was immediately apparent the defendant had narcotics in his pocket from officer’s testimony that, based on his experience, the object he felt was narcotics); State v. Cain, No. 04-0167, 2005 WL 598791 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005) (finding officer credible in his testimony that he believed the pi

2018“If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent . . . its warrantless seizure would be justified.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 375–76 (1993); accord Scott, 518 N.W.2d at 349–50; State v. Harriman, 737 N.W.2d 318 , 319–20 (Iowa Ct. App. 10 2007).