12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turpin v. Curtisgreen2 sentences2024Assuming that Isaac asked counsel to testify and counsel told him “no,” 4 and that counsel performed deficiently by doing so, we conclude that Isaac failed to show that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. (a) Isaac first argues that rather than require him to show prejudice under Strickland, we should presume prejudice because this case falls into the “constructive denial of counsel” exception to Strickland that we described in Turpin, 278 Ga. at 699 (1) (identifying “constructive denial of counsel” as one of the “narrow range of circumstances” where we “apply a presu 2024Assuming that Isaac asked counsel to testify and counsel told him “no,”4 and that counsel performed deficiently by doing so, we conclude that Isaac failed to show that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. (a) Isaac first argues that rather than require him to show prejudice under Strickland, we should presume prejudice because this case falls into the “constructive denial of counsel” exception to Strickland that we described in Turpin, 278 Ga. at 699 (1) (identifying “constructive denial of counsel” as one of the “narrow range of circumstances” where we “apply a presum | 3 | 3 |
Hardeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Hardeman v. State, 281 Ga. 220, 222 ( 635 SE2d 698 ) (2006) (constructive denial of counsel is one of a narrow range of circumstances in which the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be presumed). 2012See Hardeman v. State, 281 Ga. 220, 222 ( 635 SE2d 698 ) (2006) (constructive denial of counsel is one of a narrow range of circumstances in which the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be presumed). | 3 | 3 |
Moody v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). 1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Lajara v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). 1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). 1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Jowers v. Stategreen2 sentences1996In the case sub judice, we direct our inquiry to the prejudice component of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 ( 325 SE2d 362 ), and find that defendant failed to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra.]’ Smith v. Francis, [supra at 783 (1)].” J 1996In the case sub judice, we direct our inquiry to the prejudice component of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 ( 325 SE2d 362 ), and find that defendant failed to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra.]’ Smith v. Francis, [supra at 783 (1)].” J | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). 1997Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Allen v. State, 263 Ga. 60, 62 (4) ( 428 SE2d 73 ) (1993); Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480, 481 ( 422 SE2d 173 ) (1992); Moody v. State, 206 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) (c) ( 425 SE2d 397 ) (1992). | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Francisgreen2 sentences1996In the case sub judice, we direct our inquiry to the prejudice component of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 ( 325 SE2d 362 ), and find that defendant failed to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra.]’ Smith v. Francis, [supra at 783 (1)].” J 1996In the case sub judice, we direct our inquiry to the prejudice component of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 ( 325 SE2d 362 ), and find that defendant failed to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra.]’ Smith v. Francis, [supra at 783 (1)].” J | 1 | 2 |
Wainwright v. Stategreen2 sentences2024This exception, we have held, applies “only when there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial process, such that 4 Since we resolve Isaac’s ineffective assistance claim on prejudice, we need not decide whether the trial court made a factual finding that Isaac never expressed a desire to testify or whether such a finding is clearly erroneous. 11 counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 68 (3) (823 SE2d 749) (2019). 5 And, we have held, for this exception to apply, counsel’s failure must be “complete” and “occur th 2024This exception, we have held, applies “only when there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial process, such that 4 Since we resolve Isaac’s ineffective assistance claim on prejudice, we need not decide whether the trial court made a factual finding that Isaac never expressed a desire to testify or whether such a finding is clearly erroneous. 11 counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 68 (3) (823 SE2d 749) (2019). 5 And, we have held, for this exception to apply, counsel’s failure must be “complete” and “occur th | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cronicgreen1 sentence2012The attorney’s failure must be complete and must occur throughout the proceeding and not merely at specific points.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Turpin, supra; see United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 659 (III) (104 SC 2039, 80 LE2d 657) (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Greer v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2009In evaluating the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply a presumption of prejudice only in extremely narrow circumstances which are not applicable here. [Cit.] "(E)ven if the law presumes prejudice for certain errors when they are timely raised," a convicted defendant who, like [Bass], is seeking to overcome a procedural bar, whether in conjunction with or separate from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "does not have the benefit of that presumption of prejudice, and must instead meet the actual prejudice test...." [Cits.] Greer v. Thompson, 281 Ga. 419 2009In evaluating the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply a presumption of prejudice only in extremely narrow circumstances which are not applicable here. [Cit.] "(E)ven if the law presumes prejudice for certain errors when they are timely raised," a convicted defendant who, like [Bass], is seeking to overcome a procedural bar, whether in conjunction with or separate from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "does not have the benefit of that presumption of prejudice, and must instead meet the actual prejudice test...." [Cits.] Greer v. Thompson, 281 Ga. 419 | 1 | 1 |
Turpin v. Toddgreen2 sentences2006Turpin v. Curtis, supra at 699-700 (1). “[E]ven if the law presumes prejudice for certain errors when they are timely raised,” a convicted defendant who, like Thompson, is seeking to overcome a procedural bar, whether in conjunction with or separate from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “does not have the benefit of that presumption of prejudice, and must instead meet the actual prejudice test....” Turpin v. Todd, supra at 828 (2) (b). 2006Turpin v. Curtis, supra at 699-700 (1), 606 S.E.2d 244 . "[E]ven if the law presumes prejudice for certain errors when they are timely raised," a convicted defendant who, like Thompson, is seeking to overcome a procedural bar, whether in conjunction with or separate from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "does not have the benefit of that presumption of prejudice, and must instead meet the actual prejudice test. . . ." Turpin v. Todd, supra at 828 (2)(b), 493 S.E.2d 900 . | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See also Owens v. State, 269 Ga. 887, 888 (2) (a) ( 506 SE2d 860 ) (1998) (“The circumstances under which a court will presume prejudice are extremely limited.”). 2004See also Owens v. State, 269 Ga. 887, 888 (2) (a) ( 506 SE2d 860 ) (1998) (“The circumstances under which a court will presume prejudice are extremely limited.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1996In the case sub judice, we direct our inquiry to the prejudice component of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 ( 325 SE2d 362 ), and find that defendant failed to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra.]’ Smith v. Francis, [supra at 783 (1)].” J 1996In the case sub judice, we direct our inquiry to the prejudice component of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 ( 325 SE2d 362 ), and find that defendant failed to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 , supra.]’ Smith v. Francis, [supra at 783 (1)].” J | 4 | 1994–1997 |
Nelson v. Hall
green
1 sentence2010To establish the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Baskin must show that, had counsel performed adequately, there is “ ‘a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal would have been different.’ [Cits.]” Id. at 794 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Turner v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2009Both Turner v. Louisiana, supra, and Gonzales v. Beto, supra, imply that actual prejudice would be shown by evidence that the witness-bailiff spoke to the jurors about the case itself outside the courtroom. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gonzales v. Beto, Corrections Director
green
1 sentence2009Both Turner v. Louisiana, supra, and Gonzales v. Beto, supra, imply that actual prejudice would be shown by evidence that the witness-bailiff spoke to the jurors about the case itself outside the courtroom. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Walker v. Houston
green
1 sentence2004(Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Walker v. Houston, supra. In evaluating the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply a presumption of its existence “in only a narrow range of circumstances. . . .” State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337 ( 588 SE2d 738 ) (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Heath
green
2 sentences2004(Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Walker v. Houston, supra. In evaluating the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply a presumption of its existence “in only a narrow range of circumstances. . . .” State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337 ( 588 SE2d 738 ) (2003). 2004(Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Walker v. Houston, supra. In evaluating the prejudice component of a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply a presumption of its existence “in only a narrow range of circumstances. . . .” State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337 ( 588 SE2d 738 ) (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.