An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be resolved without addressing deficient performance if the defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice.
A defendant convicted of felony murder appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court's sequential jury charge on felony murder and voluntary manslaughter was prejudicial and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges regarding the effects of testimonial immunity. The court held that although the jury charge was sequential, the jury's verdict form and request for a recharge demonstrated they had considered the lesser offense, satisfying the purpose of the merger rule. Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the court applied the Strickland standard and determined that the defendant failed to show prejudice, as there was no reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have changed had the requested charges been given.
263 Ga. at 440 Analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel requirements92 citing cases“or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.”
- Lewis Terrance Williams v. State, No. A19A2021 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2020).published (Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed the performance component prior to the prejudice component, it acknowledged that a court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to approach the in…)
- Suggs v. State, 526 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. 2000).published“(b)oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact”
- Caldwell, Warden v. Edenfield; & Vice Versa, 890 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. 2023).published See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV) (noting that a court need not address counsel’s performance if an ineffective assistance claim can be denied based on a lack of prejudice alone); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 60…
- James Tyrone Carmichael v. State, 836 S.E.2d 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).publishedAs a general rule, matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”19 In other words, “hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel, and…
- FORD v. TATE (& Vice Versa), 835 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 2019).published See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV) (noting that an appellate court need not address counsel’s performance if the claim can be rejected based on a lack of prejudice); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (sam…
- Vincent Lamont Easley, Jr. v. State, 833 S.E.2d 591 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).publishedGenerally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced the client that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but…
- Otis Robert Tripp, Jr. v. State, 825 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).publishedWe reversed both of those conclusions in our previous opinion. 4 outcome of the trial would have been different.[14] The criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of r…
- Anthony v. State, 823 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).publishedGenerally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced the client that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but…
- Bryson v. Jackson, 791 S.E.2d 43 (Ga. 2016).publishedStrickland v. Washington, supra[, 466 U. S.] at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Seabolt v. Norris, 783 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. 2016).publishedStrickland v. Washington, supra[, 466 U. S.] at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
Show 81 more citing cases
- Williams v. Rudolph, 777 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 2015).publishedStrickland v. Washington, supra[, 466 U. S.] at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Humphrey v. Riley, 731 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2012).publishedSee Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting t…
- Humphrey v. Lewis, 728 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. 2012).publishedSee Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (stating that a court may deny an ineffective assistance claim based solely on the absence of prejudice arising from counsel’s alleged deficie…
- Patterson v. State, 720 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).published“[A] court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to . . . address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one”
- Humphrey v. Morrow, 717 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. 2011).published (noting that an appellate court need not address whether counsel was deficient if the claim can be rejected based on a lack of prejudice)
- Askew v. State, 713 S.E.2d 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Cuzzort v. State, 703 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Brown v. Baskin, 690 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 2010).publishedStrickland v. Washington, supra at 698; Bajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Johnson v. State, 687 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).publishedAccord Cleveland I, supra at 145-146; Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 113 (2) (b) ( 671 SE2d 200 ) (2008); Carson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 763, 765 ( 592 SE2d 161 ) (2003) (whole court). 10 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 6…
- Santibanez v. State, 686 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).publishedWith respect to his conviction for methamphetamine trafficking, Santibanez was sentenced to thirty years, to serve twenty in prison and ten on. probation; he was fined $300,000. 11 See Yarbrough v. State, 264 Ga. App. 848, 849 (1) ( 592 SE…
- Taylor v. State, 686 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).publishedJohnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 (Citations omitted.) Glover v. State, 285 Ga. 461, 464 (5) ( 678 SE2d 476 ) (2009). 2 Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993); Pringle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 230, 234 (2) (…
- ADEM v. State, 686 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).publishedSmith, P J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). 2 OCGA § 16-5-24. 3 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 4 Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) ( 589 SE2d 108 ) (2003). 5 Williams v. State, 265 Ga. 681, 682 (1) ( 4…
- Mahoney v. State, 675 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) We find no merit in Mahoney’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to reserve objections to the total charge because Mahoney has not demonstrated that any pre…
- Hall v. Brannan, 670 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. 2008).publishedSee Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s professional deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (hol…
- Whatley v. Terry, 668 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 2008).publishedInd. 2001); Williams v. State, 706 NE2d 149, 161 (II) (Ind. 1999). 17 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 174-175 (III) (122 SC 1237, 152 LE2d 291) (2002). 18 Id. at 168 (II) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (98 SC 1173, 55 LE2d 4…
- Schofield v. Cook, 663 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 2008).publishedStrickland, 466 U. S. at 698 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Williams v. State, 661 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) We find no merit in Williams’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial because his counsel failed to move to exclude the victim’s identification of him at trial based…
- Reynolds v. State, 658 S.E.2d 815 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). 1.
- Bass v. State, 655 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).published See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). [5] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Worthy v. State, 286 Ga.App. 77, 79 (2), 648 S.E.2d 682 (2007). [6] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App…
- Francis v. State, 651 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).published Bajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Dixon v. State, 645 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).publishedJohnson, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457 ( 588 SE2d 691 ) (2003). 2 Panzner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 868 ( 616 SE2d 201 ) (2005). 3 Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 195 (2) ( 625 SE2d 397 ) (2006). 4 Short v. Stat…
- Simmons v. State, 644 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).publishedSmith, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur. 1 “Personal Mail Box.” 2 Simmons was later assigned mailbox 143. 3 Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 131 (3) ( 475 SE2d 637 ) (1996) (citation and. punctuation omitted). 4 Turner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 74…
- Schofield v. Holsey, 642 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 2007).published Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698 ; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Espinosa v. State, 645 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).publishedTom Durden, District Attorney, Henry P. Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Ruiz v. State, 277 Ga. App. 178 ( 626 SE2d 136 ) (2006) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781,…
- Ford v. State, 641 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).publishedSmith, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur. 1 See Kennedy v. State, 279 Ga. App. 415, 416 (1) ( 631 SE2d 462 ) (2006). 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Revere v. State, 277 Ga. App. 393, 394 (1) (a) ( 62…
- Feaster v. State, 641 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).publishedKatz, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500 ( 629 SE2d 485 ) (2006) (citations omitted). 2 See OCGA §§ 16-8-41 (a) (armed robbery); 16-11-106 (b) (possession of a firearm during commission of a fe…
- Buckholts v. State, 641 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).publishedSmith, P. J., and Ruffin, J., concur. 1 See generally Totino v. State, 266 Ga. App. 265, 265-266 (1) (a) ( 596 SE2d 749 ) (2004). 2 Collins v. State, 273 Ga. 93, 94 (2) ( 538 SE2d 47 ) (2000), citing Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2)…
- Head v. State, 631 S.E.2d 808 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Paige v. State, 627 S.E.2d 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Paige contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial after the victim began crying on the witness stand, requiring a recess to be taken.
- Wilburn v. State, 629 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Wilburn claims his counsel should have objected to Barnes’s testimony that she did not believe Price assaulted the victim because she had “been familiar with Mr. Price for…
- Mayo v. State, 626 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Mayo claims that his trial counsel’s too short and infrequent meetings with him require a new trial.
- Andrews v. State, 620 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) We find no merit in Andrews’ claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the evidence about the Fulton County incidents.
- Duvall v. State, 614 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).publishedAndrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Williams v. State, 217 Ga. App. 636, 638 (3) ( 458 SE2d 671 ) (1995) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2 OCGA§ 16-6-4 (a) (“Aperson commits the offense of child molestation whenhe or she does any…
- Horne v. State, 614 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).publishedHorne appeals from this ruling. 2 Bruce v. State, 252 Ga. App. 494, 498 (2) ( 555 SE2d 819 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 3 Scapin v. State, 204 Ga. App. 725 ( 420 SE2d 385 ) (1992) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 Bajara v. State,…
- Johnson v. State, 612 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).publishedAnd, applying the plain error rule, we find that none of the comments “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of [the] proceedings.” (Punctuation omitted.) Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58 ) (200…
- Fennell v. State, 611 S.E.2d 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Fennell argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to present his entrapment defense.
- Miller v. State, 610 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).published Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Buckley v. State, 606 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).publishedLajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993). (a) Buckley contends his counsel was ineffective for abandoning the claim that the indictment was defective for failing to “describe or name the item for which the Appellant wa…
- Leonard v. State, 603 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).publishedJ., and Johnson, P. J., concur. 1 (Footnote omitted.) Faulkner v. State, 260 Ga. App. 794 ( 581 SE2d 365 ) (2003). 2 See Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197,198 (1) ( 581 SE2d 279 ) (2003); Slater v. State, 209 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 434 SE2d…
- Bruce v. State, 603 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).publishedNOTES [1] 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [2] See Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2), 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). [3] Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3), 435 S.E.2d 600 (1993). [4] Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87-88…
- Rayshad v. State, 670 S.E.2d 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).published
- Sorrells v. State, 476 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. 1996).published
- Wicks v. State, 604 S.E.2d 768 (Ga. 2004).published
- Curry v. State, 519 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).published
- Lawson v. State, 620 S.E.2d 600 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).published
- Covington v. State, 555 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).published
- Derrick v. State, 438 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1994).published
- Hopper v. State, 598 S.E.2d 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).published
- Jones v. State, 560 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).published
- Bates v. State, 596 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. 2004).published
- White v. State, 453 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1995).published
- Walker v. Houston, 588 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 2003).published
- Ballard v. State, 601 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).published
- Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1998).published
- Sims v. State, 615 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).published
- Weathersby v. State, 587 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).published
- Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2003).published
- Zant v. Means, 522 S.E.2d 449 (Ga. 1999).published
- McCord v. State, 493 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 1997).published
- Springs v. Seese, 558 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. 2002).published
- Columbus v. State, 513 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. 1999).published
- Spencer v. State, 676 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).published
- Head v. Ferrell, 554 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 2001).published
- Mosely v. State, 599 S.E.2d 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).published
- McDougal v. State, 521 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).published
- Turpin v. Lipham, 510 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1998).published
- Williams v. State, 446 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).published
- Pearson v. State, 454 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).published
- Tessmer v. State, 539 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 2000).published
- Brown v. State, 617 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).published
- Williamson v. State, 507 S.E.2d 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).published
- Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 1995).published
- Mency v. State, 492 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).published
- Hall v. Lewis, 692 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 2010).published
- Head v. Thomason, 578 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 2003).published
- Benham v. State, 591 S.E.2d 824 (Ga. 2004).published
- Barrett v. State, 733 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 2012).published
- Sears v. Humphrey, 751 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 2013).published
- Postell v. State, 443 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).published
- Shelton v. State, 469 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).published
- Green v. State, 523 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).published
263 Ga. at 439 Disapproving sequential jury charges in felony murder cases3 citing cases“After reviewing the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Lajara guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.”
- Green v. State, 470 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. 1996).published
- Battles v. Chapman, 506 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. 1998).published
- Brewer v. State, 481 S.E.2d 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).published
263 Ga. at 441 Finding no prejudice to sustain ineffective assistance claim3 citing casesDecided October 18, 1993. Garland B. Cook, Jr., for appellant. Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Matthew P. Stone,…
- Francis v. State, 651 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).published Bajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993).
- Lowe v. State, 526 S.E.2d 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).published
- Harris v. State, 595 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).published
v.
the State
Luis Añado Lajara was convicted of felony murder in the death[*439] of David Alley and sentenced to life imprisonment. [1] He appeals and we affirm.
1. The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution are sufficient to prove that Lajara became involved in an altercation with the victim outside a bar and fatally stabbed the victim in the abdomen during the course of that altercation. After reviewing the record, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Lajara guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Lajara claims that he was prejudiced by the court’s charge concerning the method the jury should follow in considering the offenses of felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. Lajara maintains that the court’s charge was sequential in that it required the jury to first acquit him of felony murder before it could consider the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
In Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992) we adopted a modified version of the merger rule to ensure that persons would not be convicted of felony murder in cases where the facts otherwise warrant a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. To ensure that juries consider the offense of voluntary manslaughter during their deliberations, we expressly disapproved of sequential charges in the felony murder, voluntary manslaughter context. Sequential charges concerning these two offenses allow the jury to stop deliberation once they have reached a guilty verdict on the felony murder charge without first considering the mitigating factors of provocation and passion which are present in cases of voluntary manslaughter. See Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795 (426 SE2d 547) (1993) (Hunt, P. J., concurring). Having reviewed the charge, we conclude that the trial court did give a sequential charge as Lajara contends. [2]
Our holding in Edge was designed to preclude juries from automatically finding defendants guilty of felony murder without any consideration of voluntary manslaughter. See Shaw v. State, 263 Ga. 88 (428 SE2d 566) (1993). Although the trial court did not follow Edge in giving its charge, the facts show that the jury did consider voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the jury entered the words “not[*440] guilty” next to the offense of voluntary manslaughter on the verdict form they returned to the court. Moreover, during jury deliberations, the jury asked for and received a recharge from the court solely on the issue of voluntary manslaughter. We find that the jury’s verdict form and request for a recharge on voluntary manslaughter prove that the jury did, in fact, consider the charge of voluntary manslaughter and that the purpose of Edge was achieved despite the sequential charge given by the court. This enumeration is therefore without merit. [3]
3. Lajara’s co-defendant, Boterf, testified at the trial after a grant of testimonial immunity by the court. Lajara argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request charges from the court concerning the meaning and effect of testimonial immunity.
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, Lajara must show that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the alleged ineffective act, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459 (396 SE2d 891) (1990). [4] “[B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 698.
Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed the performance component prior to the prejudice component, it acknowledged that a court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to approach the inquiry in that order or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.
In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.[*441] Decided October 18, 1993. Garland B. Cook, Jr., for appellant. Michael H. Crawford, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Matthew P. Stone, Staff Attorney, for appellee.
Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697.
Here, we have first directed our inquiry to the prejudice component and, after reviewing the entire record, we find nothing to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of Lajara’s trial would have been different had counsel asked for the charges concerning the meaning and effect of testimonial immunity. Therefore, Lajara’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail since he has shown no prejudice.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.The crime was committed on October 6,1991 and Lajara was indicted on December 10, 1991. His trial commenced on May 11, 1992 and on May 13, 1992, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a motion for new trial on June 10, 1992, which was denied on November 2, 1992. On November 25, 1992, new defense counsel filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and for an extension of time for the filing of a notice of appeal. The motion was granted and following an evidentiary hearing on January 20, 1993, the trial court entered its order finding that Lajara was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The case was docketed in this court on January 26, 1993 and was orally argued on April 12, 1993.
To avoid error trial courts should modify the charge on felony murder and voluntary manslaughter in the manner discussed by this court in Edge.
Our determination in Div. 2 renders moot defendant’s enumerations concerning whether counsel preserved the right to object to the charge and whether counsel was ineffective if the right was not preserved.
We do not reach the question of whether the failure to request such a charge shows that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by the other component of Strickland.