signed waiver (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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signed waiver in Georgia

12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Rush v. Stategreen
ga · 2003 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2008
2 sentences

2008Second, and more important, detailed questioning of the defendant by the trial court that reveals that he was informed of his right to appeal and that he voluntarily waived that right is sufficient to show the existence of a valid, enforceable waiver. [Cit.] Rush v. State, 276 Ga. 541, 542 ( 579 SE2d 726 ) (2003).

2008Second, and more important, detailed questioning of the defendant by the trial court that reveals that he was informed of his right to appeal and that he voluntarily waived that right is sufficient to show the existence of a valid, enforceable waiver. [Cit.] Rush v. State, 276 Ga. 541, 542 ( 579 SE2d 726 ) (2003).

22
Seitman v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019To establish a valid waiver, the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will show that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.15 14 Seitman, 320 Ga. App. at 647 (“[T]he record must affirmatively show that the defendant made the decision to waive his right to a jury trial, or at least that he . . . agreed with the decision.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); cf. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 169, 170 (1) ( 670 SE2d 104 ) (2008) (The State failed to demonstrate that the defendant waive

11
Jones v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019To establish a valid waiver, the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will show that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.15 14 Seitman, 320 Ga. App. at 647 (“[T]he record must affirmatively show that the defendant made the decision to waive his right to a jury trial, or at least that he . . . agreed with the decision.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); cf. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 169, 170 (1) ( 670 SE2d 104 ) (2008) (The State failed to demonstrate that the defendant waive

2019To establish a valid waiver, the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will show that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.15 14 Seitman, 320 Ga. App. at 647 (“[T]he record must affirmatively show that the defendant made the decision to waive his right to a jury trial, or at least that he . . . agreed with the decision.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); cf. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 169, 170 (1) ( 670 SE2d 104 ) (2008) (The State failed to demonstrate that the defendant waive

11
Kado Renfro v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2019 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019To establish a valid waiver, the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will show that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.15 14 Seitman, 320 Ga. App. at 647 (“[T]he record must affirmatively show that the defendant made the decision to waive his right to a jury trial, or at least that he . . . agreed with the decision.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); cf. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 169, 170 (1) ( 670 SE2d 104 ) (2008) (The State failed to demonstrate that the defendant waive

2019To establish a valid waiver, the trial court must apprise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in representing himself so that the record will show that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.15 14 Seitman, 320 Ga. App. at 647 (“[T]he record must affirmatively show that the defendant made the decision to waive his right to a jury trial, or at least that he . . . agreed with the decision.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); cf. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 169, 170 (1) ( 670 SE2d 104 ) (2008) (The State failed to demonstrate that the defendant waive

11
Bryan v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See Bryan, supra, 296 Ga. App. at 342 .

11
Wiggins v. Stategreen
ga · 2006 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court of the United States held that both statements were inadmissible, concluding that "it would ordinarily be unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to independent evaluation *221 simply because Miranda warnings formally punctuate them in the middle." [Cit.] Wiggins v. State, 280 Ga. 627, 629 (2)(a), 632 S.E.2d 80 (2006).

2009Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court of the United States held that both statements were inadmissible, concluding that "it would ordinarily be unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to independent evaluation *221 simply because Miranda warnings formally punctuate them in the middle." [Cit.] Wiggins v. State, 280 Ga. 627, 629 (2)(a), 632 S.E.2d 80 (2006).

11
Aldridge v. Stategreen
ga · 1988 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 76 (3) ( 365 SE2d 111 ) (1988).

2001Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 76 (3) ( 365 SE2d 111 ) (1988).

11
Holloway v. Arkansasgreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 484-487 (98 SC 1173, 55 LE2d 426) (1978).

11
Wheat v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997It affected the fundamental right to independent counsel, and the court was obligated to assure the validity of the signed waiver. “[T]rial courts, when alerted by objection from one of the parties, have an independent duty to ensure that criminal defendants receive a trial that is fair and does not contravene the Sixth Amendment.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U. S. 153, 161 (108 SC 1692, 100 LE2d 140) (1988).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Durden v. Johnson green
ga · 1942
1 sentence

2025And Lair actually undermines her argument in her citation to a third case, Durden v. Johnson, 194 Ga. 689 (1942).

12025–2025
Jackson v. Denno green
scotus · 1964
2 sentences

2014The recording of the interview 3 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 6 reflects that the detective advised Johnson of his Miranda4 rights, which Johnson then knowingly and voluntarily waived, as reflected on a signed waiver form.

2014The recording of the interview 3 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 6 reflects that the detective advised Johnson of his Miranda4 rights, which Johnson then knowingly and voluntarily waived, as reflected on a signed waiver form.

12014–2014
Jones v. State green
ga · 1979
2 sentences

2010This Court has stated that [OCGA § 15-12-142 (a)] requires the jurors to be sequestered in death penalty cases. . . . [However,] the sequestration of death penalty jurors is *887 not mandatory where the defendant gives his or her consent for the jury to be dispersed during trial, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 (3) ( 256 SE2d 907 ) (1979).

2010This Court has stated that [OCGA § 15-12-142 (a)] requires the jurors to be sequestered in death penalty cases. . . . [However,] the sequestration of death penalty jurors is *887 not mandatory where the defendant gives his or her consent for the jury to be dispersed during trial, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 (3) ( 256 SE2d 907 ) (1979).

12010–2010
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

1985The trial court found that Parks "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights after being advised thereof as required by Miranda v. Arizona, [ 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966)]" and that considering the totality of the circumstances his "written statement and his oral admissions were made voluntarily, without being induced by hope of benefit or fear of injury." Record, p. 91.

1985The trial court found that Parks “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights after being advised thereof as required by Miranda v. Arizona, [ 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966)]” and that considering the totality of the circumstances his “written statement and his oral admissions were made voluntarily, without being induced by hope of benefit or fear of injury.” Record, p. 91.

11985–1985
Seisel & Co. v. Wells green
ga · 1896
2 sentences

1953It is further said on the same page of that opinion that, “where no process is attached to the petition, and process is not waived by the defendant, service of the petition upon him does not give the court jurisdiction to render a judgment against him.” Supporting this ruling, which is undoubtedly sound, the opinion cites Seisel v. Wells, 99 Ga. 159 ( 25 S. E. 266 ), and Neal-Millard Co. v. Owens, 115 Ga. 959 ( 42 S. E. 266 ).

1953It is further said on the same page of that opinion that, “where no process is attached to the petition, and process is not waived by the defendant, service of the petition upon him does not give the court jurisdiction to render a judgment against him.” Supporting this ruling, which is undoubtedly sound, the opinion cites Seisel v. Wells, 99 Ga. 159 ( 25 S. E. 266 ), and Neal-Millard Co. v. Owens, 115 Ga. 959 ( 42 S. E. 266 ).

11953–1953
Harris v. Davis green
ga · 1902
1 sentence

1953It is further said on the same page of that opinion that, “where no process is attached to the petition, and process is not waived by the defendant, service of the petition upon him does not give the court jurisdiction to render a judgment against him.” Supporting this ruling, which is undoubtedly sound, the opinion cites Seisel v. Wells, 99 Ga. 159 ( 25 S. E. 266 ), and Neal-Millard Co. v. Owens, 115 Ga. 959 ( 42 S. E. 266 ).

11953–1953
Neal-Millard Co. v. Owens green
ga · 1902
1 sentence

1953It is further said on the same page of that opinion that, “where no process is attached to the petition, and process is not waived by the defendant, service of the petition upon him does not give the court jurisdiction to render a judgment against him.” Supporting this ruling, which is undoubtedly sound, the opinion cites Seisel v. Wells, 99 Ga. 159 ( 25 S. E. 266 ), and Neal-Millard Co. v. Owens, 115 Ga. 959 ( 42 S. E. 266 ).

11953–1953

Where else courts name it

OH 41 (1992–2023) IN 29 (1972–2019) PA 20 (1947–2024) IL 19 (1981–2026) CA 18 (1969–2026) TX 17 (1984–2024) GA 12 (1953–2025) NM 10 (1978–2024) LA 10 (1975–2018) FL 9 (1972–2021) NY 7 (1979–2021) TN 7 (1998–2014) NC 6 (1977–2009) KS 6 (1939–2025) MO 5 (1983–2023) MD 5 (2009–2015) MS 5 (1997–2011) OR 4 (1998–2021) WA 4 (1983–2017) MI 4 (1975–2026) MA 4 (2009–2026) NH 3 (1982–1989) CO 3 (1956–2021) CT 3 (1998–2026) NV 3 (2000–2016) WY 3 (2014–2020) AZ 3 (1970–2022) IA 2 (1951–2022) ID 2 (2010–2019) AL 2 (1972–1982) VT 2 (1993–2008) VA 2 (2004–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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