inherent powers doctrine in Hawaii

2025"HRS § 603-21.9(1) & (6) is a legislative restatement of the inherent powers doctrine." Id. at 331, 197 P.3d at 783 (footnote omitted).

2022HRS § 603-21.9 "is a legislative restatement of the inherent powers doctrine." Kaina v. Gellman, 119 Hawai#i 324, 331, 197 P.3d 776, 783 (App. 2008) (citations omitted).

2000Baird & Co., Inc., 6 Haw.App. 431, 438 , 726 P.2d 268, 273 (1986) (holding that HRS § 603-21.9(6), which provides that the circuit courts have the power to make judgments, decrees, orders, and mandates necessary to carry into full effect the powers given to them by law, is a legislative restatement of the inherent powers doctrine, and the exercise of the powers set forth therein is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review).

2000Baird & Co., Inc., 6 Haw.App. 431, 438 , 726 P.2d 268, 273 (1986) (holding that HRS § 603-21.9(6), which provides that the circuit courts have the power to make judgments, decrees, orders, and mandates necessary to carry into full effect the powers given to them by law, is a legislative restatement of the inherent powers doctrine, and the exercise of the powers set forth therein is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review).

2016Further, the trial court has “inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers” to “curb abuses and promote a fair process.” Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994); Kaina v. Gellman, 119 Hawai'i 324, 330 , 197 P.3d 776, 782 (App. 2008) (noting that HRS §§ 603-21.9(1) and (6) 32 are the “legislative restatement of the inherent powers doctrine”). 33 Therefore, trial courts are indeed empowered with the tools to curb the concurrence’s hypothetical requests of counsel for access that have no legitimate purpose, even assuming the unlikely f

2016Further, the trial court has “inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers” to “curb abuses and promote a fair process.” Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507 , 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994); Kaina v. Gellman, 119 Hawai'i 324, 330 , 197 P.3d 776, 782 (App. 2008) (noting that HRS §§ 603-21.9(1) and (6) 32 are the “legislative restatement of the inherent powers doctrine”). 33 Therefore, trial courts are indeed empowered with the tools to curb the concurrence’s hypothetical requests of counsel for access that have no legitimate purpose, even assuming the unlikely f

1999Indeed, “[c]ircuit courts also have broad discretion to sanction litigants pursuant to their ‘inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.’ ” Kawamata Farms, Inc., 86 Hawai'i at 247-48 , 948 P.2d at 1088 -89 (citing Richardson, 76 Hawai'i at 507 , 880 P.2d at 182 ).

1999Indeed, “[c]ircuit courts also have broad discretion to sanction litigants pursuant to their ‘inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation process before them.’ ” Kawamata Farms, Inc., 86 Hawai'i at 247-48 , 948 P.2d at 1088 -89 (citing Richardson, 76 Hawai'i at 507 , 880 P.2d at 182 ).

2023See Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 91 Hawaiʻi 372, 393, 984 P.2d 1198, 1219 (1999).

2009We have previously noted that the separation of powers doctrine “is intended to preclude a commingling of ... essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of either of the other departments.” See, e.g., Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 75 Haw. 333, 353 , 861 P.2d 723, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, 779 So.2d 715, 721 (La.2001) (“the inherent p

2009We have previously noted that the separation of powers doctrine “is intended to preclude a commingling of ... essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of either of the other departments.” See, e.g., Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 75 Haw. 333, 353 , 861 P.2d 723, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, 779 So.2d 715, 721 (La.2001) (“the inherent p

2000“An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or has disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262 , 978 P.2d 700 (1999) (quoting State v. Davia, 87 Hawai'i 249, 253 , 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1998) (citations omitted)).

2000“An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or has disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262 , 978 P.2d 700 (1999) (quoting State v. Davia, 87 Hawai'i 249, 253 , 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1998) (citations omitted)).

1999On appeal, this court, relying upon HRS § 603-21.9(6) (the inherent powers doctrine), affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, because the entry of judgment “prevented the parties against whom sanctions were imposed from profiting by their own violations.” Id. at 620, 726 P.2d at 262 (citing Fields v. Stauffer Publications, Inc., 2 Kan.App.2d 323 , 578 P.2d 1138, 1143 (1978) (citations omitted)) (internal brackets omitted).

1999On appeal, this court, relying upon HRS § 603-21.9(6) (the inherent powers doctrine), affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, because the entry of judgment “prevented the parties against whom sanctions were imposed from profiting by their own violations.” Id. at 620, 726 P.2d at 262 (citing Fields v. Stauffer Publications, Inc., 2 Kan.App.2d 323 , 578 P.2d 1138, 1143 (1978) (citations omitted)) (internal brackets omitted).

1999Specifically addressing the revocation of pro hac vice status and the imposi *394 tion of permanent prospective sanctions pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated: “Any court which has the power to admit attorneys to practice may also sanction them for unprofessional conduct.” Standing Committee on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.1984); see also Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993).

1999Specifically addressing the revocation of pro hac vice status and the imposi *394 tion of permanent prospective sanctions pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated: “Any court which has the power to admit attorneys to practice may also sanction them for unprofessional conduct.” Standing Committee on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.1984); see also Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993).

1999Specifically addressing the revocation of pro hac vice status and the imposi *394 tion of permanent prospective sanctions pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated: “Any court which has the power to admit attorneys to practice may also sanction them for unprofessional conduct.” Standing Committee on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.1984); see also Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993).

1999Specifically addressing the revocation of pro hac vice status and the imposi *394 tion of permanent prospective sanctions pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated: “Any court which has the power to admit attorneys to practice may also sanction them for unprofessional conduct.” Standing Committee on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.1984); see also Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993).

1995Moreover, where sanctions are sought pursuant to HRCP Rule 11, “the inherent power of a court [also] can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.” In re Dubin, 9 Haw.App. 249, 260 , 833 P.2d 85, 92 (1992) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 , 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2135 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)).

1995Moreover, where sanctions are sought pursuant to HRCP Rule 11, “the inherent power of a court [also] can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.” In re Dubin, 9 Haw.App. 249, 260 , 833 P.2d 85, 92 (1992) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 , 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2135 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)).