public disclosure bar (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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public disclosure bar in Illinois

12 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilsongreen
scotus · 2010 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, 559 U.S. at 294-95 .

2017See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, 559 U.S. at 294-95 .

33
United States Ex Rel. Moore & Co. P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLCgreen
ca3 · 2016 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 302-03 (2016), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that a response to a FOIA request still qualified as a report for purposes of the federal public disclosure bar even after the statute was amended. 9 1-16-1574 &19 Furthermore, we find the Village’s additional argument—that our interpretation of the Act cannot stand where information in the news media can act as a public disclosure bar, thus demonstrating that “State” need not mean the unit of government being defrauded—is misplaced.

2017However, the suit may be barred if the information upon which it is based was publicly disclosed. 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4) (West 2014). &46 The purpose of a public disclosure bar is to eliminate " 'parasitic' " lawsuits that are based on information of which the government is well aware and which then result in a windfall to "enterprising individuals." United States ex rel Moore & Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F. 3d 294, 297-99 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing the public disclosure bar in the federal False Claims Act).

33
Bailey & Associates, Inc. v. Department of Employment Securitygreen
illappct · 1997 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See Bailey & Associates, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 289 Ill.

2017See Bailey & Associates, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 289 Ill.

33
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirkgreen
scotus · 2011 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2017–2020
2 sentences

2020In fact, in Schindler, the United States Supreme Court noted how the inclusion of “news media, suggest[s] that the public disclosure bar provides a broa[d] sweep.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schindler, 563 U.S. at 408 .

2017In so doing, the Supreme Court defined “report” based on the word’s ordinary meaning, namely, something that gives information or a notification, and 8 1-16-1574 based on the “generally broad scope of the FCA’s public disclosure bar.” Id. at 407-08 .

24
United States Ex Rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center, LLCgreen
ca4 · 2016 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020
2 sentences

2020Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center, 816 F.3d 37, 43 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel.

2019Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center, LLC, 816 F.3d 37, 43 (4th Cir. 2016) (the public disclosure bar aims to stifle parasitic lawsuits that merely reiterate previously disclosed fraudulent acts).

22
State Ex Rel. Beeler, Schad & Diamond, P.C. v. Target Corp.green
illappct · 2006 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Humphrey, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 867 ; see also Target Corp., 367 Ill.

11
Rockwell International Corp. v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2007 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020See Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 471-72 , 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1408 (2007).

2020See Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 471-72 , 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1408 (2007).

11
United States Ex Rel. King v. Hillcrest Health Center, Inc.green
ca10 · 2001 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020King v. Hillcrest Health Center, Inc., 264 F.3d 1271, 1281 (quoting Ackley, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 668 .) ¶ 58 There is no specific time frame requirement when relators must voluntarily disclose the information to the state; however, there must be enough time for the state to engage in its own investigation of the alleged fraud.

11
Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Authoritygreen
ca7 · 2016 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020The public disclosure bar may apply so long as the facts disclosing fraud are in the government’s possession or the public domain.); see also Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Authority, 815 F.3d 267, 278 (7th Cir. 2016)(quoting Absher, 764 F.3d at 708 (all that is required is that “ ‘[the] facts establishing the essential - 16 - elements of fraud—and consequently, providing a basis for the inference that fraud has been committed—are in the government’s possession or the public domain’ ”). ¶ 37 The public disclosures in this case do not involve allegations of fraud.

11
United States of America and Eunice Mathews v. Bank of Farmingtongreen
ca7 · 1999 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Prior to Glaser, the Seventh Circuit held such suits were “based upon” publicly disclosed information when they “ ‘depend[ed] essentially upon publicly disclosed information and [were] actually derived from such information.’ ” Glaser 570 F.3d at 914 (quoting United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 1999)).

11
United States Ex Rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Center, Inc.green
ca7 · 2014 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020The public disclosure bar may apply so long as the facts disclosing fraud are in the government’s possession or the public domain.); see also Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Authority, 815 F.3d 267, 278 (7th Cir. 2016)(quoting Absher, 764 F.3d at 708 (all that is required is that “ ‘[the] facts establishing the essential - 16 - elements of fraud—and consequently, providing a basis for the inference that fraud has been committed—are in the government’s possession or the public domain’ ”). ¶ 37 The public disclosures in this case do not involve allegations of fraud.

11
United States v. Sorgnardgreen
ca3 · 2005 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 2005). ¶ 32 Because the public disclosure bar requires dismissal of a relator’s suit based on fraud already disclosed in, as relevant here, the news media, unless the relator was an original source, we must first ask whether the allegations or transactions raised by the relator were publicly disclosed.

11
United States v. CSL Behring, L.L.C.green
ca8 · 2017 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See United States v. CSL Behring, L.L.C., 855 F.3d 935, 944 (8th Cir. 2017) (an allegation of industry-wide fraud without specifically naming or providing enough information to directly identify the entity engaged in the fraudulent activity is insufficient to trigger the public disclosure bar).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

CaseCitedYears
Lyons Township ex rel Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park green
illappct · 2017
2 sentences

2020The court reasoned, in part, the school districts have no authority to oppose the dismissal of a qui tam action under the Act, making their “resolutions” irrelevant. ¶ 64 Relators incorrectly relied upon the First District decision in Lyons Township, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574 , to argue the allegedly defrauded entity may be “the State” within the meaning of the statute and thereby has the authority to oppose dismissal of a claim under the public disclosure bar.

2019Kielczynski v. Village of Indian Head Park, 2017 IL App (1st) 161574, ¶ 11 . ¶ 31 The public disclosure bar is intended to preclude a relator’s action when the alleged fraud was publicly disclosed in a listed source, unless the relator was an original source of certain information underlying the action.

32019–2020
Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. The City of Naperville green
ill · 2012
2 sentences

2017Patrick, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31 . &44 The trial court granted Indian Head's motion to dismiss based upon the public disclosure bar in the Illinois False Claims Act (740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4) (West 2014)) and section 2-106 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 2014)).

2017Patrick, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31 . 16 1-16-1574 &46 The trial court granted Indian Head's motion to dismiss based upon the public disclosure bar in the Illinois False Claims Act (740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4) (West 2014)) and section 2-106 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 2014)).

32017–2017
United States ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kansas City Power & Light Co. green
ca8 · 2014
2 sentences

2017Kraxberger, 756 F.3d at 1078-79 . 19

2017Kraxberger, 756 F.3d at 1078-79 . 20

32017–2017
Scachitti v. UBS Financial Services green
ill · 2005
2 sentences

2024Dismissal is not warranted under the public disclosure bar if “the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” Id.

2020“No one but the Attorney General may intervene in the action, and the Attorney General retains the right to intervene in the lawsuit at any time.” (Emphasis added.) Scachitti, 215 Ill. 2d at 511 . ¶ 66 Finally, relators argue that even if their claim falls under the public disclosure bar and they do not qualify as original sources, their claim should not be dismissed because their suit is not “parasitic” in nature.

22020–2024
Johnson v. K Mart Corp. green
illappct · 2000
2 sentences

2000App. 3d 573 , 723 N.E.2d 1192 (2000), appeal allowed, 188 Ill. 2d 565 , 729 N.E.2d 496 (2000), the court agreed with Miller, stating, “We too hold that the public disclosure requirement may be satisfied by proof that the plaintiff has a special relationship with the ‘public’ to whom the information is disclosed.” Johnson, 311 Ill.

2000App. 3d 573 , 723 N.E.2d 1192 (2000), appeal allowed, 188 Ill. 2d 565 , 729 N.E.2d 496 (2000), the court agreed with Miller, stating, “We too hold that the public disclosure requirement may be satisfied by proof that the plaintiff has a special relationship with the ‘public’ to whom the information is disclosed.” Johnson, 311 Ill.

22000–2000
Fox v. Seiden green
illappct · 2016
1 sentence

2024Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, fail to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists, thereby entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2022); Fox v. Seiden, 2016 IL App (1st) 141984, ¶ 12 .

12024–2024
Bowles v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. neutral
illappct · 2013
1 sentence

2020Bowles v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 121072, ¶ 19 , 996 N.E.2d 1267 . ¶ 31 A. Public Disclosure ¶ 32 “The public-disclosure bar aims ‘to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits’ in which a relator, instead of plowing new ground, attempts to free-ride by merely reiterating previously disclosed fraudulent acts.” United States ex rel.

12020–2020
United States of America, Ex Rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Company David A. Fink v. Francis X. Quinn green
cadc · 1994
1 sentence

2020Quinn, 14 F.3d at 654 .

12020–2020
United States Ex Rel. Ackley v. International Business MacHines Corp. green
mdd · 1999
1 sentence

2020King v. Hillcrest Health Center, Inc., 264 F.3d 1271, 1281 (quoting Ackley, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 668 .) ¶ 58 There is no specific time frame requirement when relators must voluntarily disclose the information to the state; however, there must be enough time for the state to engage in its own investigation of the alleged fraud.

12020–2020
United States of America, Ex Rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. The Prudential Insurance Company green
ca3 · 1991
2 sentences

2020The term “in the course of a civil, criminal, or administrative hearing” under the public disclosure bar “should be interpreted broadly to include allegations and information - 13 - disclosed in connection with civil, criminal, or administrative litigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prudential Insurance, 944 F.2d at 1156 . ¶ 33 Relators acknowledge in their brief “some, but not all of the documents relied on by [them] to state a claim were obtained by [FOIA] requests to the school districts.” They also agree they “obtained some documents from the Chatham district in [Open Meetings a

2020Accordingly, because we interpret this provision of the Public Disclosure Act “broadly to include allegations and information disclosed in connection with civil, criminal, or administrative litigation” (Prudential Insurance, 944 F.2d at 1156 ), even if this information materially added to information publicly disclosed, relators cannot avoid this section of the public disclosure bar. ¶ 56 From a procedural standpoint even if relators were an “original source” they were required to “voluntarily provide[ ] the information to the State before filing an action under this Section.” 740 ILCS 175/4 (

12020–2020
Bowles v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. neutral
illappct · 2013
1 sentence

2020Bowles v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 2013 IL App (4th) 121072, ¶ 19 , 996 N.E.2d 1267 . ¶ 31 A. Public Disclosure ¶ 32 “The public-disclosure bar aims ‘to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits’ in which a relator, instead of plowing new ground, attempts to free-ride by merely reiterating previously disclosed fraudulent acts.” United States ex rel.

12020–2020
Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc. green
ca7 · 2009
2 sentences

2020Although our circuit courts are considered courts of general jurisdiction, the four-step test in Lyons Township still serves to determine whether the “public disclosure bar” may apply under the Illinois False Claims Act. ¶ 15 “To trigger the public-disclosure bar of [section (e)(4)(A) of the Act], it is not enough that allegations of wrongdoing have been publicly disclosed; the relator’s allegations must also be ‘based upon’ the public disclosure.” Glaser, 570 F.3d at 914 .

2020Prior to Glaser, the Seventh Circuit held such suits were “based upon” publicly disclosed information when they “ ‘depend[ed] essentially upon publicly disclosed information and [were] actually derived from such information.’ ” Glaser 570 F.3d at 914 (quoting United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 1999)).

12020–2020
United States Ex. Rel. Humphrey v. Franklin-Williamson Human Services, Inc. green
ilsd · 2002
1 sentence

2020Humphrey, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 867 ; see also Target Corp., 367 Ill.

12020–2020
Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. green
ill · 2017
1 sentence

2019Relators assert that the trial court erred in finding that their failure to plead an actual completed transaction demonstrating that Home Depot did not charge customers sales tax warranted dismissal under section 2-615. ¶ 39 The critical inquiry raised by a section 2-615 motion to dismiss “is whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Bogenberger v. Pi Kappa Alpha Corp., 2018 IL 120951 , ¶ 23; Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 2017 IL 121200 , ¶

12019–2019
Bogenberger v. Pi Kappa Alpha Corporation, Inc. green
ill · 2018
1 sentence

2019Relators assert that the trial court erred in finding that their failure to plead an actual completed transaction demonstrating that Home Depot did not charge customers sales tax warranted dismissal under section 2-615. ¶ 39 The critical inquiry raised by a section 2-615 motion to dismiss “is whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Bogenberger v. Pi Kappa Alpha Corp., 2018 IL 120951 , ¶ 23; Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 2017 IL 121200 , ¶

12019–2019
State of Illinois ex rel. Schad, Diamond and Shedden, P.C. v. National Business Furniture, LLC green
illappct · 2016
1 sentence

2019Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. National Business Furniture, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 150526, ¶ 32 . ¶ 30 Turning first to the applicability of the public disclosure bar, the Act provides that the “court shall dismiss an action or claim *** if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed: *** (iii) from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4)(A) (West 2014).

12019–2019
United States v. Emergency Medical Associates of Illinois, Inc., Illinois, Inc. green
ca7 · 2006
1 sentence

2006Gear, 436 F.3d at 728 .

12006–2006
Miller v. Motorola, Inc. green
illappct · 1990
11995–1995
Beaumont v. Brown green
mich · 1977
11990–1990

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 740 ILCS 175/4 (8) IL § 740 ILCS 175/3 (7) IL § 740 ILCS 175/1 (5) IL § 740 ILCS 175/2 (5) USC § 31u.s.c.3730 (5) IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (3) IL § 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (3) IL § 745 ILCS 10/2-106 (3) IL § 745 ILCS 10/2-107 (3) USC § 31u.s.c.3729-3733 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 12 (1990–2024) CA 12 (2003–2026) TX 8 (2017–2025) NJ 3 (2019–2024) MA 2 (2019–2021) IN 2 (1995–2023) NM 2 (2015–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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