public disclosure bar in California

2026Instead, the parties’ dispute focuses on the applicability of the public disclosure bar, which states, in full, “No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing[,] in a legislative or administrative report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” (§ 1871.7, subd. (h)(2)(A).) Ballidis and the Law Firm argue “the key ques

2026(Pacific Bell, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 746, fn. 3 .) 8 Weitzman interpreted the public disclosure bar’s original source exception.

2026(Weitzman, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 .) The Legislature included the qui tam provision and the public disclosure bar in this initial version.

2026Bill No. 1300).) However, despite the inclusion of the public disclosure bar, “[c]ommittee reports that discuss Assembly Bill No. 1300 contain no specific analysis of [the public disclosure bar].” ( Weitzman, supra, at p. 547 .) The Legislature later expanded the IFPA’s protections to include all forms of insurance fraud.

2025Co. v. Weitzman (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 534, 564 [the public disclosure requirement is “intended to bar parasitic or opportunistic actions by persons simply taking advantage of public information without contributing to or assisting in the exposure of the fraud”]; accord, Mao’s Kitchen, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 146 [“ ‘ “[w]here there has been a public disclosure[,] the governmental authority is ‘already in a position to vindicate society’s interests, and a qui tam action would serve no purpose’ ” ’ ”].) We thus conclude the trial court properly sustained Defendants’ demurrers.

2016The public disclosure bar of former subdivision (d)(3)(A) Qui tam claims based on certain categories of publicly disclosed information are barred unless the plaintiff is an original source of the information. 6 (See former subd. (d)(3)(A).) This prohibition, known as the public disclosure bar, is intended to prevent “ ‘parasitic or opportunistic actions by persons simply taking advantage of public information without contributing to or assisting in the exposure of the fraud.’ ” ( Wohlner, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1677-1678; accord, Mao’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Mundy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 132,

2023Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297, 319, fn. 13 [government defendants waived argument never raised or asserted below].) We need not decide this question, however, as we conclude that the public disclosure bar does not apply.17 We begin by addressing two threshold issues.

2023Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297, 319, fn. 13 [government defendants waived argument never raised or asserted below].) We need not decide this question, however, as we conclude that the public disclosure bar does not apply.17 We begin by addressing two threshold issues.

2023(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court absent exceptional circumstances]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1389, fn. 13 [denying request for judicial notice where existence of newspaper article is irrelevant and truth of its contents is not judicially noticeable].) 13 In Massachusetts, the action was dismissed after the court found that EMMA was “news media” under the public disclosure bar of the Massachusetts False Claims Act (MFCA).8 That ru

2023(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court absent exceptional circumstances]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1389, fn. 13 [denying request for judicial notice where existence of newspaper article is irrelevant and truth of its contents is not judicially noticeable].) 13 In Massachusetts, the action was dismissed after the court found that EMMA was “news media” under the public disclosure bar of the Massachusetts False Claims Act (MFCA).8 That ru

2023(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court absent exceptional circumstances]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1389, fn. 13 [denying request for judicial notice where existence of newspaper article is irrelevant and truth of its contents is not judicially noticeable].) 13 In Massachusetts, the action was dismissed after the court found that EMMA was “news media” under the public disclosure bar of the Massachusetts False Claims Act (MFCA).8 That ru

2023(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court absent exceptional circumstances]; In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1389, fn. 13 [denying request for judicial notice where existence of newspaper article is irrelevant and truth of its contents is not judicially noticeable].) 13 In Massachusetts, the action was dismissed after the court found that EMMA was “news media” under the public disclosure bar of the Massachusetts False Claims Act (MFCA).8 That ru

2023Bartlett v. Miller (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1407 (Bartlett).) Section 12652, subdivision (d)(3)(A) (section 12652(d)(3)(A)) states: “The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Attorney General or prosecuting authority of a political subdivision, if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed in any of the following: [¶] (i) A criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the state or prosecuting authority of a political subdivision or their agents are a party. [¶] (ii) A report,

2023It also addressed, and rejected, defendants’ alternative argument that the action was prohibited by the public disclosure bar because it relied on interest rates published on the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) website.4 Relying on Bartlett, the trial court concluded that EMMA is not a “report” of the state or “news media” triggering the public disclosure bar. ( Bartlett, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1413–1414 [no public disclosure bar based on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing accessible on its online database].) Edelweiss filed a fifth amended complaint, and the tria

2016Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 507 F.3d 720, 728 [same analysis under federal False Claims Act]; Kennard v. Comstock Resources, Inc. (10th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 [the public disclosure requirement “clearly contemplates that the information be in the public domain in some capacity and the Government is not the equivalent of the public domain”].) 8 Absent a public disclosure of the State’s audit or investigation in one of the venues or by the means identified in CFCA, there is no basis for dismissal of the action under CFCA’s public disclosure bar, which is all the court considered

2012Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 507 F.3d 720, 728 (Rost); accord, Kennard v. Comstock Resources, Inc. (10th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 [the public disclosure requirement “clearly contemplates that the information be in the public domain in some capacity and the Government is not the equivalent of the public domain”]; U.S. ex rel.

2016Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 507 F.3d 720, 728 [same analysis under federal False Claims Act]; Kennard v. Comstock Resources, Inc. (10th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 [the public disclosure requirement “clearly contemplates that the information be in the public domain in some capacity and the Government is not the equivalent of the public domain”].) 8 Absent a public disclosure of the State’s audit or investigation in one of the venues or by the means identified in CFCA, there is no basis for dismissal of the action under CFCA’s public disclosure bar, which is all the court considered

2012Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 507 F.3d 720, 728 (Rost); accord, Kennard v. Comstock Resources, Inc. (10th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 [the public disclosure requirement “clearly contemplates that the information be in the public domain in some capacity and the Government is not the equivalent of the public domain”]; U.S. ex rel.

2026(See e.g., Silbersher v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl. (9th Cir. 2024) 89 F.4th 1154, 1163 [the public disclosure bar applies only if “‘(1) the disclosure at issue occurred through one of the channels specified in the statute; (2) the disclosure was public; and (3) the relator’s action is substantially the same as the allegation or transaction publicly disclosed’”]; Mistick PBT, supra, 186 F.3d at p. 388 [“a qui tam action is ‘based upon’ a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam acti

2026(See e.g., Silbersher v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl. (9th Cir. 2024) 89 F.4th 1154, 1163 [the public disclosure bar applies only if “‘(1) the disclosure at issue occurred through one of the channels specified in the statute; (2) the disclosure was public; and (3) the relator’s action is substantially the same as the allegation or transaction publicly disclosed’”]; Mistick PBT, supra, 186 F.3d at p. 388 [“a qui tam action is ‘based upon’ a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam acti

2026(See e.g., Silbersher v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl. (9th Cir. 2024) 89 F.4th 1154, 1163 [the public disclosure bar applies only if “‘(1) the disclosure at issue occurred through one of the channels specified in the statute; (2) the disclosure was public; and (3) the relator’s action is substantially the same as the allegation or transaction publicly disclosed’”]; Mistick PBT, supra, 186 F.3d at p. 388 [“a qui tam action is ‘based upon’ a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam acti

2026(See e.g., Silbersher v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl. (9th Cir. 2024) 89 F.4th 1154, 1163 [the public disclosure bar applies only if “‘(1) the disclosure at issue occurred through one of the channels specified in the statute; (2) the disclosure was public; and (3) the relator’s action is substantially the same as the allegation or transaction publicly disclosed’”]; Mistick PBT, supra, 186 F.3d at p. 388 [“a qui tam action is ‘based upon’ a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam acti

2026Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 792 F.3d 1121, 1132 [the public disclosure bar “bars suits based on publicly disclosed ‘allegations or transactions,’ not information”].) This intent is reflected in section 1871.7 itself which contains a clause that provides for a limited recovery to a qui tam plaintiff when the court finds the complaint to have been “based primarily on disclosures of specific information . . . relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing.” (§ 1871.7, subd. (g)(1)(B).) Thus, the California Legislature, like Congress

2021Co. v. Cruz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1187-1188, fn. 7 [insurer filed an IFPA action covering only the false claims involving its insureds].) In contrast, requiring relators to seek broad relief might discourage some from filing an IFPA action to avoid the expense and/or risk of a large-scale lawsuit.

2016(See Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 ] [“[i]t is a maxim of statutory construction that ‘[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word [or phrase] surplusage’ ”]; Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 706 , 923 P.2d 1 ] [same].) Rather than focusing on the statutory language in former subdivision (d)(3)(A), the Attorney General relies on federal cases interpreting the public disclosure bar in the federal False Claims Act.

2016(See Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 ] [“[i]t is a maxim of statutory construction that ‘[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word [or phrase] surplusage’ ”]; Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 706 , 923 P.2d 1 ] [same].) Rather than focusing on the statutory language in former subdivision (d)(3)(A), the Attorney General relies on federal cases interpreting the public disclosure bar in the federal False Claims Act.

2016(See Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 ] [“[i]t is a maxim of statutory construction that ‘[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word [or phrase] surplusage’ ”]; Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 706 , 923 P.2d 1 ] [same].) Rather than focusing on the statutory language in former subdivision (d)(3)(A), the Attorney General relies on federal cases interpreting the public disclosure bar in the federal False Claims Act.

2016(See Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499 , 957 P.2d 1333 ] [“[i]t is a maxim of statutory construction that ‘[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word [or phrase] surplusage’ ”]; Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 706 , 923 P.2d 1 ] [same].) Rather than focusing on the statutory language in former subdivision (d)(3)(A), the Attorney General relies on federal cases interpreting the public disclosure bar in the federal False Claims Act.

2011Atkinson v. Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co. (E.D.Pa. 2007) 528 F.Supp.2d 533, 538-540 (Atkinson).) It follows that a court imposing the public disclosure bar in a qui tarn CFCA action—even if the bar is deemed jurisdictional—may award attorney fees.

2011(County of Kern v. Jadwin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 65 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 837 ].) A claim is clearly frivolous if it is “ ‘utterly lacking in legal merit and evidentiary support.’ ” (Atkinson, supra, 528 F.Supp.2d at p. 543 .) Stated otherwise, a claim is clearly frivolous “when, viewed objectively, it may be said to have no reasonable chance of success, and present no valid argument to modify present law.” (Mikes v. Straus (2d Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 687 , 705 (Mikes).) Thus, a qui tam plaintiff’s action dismissed under the public disclosure bar is clearly frivolous where the plaintiff’s claim that h

2011(Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States (2007) 549 U.S. 457, 467 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 190 , 127 S.Ct. 1397 ].) It “speaks to ‘the power of a particular court’ as well as ‘the substantive rights of the parties.’ ” (Id. at p. 468.) The CFCA is arguably less clear on this point but the question of jurisdiction need not detain us.

2011(Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States (2007) 549 U.S. 457, 467 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 190 , 127 S.Ct. 1397 ].) It “speaks to ‘the power of a particular court’ as well as ‘the substantive rights of the parties.’ ” (Id. at p. 468.) The CFCA is arguably less clear on this point but the question of jurisdiction need not detain us.

2011Vuyyuru v. Jadhav (4th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 337, 356 (Vuyyuru).) As for harassment, the Ninth Circuit has held that an action is brought for purposes of harassment “when the plaintiff pursues the litigation with an improper purpose, such as to annoy or embarrass the defendant.” (Pfingston v. Ronan Engineering Co. (9th Cir. 2002) 284 F.3d 999, 1006 .) Some courts have observed that “[t]he award of fees under the False Claims Act is reserved for rare and special circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 1006-1007.) We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion.

2011Plaintiff Standard’s claim that it qualified as a proper qui tarn plaintiff “clearly had no reasonable chance of success.” (Vuyyuru, supra, 555 F.3d at p. 356 .) Standard’s CFCA claim was clearly frivolous.

2011As noted earlier, “a qui tam complaint filed after allegations have been publicly disclosed is, by definition, ‘based upon’ the publicly disclosed information, even if the plaintiff made the disclosure.” (U.S. v. Alcan Electrical & Engineering, Inc., supra, 197 F.3d at p. 1020.) “[Wjhere the allegations of the fraud are already public knowledge, the relator confers no additional benefit upon the government by subsequently repeating the fraud allegations in his complaint.” (Biddle, supra, 161 F.3d at p. 539.) No reasonable person could think that the allegations in the prior litigation and this

2011As noted earlier, “a qui tam complaint filed after allegations have been publicly disclosed is, by definition, ‘based upon’ the publicly disclosed information, even if the plaintiff made the disclosure.” (U.S. v. Alcan Electrical & Engineering, Inc., supra, 197 F.3d at p. 1020.) “[Wjhere the allegations of the fraud are already public knowledge, the relator confers no additional benefit upon the government by subsequently repeating the fraud allegations in his complaint.” (Biddle, supra, 161 F.3d at p. 539.) No reasonable person could think that the allegations in the prior litigation and this

2011(Brown v. Desert Christian Center (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 733, 740-742 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 ] [dismissal upon finding workers’ compensation to be the exclusive remedy did not bar later award of attorney fees]; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] [mandatory dismissal under five-year statute did not bar later award of attorney fees].) It is also important to note that the public disclosure bar is jurisdictional under the FFCA, yet a court retains jurisdiction following dismissal to award attorney fees.

2011(Brown v. Desert Christian Center (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 733, 740-742 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 ] [dismissal upon finding workers’ compensation to be the exclusive remedy did not bar later award of attorney fees]; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] [mandatory dismissal under five-year statute did not bar later award of attorney fees].) It is also important to note that the public disclosure bar is jurisdictional under the FFCA, yet a court retains jurisdiction following dismissal to award attorney fees.

2011(Brown v. Desert Christian Center (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 733, 740-742 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 ] [dismissal upon finding workers’ compensation to be the exclusive remedy did not bar later award of attorney fees]; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] [mandatory dismissal under five-year statute did not bar later award of attorney fees].) It is also important to note that the public disclosure bar is jurisdictional under the FFCA, yet a court retains jurisdiction following dismissal to award attorney fees.

2011(Brown v. Desert Christian Center (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 733, 740-742 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 ] [dismissal upon finding workers’ compensation to be the exclusive remedy did not bar later award of attorney fees]; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 872 , 743 P.2d 932 ] [mandatory dismissal under five-year statute did not bar later award of attorney fees].) It is also important to note that the public disclosure bar is jurisdictional under the FFCA, yet a court retains jurisdiction following dismissal to award attorney fees.