facts upon claim in Kentucky

1949Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8 , 125 S. W. 2d 763 .” Here the testimony uncontradictedly shows that this truck was loaned to Doc Livingston to drive to and from his work.

1949Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8 , 125 S. W. 2d 763 .” Here the testimony uncontradictedly shows that this truck was loaned to Doc Livingston to drive to and from his work.

2025It must be emphasized that probable cause “covers both a mistake of law and a mistake of fact, and it exists where the person who initiates civil proceedings ‘reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and . . . that under those facts the claim may be valid under the applicable law.’” Prewitt, 777 S.W.2d at 894 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675).

2025It must be emphasized that probable cause “covers both a mistake of law and a mistake of fact, and it exists where the person who initiates civil proceedings ‘reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and . . . that under those facts the claim may be valid under the applicable law.’” Prewitt, 777 S.W.2d at 894 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675).

2023“What constitutes a reasonable time in which to move to vacate a judgment under CR 60.02 is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court.” Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858 .

2021Mapother v. Mapother, 750 S.W.2d at 431 ; see also D’Angelo v. Mussler, 290 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Ky. App. 2009).

2005(Emphasis added.) Both the Nelson Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the “shall be filed” requirement was mandatory and that neither had authority to sua sponte adopt a so-called “prison mailbox rule.” In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 , 108 S.Ct. 2379 , 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the United States Supreme Court adopted such a rulé for the filing of a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner.

2005(Emphasis added.) Both the Nelson Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the “shall be filed” requirement was mandatory and that neither had authority to sua sponte adopt a so-called “prison mailbox rule.” In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 , 108 S.Ct. 2379 , 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the United States Supreme Court adopted such a rulé for the filing of a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner.

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1947Clearly in defensive instructions the jurors are only required to believe the facts upon which the instruction is based, and are not required to believe such facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an instruction.” See also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 460 , 11 S. W. 2d 125 ; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 601 , 59 S. W. 2d 573 ; Feldman v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 277 , 79 S. W. 2d 960 ; and Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830 , 81 S. W. 2d 891 .

1944In the comment on-this section it is pointed out that it is enough that the one initiating the action believes that he can establish the the existence of the alleged facts to the satisfaction of the fact finding tribunal and that under such facts he may have a valid claim — in short, ‘ ‘ all that is necessary is that the claimant reasonably believe that there is a chance that his claim may be held valid on adjudication.” In Woods v. Finnell, supra, this court said: “In cases where the plaintiff has mistaken his action, * * * or where, by reason of some imaginary claim, he has seen proper to su

1931Co., 152 Ky. 278 , 153 S. W. 421 . ■In the instructions given by the court to the jury, the court set out such facts as in law constituted ‘ ‘ a reasonable rule,” and thus the facts upon which the rule to be reasonable, within the meaning of the law, were stated in the instructions.

1931Co., 152 Ky. 278 , 153 S. W. 421 . ■In the instructions given by the court to the jury, the court set out such facts as in law constituted ‘ ‘ a reasonable rule,” and thus the facts upon which the rule to be reasonable, within the meaning of the law, were stated in the instructions.

1926Lee v. Com., 210 Ky. 410 .

1923Again in the later case of Hall v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 167 , the court had the precise question under consideration, and in-holding the error was not prejudicial said: “If the phraseology of the instruction, coupled with the testimony in thé case, is such that the jury could not have been misled to the defendant’s prejudice, the technical error will not be given the broad effect of working a reversal of the judgment. ’ ’ Clearly in this case, where the court expressly authorized an acquittal of the defendant upon the ground of self-defense if they believed the facts upon which the instructio