criminal offense involving violation in Massachusetts

2011Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 6 (1996), and provides that “[i]n no event shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance under the provisions of’ G.L.c. 32, §§1-28; G.L.c. 32, §15(4).

2006L. c. 32, § 15(4), as inserted by St. 1987, c. 697, § 47, “[i]n no event shall any member [of the retirement system] after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance . . . .” Upon such conviction, § 15(4) further provides that the member “shall receive, unless otherwise prohibited by law, a return of his accumulated total [contributions to the retirement system]; provided, however, that the rate of regular interest for the purpose of calculating accumulated total [contributions] shal

2020See also State Bd. of Ret. v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 179-80 (2006) (holding that federal convictions could trigger G.L. c. 32, § 15(4), which does not enumerate any specific crimes, but requires public -13- employees to forfeit pension "after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position").

2011L. c. 32, § 15(4), inserted by St. 1987, c. 189, § 47, provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n no event shall any member [of the retirement system] after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance ...” (emphasis added). 6 The Supreme Judicial Court has held that § 15(4) “is considered to be penal and, therefore, its language must be construed narrowly, not stretched to accomplish an unexpressed result.” State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, supra at 174-175 .

2017L. c. 32, § 15 (4), “is guided by the familiar principle that ‘a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’ ” Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 668 (2014), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).

2014Section 15 (4) provides in relevant part: “In no event shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance Where we must interpret the terms of a statute, we look “to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all [the statute’s] words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.” Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass.

2019Subsection (4), inserted by St. 1987, c. 697, § 47, and entitled "Forfeiture of pension upon misconduct," provides that "in no event" shall any member of the State retirement system be entitled to a retirement allowance "after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position." 5 This subsection was enacted in reaction to this court's decision in Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd ., 396 Mass. 684 , 488 N.E.2d 401 (1986).

2019Subsection (4), inserted by St. 1987, c. 697, § 47, and entitled "Forfeiture of pension upon misconduct," provides that "in no event" shall any member of the State retirement system be entitled to a retirement allowance "after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position." 5 This subsection was enacted in reaction to this court's decision in Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd ., 396 Mass. 684 , 488 N.E.2d 401 (1986).

2017L. c. 32, § 15 (4), “is guided by the familiar principle that ‘a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’ ” Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 668 (2014), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).

2014See Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353 , 360 *389 (2001).

2006See Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 717, 719-720 (1999).