finding of voluntary waiver in Massachusetts

2000Although the judge’s ultimate findings are open for review, ‘a finding of voluntary waiver is “entitled to substantial deference by this court.” Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), aff’d, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).’ Commonwealth v. Tabor, [ 376 Mass. 811, 822 (1978)].

1987While the judge’s ultimate findings and conclusions of law are open for this court to review, a finding of voluntary waiver is “entitled to substantial deference by this court.” Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).

2000However, ‘[o]ur appellate function requires that we make our own independent determination on the correctness of the judge’s “application of constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977).’ Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Tavares, supra at 144-145 .

1982Although the judge’s ultimate findings are open for review, “a finding of voluntary waiver is ‘entitled to substantial deference by this court.’ Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), aff’d, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).” Commonwealth v. Tabor, supra. However, “ [o]ur appellate function requires that we make our independent determination on the correctness of the judge’s ‘application of constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .’ Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977).

2010Furthermore, the defendant indicated that he understood the Miranda rights by the physical voluntary act of signing the Miranda card indicating that he understood his rights.” 21 In reviewing a decision of a motion judge, we accept his findings of fact absent clear error, “and a finding of voluntary waiver is given substantial deference.” Id.

2010Furthermore, the defendant indicated that he understood the Miranda rights by the physical voluntary act of signing the Miranda card indicating that he understood his rights." [21] In reviewing a decision of a motion judge, we accept his findings of fact absent clear error, "and a finding of voluntary waiver is given substantial deference." Id.

2000Although the judge’s ultimate findings are open for review, ‘a finding of voluntary waiver is “entitled to substantial deference by this court.” Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), aff’d, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).’ Commonwealth v. Tabor, [ 376 Mass. 811, 822 (1978)].

1982Although the judge’s ultimate findings are open for review, “a finding of voluntary waiver is ‘entitled to substantial deference by this court.’ Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), aff’d, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).” Commonwealth v. Tabor, supra. However, “ [o]ur appellate function requires that we make our independent determination on the correctness of the judge’s ‘application of constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .’ Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977).

2000However, ‘[o]ur appellate function requires that we make our own independent determination on the correctness of the judge’s “application of constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977).’ Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Tavares, supra at 144-145 .

1982Although the judge’s ultimate findings are open for review, “a finding of voluntary waiver is ‘entitled to substantial deference by this court.’ Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), aff’d, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).” Commonwealth v. Tabor, supra. However, “ [o]ur appellate function requires that we make our independent determination on the correctness of the judge’s ‘application of constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .’ Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550 (1977).

2010The motion judge was entitled to accept the testimony of the police about the defendant’s appearance and level of sobriety, see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 204 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 803-805 (1990), and to give weight to the repeated issuance of Miranda warnings.

2010The motion judge was entitled to accept the testimony of the police about the defendant's appearance and level of sobriety, see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 204 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 803-805 (1990), and to give weight to the repeated issuance of Miranda warnings.

2010The motion judge was entitled to accept the testimony of the police about the defendant’s appearance and level of sobriety, see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 204 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 803-805 (1990), and to give weight to the repeated issuance of Miranda warnings.

2010The motion judge was entitled to accept the testimony of the police about the defendant's appearance and level of sobriety, see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 204 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 803-805 (1990), and to give weight to the repeated issuance of Miranda warnings.

2006Commonwealth v. Auclair, supra. In looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a statement, the judge may consider, among other things, “promises or other inducements, ... the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Magee, 423 Mass. 381, 388 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995).

2005Absent clear error, we accept a motion judge’s findings of fact, Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 743 (1990), and a finding of voluntary waiver is given substantial deference.

1982See Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 251 (1981).

1978However, he claims that the judge’s ultimate finding of a voluntary waiver is erroneous because the testimony before the judge was conflicting and the evidence supporting a finding of voluntary waiver is not "credible.” "In reviewing a trial judge’s determination that a voluntary waiver was made, the judge’s subsidiary findings will not be disturbed, if they are warranted by the evidence, and his resolution of conflicting testimony will be accepted.” Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 303 (1978).

1978While the defendant correctly argues that the judge’s ultimate findings and conclusions of law are open for this court to review, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santo, supra at 303 a finding of voluntary waiver is "entitled to substantial deference by this court.” Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 138 (1977), affd, 439 U.S. 280 (1978).