12 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Redcrowgreen2 sentences2003The miscarriage of justice exception must be “a constitutional violation [that] has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” State v. Redcrow, 1999 MT 95, ¶ 33 , 294 Mont. 252, ¶ 33 , 980 P.2d 622, ¶ 33 . ¶21 Raugust offers that “the gravamen of [his] post-conviction relief claims” is newly discovered evidence of the following: (1) the State mishandled one of the weapons found at the scene of the offense; and (2) Rory Ross, a key eyewitness to the offense, actually confessed to the offense while waiting in the County Attorney’s office to testify in Raugust’s trial. 2003The miscarriage of justice exception must be “a constitutional violation [that] has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” State v. Redcrow, 1999 MT 95, ¶ 33 , 294 Mont. 252, ¶ 33 , 980 P.2d 622, ¶ 33 . ¶21 Raugust offers that “the gravamen of [his] post-conviction relief claims” is newly discovered evidence of the following: (1) the State mishandled one of the weapons found at the scene of the offense; and (2) Rory Ross, a key eyewitness to the offense, actually confessed to the offense while waiting in the County Attorney’s office to testify in Raugust’s trial. | 1 | 7 |
Schlup v. Delored2 sentences2013A claim of innocence, for purposes of the miscarriage of justice exception, “is procedural, rather than substantive.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314 , 115 S. Ct. at 860 . 2013A claim of innocence, for purposes of the miscarriage of justice exception, “is procedural, rather than substantive.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314 , 115 S. Ct. at 860 . | 1 | 2 |
House v. Bellgreen2 sentences2013Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28 , 115 S. Ct. at 867 ; House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 , 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). 2013Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28 , 115 S. Ct. at 867 ; House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 , 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Bousley v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013Stated concisely, “ ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 , 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998). 2013Stated concisely, “ ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 , 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 749834green2 sentences2013Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05 , 113 S. Ct. at 862-63 ; Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 2013Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05 , 113 S. Ct. at 862-63 ; Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Murraygreen2 sentences2013Regrettably, this conception of substantive and procedural claims missed the mark and is prone to generate confusion. ¶112 It is true that the miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with “actual innocence,” as distinct from “legal innocence.” This distinction was mentioned in Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339-40 , 112 S. Ct. at 2518-19 , and can be traced back to Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986). 2013Regrettably, this conception of substantive and procedural claims missed the mark and is prone to generate confusion. ¶112 It is true that the miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with “actual innocence,” as distinct from “legal innocence.” This distinction was mentioned in Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339-40 , 112 S. Ct. at 2518-19 , and can be traced back to Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2007State v. Nichols, 1999 MT 212, ¶ 20 , 295 Mont. 489, ¶ 20 , 986 P.2d 1093, ¶ 20 (citations omitted). ¶17 Here, the District Court concluded that Evert’s “amended” petition was a procedurally barred second or subsequent petition because Evert had already amended the petition once when his previous attorney filed the “supplemental petition.” The court also noted that all claims that Evert could have appealed were barred from review under postconviction relief. 2007State v. Nichols, 1999 MT 212, ¶ 20 , 295 Mont. 489, ¶ 20 , 986 P.2d 1093, ¶ 20 (citations omitted). ¶17 Here, the District Court concluded that Evert’s “amended” petition was a procedurally barred second or subsequent petition because Evert had already amended the petition once when his previous attorney filed the “supplemental petition.” The court also noted that all claims that Evert could have appealed were barred from review under postconviction relief. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rosalesgreen2 sentences2002State v. Rosales, 2000 MT 89, ¶ 7 , 299 Mont. 226, ¶ 7 , 999 P.2d 313, ¶ 7 (citations omitted). 5 ¶17 Here, Phillips has not claimed that he is actually innocent of felony theft. 2002State v. Rosales, 2000 MT 89, ¶ 7 , 299 Mont. 226, ¶ 7 , 999 P.2d 313, ¶ 7 (citations omitted). 5 ¶17 Here, Phillips has not claimed that he is actually innocent of felony theft. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2000DISCUSSION 1. ¶Did the District Court err when it denied Paige's petition for postconviction relief? 2. ¶Paige asserts that the District Court erred when it dismissed his petition and denied him an evidentiary hearing where he could present evidence that his guilty plea was coerced, that he was impaired at the time of the plea because of his use of Nortriptyline, an antidepressant medication, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his attorney Mansch. 3. ¶In response, the State points out that Paige's petition for postconviction relief was untimely pursuant to § 46-21-102, 2000DISCUSSION 1. ¶Did the District Court err when it denied Paige's petition for postconviction relief? 2. ¶Paige asserts that the District Court erred when it dismissed his petition and denied him an evidentiary hearing where he could present evidence that his guilty plea was coerced, that he was impaired at the time of the plea because of his use of Nortriptyline, an antidepressant medication, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his attorney Mansch. 3. ¶In response, the State points out that Paige's petition for postconviction relief was untimely pursuant to § 46-21-102, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jordan v. State
green
2 sentences2023Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶ 5 , 338 Mont. 113 , 162 P.3d 863 . 2023Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶ 5 , 338 Mont. 113 , 162 P.3d 863 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Abe
green
2 sentences2013It is true (see Beach I, ¶ 40) that we deemed it appropriate to apply the Clark factors to a postconviction petition alleging newly discovered evidence in Crosby , ¶ 20, and in State v. Abe, 2001 MT 260, ¶¶ 8-13 , 307 Mont. 233 , 37 P.3d 77 . 2013It is true (see Beach I, ¶ 40) that we deemed it appropriate to apply the Clark factors to a postconviction petition alleging newly discovered evidence in Crosby , ¶ 20, and in State v. Abe, 2001 MT 260, ¶¶ 8-13 , 307 Mont. 233 , 37 P.3d 77 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sawyer v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2013Regrettably, this conception of substantive and procedural claims missed the mark and is prone to generate confusion. ¶112 It is true that the miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with “actual innocence,” as distinct from “legal innocence.” This distinction was mentioned in Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339-40 , 112 S. Ct. at 2518-19 , and can be traced back to Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986). 2013Regrettably, this conception of substantive and procedural claims missed the mark and is prone to generate confusion. ¶112 It is true that the miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with “actual innocence,” as distinct from “legal innocence.” This distinction was mentioned in Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339-40 , 112 S. Ct. at 2518-19 , and can be traced back to Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Herrera v. Collins
green
2 sentences2013Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05 , 113 S. Ct. at 862-63 ; Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 2013Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404-05 , 113 S. Ct. at 862-63 ; Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Wells
green
2 sentences2005State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55, ¶ 10 , 304 Mont. 329, ¶ 10 , 21 P.3d 610, ¶ 10 . 2005State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55, ¶ 10 , 304 Mont. 329, ¶ 10 , 21 P.3d 610, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ashcroft, Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union
neutral
1 sentence2003The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of executing one who is actually innocent thus requires application of the Carrier standard.... [T]he Carrier `probably resulted' standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar...." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-27 , 115 S.Ct. at 866-67 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 834-36 . ¶ 82 On October 14, 2003, the high court granted certiorari in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Haley v. Cockrell (5th | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Biddle Street Bistro, Inc. v. Tlj Co., L. L. C.
green
2 sentences2003The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of executing one who is actually innocent thus requires application of the Carrier standard.... [T]he Carrier ‘probably resulted’ standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar....” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-27, 115 S.Ct. at 866-67, 130 L.Ed.2d at 834-36. ¶82 On October 14, 2003, the high court granted certiorari in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Haley v. Cockrell (5th Cir. 2003The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of executing one who is actually innocent thus requires application of the Carrier standard.... [T]he Carrier `probably resulted' standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar...." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-27 , 115 S.Ct. at 866-67 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 834-36 . ¶ 82 On October 14, 2003, the high court granted certiorari in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Haley v. Cockrell (5th | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Beach v. Day
green
2 sentences2003Beach v. Day (1996), 275 Mont. 370, 374 , 913 P.2d 622, 624 . ¶52 More recently, in State v. Redcrow, 1999 MT 95 , 294 Mont. 252 , 980 P.2d 622 , this Court considered what a petitioner for postconviction relief was required to demonstrate in order to overcome § 46-21-102, MCA. 2003Beach v. Day (1996), 275 Mont. 370, 374 , 913 P.2d 622, 624 . ¶52 More recently, in State v. Redcrow, 1999 MT 95 , 294 Mont. 252 , 980 P.2d 622 , this Court considered what a petitioner for postconviction relief was required to demonstrate in order to overcome § 46-21-102, MCA. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Haley v. Cockrell
green
2 sentences2003The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of executing one who is actually innocent thus requires application of the Carrier standard.... [T]he Carrier ‘probably resulted’ standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar....” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-27, 115 S.Ct. at 866-67, 130 L.Ed.2d at 834-36. ¶82 On October 14, 2003, the high court granted certiorari in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Haley v. Cockrell (5th Cir. 2003The paramount importance of avoiding the injustice of executing one who is actually innocent thus requires application of the Carrier standard.... [T]he Carrier ‘probably resulted’ standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must govern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar....” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-27, 115 S.Ct. at 866-67, 130 L.Ed.2d at 834-36. ¶82 On October 14, 2003, the high court granted certiorari in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Haley v. Cockrell (5th Cir. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Barth
green
2 sentences2000Moreover, we previously held in Petition of Gray (1995), 274 Mont. 1 , 908 P.2d 1352 , that the statute of limitations for postconviction petitions is a "jurisdictional limit on litigation and its waiver may only be justified by a clear file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm (5 of 6)3/29/2007 10:45:53 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm miscarriage of justice, one so obvious that the judgment is rendered a complete nullity." Petition of Gray, 274 Mont. at 2 , 908 P.2d at 1352 ; see also State v. Perry 2000Moreover, we previously held in Petition of Gray (1995), 274 Mont. 1 , 908 P.2d 1352 , that the statute of limitations for postconviction petitions is a "jurisdictional limit on litigation and its waiver may only be justified by a clear file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm (5 of 6)3/29/2007 10:45:53 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm miscarriage of justice, one so obvious that the judgment is rendered a complete nullity." Petition of Gray, 274 Mont. at 2 , 908 P.2d at 1352 ; see also State v. Perry | 1 | 2000–2000 |
In Re Petition of Gray
green
2 sentences2000Moreover, we previously held in Petition of Gray (1995), 274 Mont. 1 , 908 P.2d 1352 , that the statute of limitations for postconviction petitions is a "jurisdictional limit on litigation and its waiver may only be justified by a clear file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm (5 of 6)3/29/2007 10:45:53 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm miscarriage of justice, one so obvious that the judgment is rendered a complete nullity." Petition of Gray, 274 Mont. at 2 , 908 P.2d at 1352 ; see also State v. Perry 2000Moreover, we previously held in Petition of Gray (1995), 274 Mont. 1 , 908 P.2d 1352 , that the statute of limitations for postconviction petitions is a "jurisdictional limit on litigation and its waiver may only be justified by a clear file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm (5 of 6)3/29/2007 10:45:53 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-242%20Opinion.htm miscarriage of justice, one so obvious that the judgment is rendered a complete nullity." Petition of Gray, 274 Mont. at 2 , 908 P.2d at 1352 ; see also State v. Perry | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.